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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Volume VIII 
This volume contains the results of two ILRV study areas: misSion/payload analysis 
and safety/abort analysis. Sections 1. 1 and 1. 2 present a statement of the problem, 
the approach to its solution, and a summary of significant results for each of the 
above study areas. 
1. 1 MISSION/ PAYLOAD ANALYSIS 
The misSion/payload analysis, a special emphasis task, addressed the problems of 
determining the space shuttle payload capability for the baseline and alternate missions 
and the utilization of this pay load capability. 
Functional requirements must be developed for each mission and converted to design 
concepts. Development of both payload and deployment/retrieval concepts will allow 
, 
an examination of the interaction with specific mission interface requirements and 
the recognition of commonality among missions. A space shuttle mission traffic 
schedule and baseline and alternate mission descriptions are first defined with the 
primary emphasis on the baseline space base/station logistics I?J.ission. Detailed 
main propulSion subsystem and attitude control subsystem 6.V requirements are 
developed for an optimized mission profile. Alternate mission performance sensitivity 
ground rules are discussed, mission profiles are presented, and FR-l alternate 
mission payload capability is assessed. A n1.odular payload concept is developed to 
satisfy all missions with a minimum number of module configurations. The inter-
action of docking and payload operations with the payload design is analyzed as is the 
influence of all missions on the final determination. of payload module design and on-
orbit operations. Preliminary module des igns are developed and key tradeoff studies 
are performed. 
The FR-l performance capability is summarized on Table 1-1. Payloads range from 
o to 88,600 pounds for on-orbit6.V requirements of 4145 to 1010 fps, respectively 
for the FR-l configuration. The mission 6.V requirements presented are also applic-
ab~e to FR-3 and FR-4. Similar alternate mission capability exists for FR-3 and 
FR-4. The study has shown that the space shuttle system is compatible with the 
missions identified in the NASA space shuttle task group report. In some instances, 
modifications to the baSic ,orbiter may be required for specific missions; however, 
the modifications can be minimized if a modular payload approach is used. 
It was concluded that a modular payload approach is feasible anddesirable for the 
space shuttle system. This approach minimizes performance penalties to the basic 
1-1 
._,' ....:~'. 
I' 
I 
i, 
1.~ 1 ' 
! ' 
I 
.,."'),, 
!' 
4 
I 
- --- -- -- '" 
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Table 1-1. FR-l Mission Performance Summary 
Orbit Orbit 
Altitude Inclination On-Orbit f:j,V 
Mission (n. mi.) (deg) (fps) 
Space Base/Station Logistics 270 55 1800 
Delivery of Propulsive stage 100 28.5 1010 
and Payload 200 55 1300 
Placement, Retrieval, Service, 100 28.5 1010/2040 
and Maintenance of Satellites 800 90 4010/4145 
Delivery of Propellants 200 28.5 1450 
300 55 1810 
Short-Duration Orbit 100 28.5 1010 
300 90 1820 
Space Rescue 270 55 3990 
*Service, Maintenance, or Retrieve 
Volume VIII 
Payload 
Capability 
(lb up) 
50,000 
88,600 
65,400 
88,600/56,000 
0/0* 
74,900 
46,600 
88,600 
21,800 
0 
space shuttle system because mission peculiar equipment will not be carried on alter-
nate missions. However, two exceptions to this general rule appear justified: 
a. The cab of the orbiter should have provisions for four mission related personnel. The 6-man orbiter cab would be used for 94 percent of the missions and would 
eliminate the need for a small personnel module. 
b. The baseline vehicle propellant tanks should be sized to include on-orbit AV re-quirements of the large traffic missions (space station and propellant delivery). This f:j,V requirement is estimated at 1800 ft/sec. This will eliminate the require-
ment to add or change tanks on alternate missions, which affects turn-around 
time and reliability. The tanks could be off-loaded on missions not requiring 
this much orbit AV (delivery of propulsive stages, etc.). 
ACPS propellant provisions for a AV of 200 fps should also be included for all mis-
sions with the exception of extended orbital missions where the orbiter is used as 
a laboratory base or for Earth surveillance. ACPS thruster arrangements should be compatible with docking requirements (control of translation and rotation). 
1. 1. 1 SPACE BASE/STATION LOGISTICS. A 12-man personnel/cargo module was designed to verify module size and weight. This module can be converted to a cargo 
module. 
Docking and orbital operations lead to the conclusion that F universal docking mechan-ism should be used on the baseline space shuttle. 
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1. 1. 2 DELIVERY OF PROPULSIVE STAGE AND PAYLOADS. It was concluded that 
the baseline space shuttle, when augmented by a propulsive stage using LH2/L02 
engines, can delivery payloads to synchronous orbit altitude with the useful payload 
weight being a function of the mode of operation. The study also identified fluid, 
mechanical, and structural interfaces between the two vehicles. 
1.1. 3 SATELLITE DELIVERY, MAINTENANCE, AND RETRIEVAL. The recom-
mended baseline for in-orbit maintenance is a separate pressurized work module. 
Retrieval of inoperative satellites presents unique problems due to random tumbling. 
A stabilization and maneuvering system is proposed as a solution. This maneuvering 
pack would be independent of the satellite's operational system, and could be con-
trolled by an orbiter operator. 
1.1. 4 PROPELLANT DELIVERY. A preliminary evaluation of alternate propellant 
delivery concepts. indicates that the space shuttle should transfer a full tank rather than 
use a propellant transfer system. This will minimize losses associated with in-orbit 
fluid transfer and will reduce the number of space shuttle flights required. 
It is also concluded that LH2 delivery is volume limited by the baseline (15 ft x 60 ft) 
payload bay. 
1. 2 SAFETY/ABORT ANALYSIS 
The requirementfQr a safety and abort analysis is based on the need to show a high 
probability of mission success and also a higher probability of successful intact abort. 
Safety and cost for space shuttles are the real drivers leading to requirements for a 
high probability of successful abort. Crew, passengers, payload, and the vehicles 
must be returned intact to make the space shuttle economically attractive. A safety 
and cost analysis conducted for the space shuttle was accomplished on the basis of 
intact abort. This analysis established safety and mission success goals which were 
used as a guide for the remainder of the study. Basic questions which were then 
addressed were: 
What makes the space shuttle unsafe? 
What action must be taken to change an, unsafe situation into a routine 
abort operation? 
How is safety improved? 
What are the interfaces of safety with weight, operations, and mission 
success? 
These questions were answered by conducting a gross failure and mission termination 
analysis with consideration given to: 
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a. Probability of occurrence of failures of subsystems, propulsion systems, and 
structure during the mission. 
b. Abort options following these failures. 
c. Availability of landing sites for aborted flights for several launch azimuths. 
d. The fire and explosion hazard P9tentials of the stored propellants. 
e. Intact abort, redundancy, and escape. 
This analys is leads to: 
a. Definition of abort procedures from the various mission phases. 
b. DeSign requirements for the vehicle. 
c. Design requirements for the minimization of the fire and explosion hazard. 
The effect of engines on safety and mission success was studied using the probable 
range of engine reliabilities and the application of fail-operational and fail-safe 
criteria to both the booster and orbiter engines. 
Finally, the safety, abort, and mission success characteristics of the FR-3 and FR-4 
vehicles were defined. 
Safety (probability of success of intact abort) and probability of mission success goals 
were established conSidering safety and cost effects as follows: 
Safety 
Mission 
0.999 (1 loss/1000 flights) 
0.97 (30 aborts/1000 flights) 
The analysis shows that these goals can be approached or melt by fail-operational/ 
fail-safe and fail-safe design approaches and by minimizing fire and explosion hazards. 
Personnel safety in flight operations of the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicle concepts is achieved 
through intact abort. Safety and cost require that the crew, passengers, payload, and 
vehicle be returned intact following failures requiring abort. The safety and abort anal-
yses show that intact abort is afeasible approach. The basic approach for treating the 
majority of failures is to provide redundancy to produce a fail-safe system or a fail-
operational system. For the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicles, mechanical/electrical sub-
systems have fail-operational, fail-safe characteristics and the integrated avionics 
system has fail-operational, fail operational, fail-safe characteristics. Whena 
failure occurs in a system with fail-operational character,istics there is no abort 
since the mission can be completed. When a failure occurs in a systern at the fail-
safe leveL it is necessary to go to an abort procedure. 
The once-around abort procedure reflects action to achieve a high probability of 
successful intact abort from all failures~ For failures during liftoff to staging phase 
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the booster and orbiter elements will complete the boost phase and stage when the 
booster propellants are depleted. The vehicles separate and the booster returns to 
the launch site in a normal manner while the orbiter continues once around the Earth 
and returns to the launch site. 
There are failure situations which may require immediate abort. Typical of these 
types of failures are structural failure, thermal protection subsystem failure, and 
catastrophic situations such as a fire requiring early separation. Following separa-
tion, a throttle/burn-dump/ reverse flight operation can be used. All remaining 
propellant is expended through the rocket nozzles and a flight profile is selected to 
allow the vehicles to return to the launch site. 
For failures after staging, the orbiter abort mode is to continue once around the Earth 
and return to the launch site. 
The FR-3 vehicle, with a 15-3 booster-orbiter engine arrangement, has a relatively low 
number of mission aborts because it incorporates fail-operational/fail-safe provisions 
for engines in the booster. The FR-3 can achieve staging with one engine out because 
the 7% overthrust capability of the booster engines allows the performance thrust-weight 
ratio to be maintained. The FR-3 can achieve intact abort with two engines out at lift-
off. During the booster phase more engines can be out and intact abort is still possible. 
The FR-3 and the FR-4 orbiter engines do not have fail-operational/fail-safe capability 
during the staging to orbit phase because the weight penalty to provide a 50% over-
thrust in the three-engine orbiter is prohibitive. The FR-3 and FR-4 orbiters do 
have fail-operational/fail-safe capability for all on-orbit maneuvers. 
The FR-4,with a 9-3-9 booster-orbiter-booster engine 'arrangement, can achieve 
staging with one engine out; however, there is a weight penalty because a 13% over-
thrust is required. This amount of overthrust is outside the presently designed 
engine propellant utilization control capability. Uprated or added engines are required 
with associated weight penalties. Because the FR-4 with the 9-3-9 arrangement does 
not have fail-operational/fail-safe capability for booster engines, mission aborts are 
higher than for the FR-3. The FR-4 has fail-safe provisions for engines and baSically 
the same abort procedures as the FR-3 described above. The intact abort success 
probability (safety) of the :F11-4 is therefore approximately the same as for the FR-3. 
Both the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicle concepts incorporate inert gas purging provisions for 
fuel tank surrounds, rocket engine bay, and payload bay to suppress potential fire or 
explosion resllltingfrom leakage and subsequent vaporization of fuel (LH2). Purging 
with an inert gas is provided during ascent and descent to an 02 concentration < 2% by 
volume for these areas. .. 
Sealed, gas-tight bulkheads separate compartments containing fuels and/or oxidizers 
and diaphragms seal off hot air and isolate hot surface ignition sources. 
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This section presents the NASA mission traffic schedule, a description of each mission, 
and the performance capabilities of the FR-1 for each mission. 
2.1 TRAFFIC MODEL 
The Nominal Space Shuttle Traffic Model from the NASA Spa(~e Shuttle Task Group 
Report, Volume 1, 12 June 1969, is the basis for the model presented in Table 2-1. 
The time period of interest is 1975 through 1985. This model reflects an average 
annual launch rate of 51 flights per year. Table 2-2 sUInrrmrizes the range of mission 
characteristics for the missions shown on Table 2-1. The frequency of mission types 
is: 
Propella.nt Delivery 44 
Personnel and Cargo Delivery 33 
PrQPulsive· Stage and Payload Delivery 9 
Experiment Module Delivery 6 
Satellite Missions 4 
Short Duration Orbit Missions I 
Rescue Missions 
2.2 SPACE STATION/BASE LOGISTICS 
·4 
100 percent 
The space shuttle transports cargo and personnel to and from a manned orbital space 
station and subsequently to a larger space base in low-altitude Earth orbit. The cargo 
includes food, liquids, and gases in addition to both experilnent rnodules and operational 
-eq¢.pment. Personnel include trained astronauts, and individuals who conduct specific 
scientific and technology experiments and operations. The shuttle logistiCS missions 
include long-lead-time scheduled resupply and crew rotations as well as discretionary 
flights. The routine logistics requirements for an orbital facility depend on the size of 
the facility and the type of experiments and operations being conducted at any given 
time. Typical requirements are summarized in Table 2-3 for a 12-man space station 
and a 50-man space base. 
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Table 2-1. NASA Mission Traffic Model 
Year 
Mission 75 76 77 78 79 80 
Logistics 1 
Space Station 
Personnel and cargo 4 4 .' 4 4 4 
Experiment module 3 3 3 3 3 
Space Hase 
Personnel and cargo 20 
Experiment module 3 
Delivery of Propulsive Stages and 7 1 8 3 4 6 
Payload 
Placement, Retrieval, Service, and 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Maintenance of Satellites 
Delivery of Propellant 
LH2 36 36 24 
L02 6 6 4 
Crew and .Cargo (Lunar Mission) 6 6 6 
Short Duration Orbit 2 2 2 .2 2 2 
Space Rescue ... 
Total Flights Per Year 18 12 19 62 63 67 
.-.-:'''''' 
.,,~ "! 
- / .... 
Total 
81 82 83 84 85 Traffic 
20 
15 
20 20 20 20 20 120 
3 3 3 3 3 18 
5 2 7 5 3 51 
2 2 2 2 2 22 
24 24 24 24 24 216 
4 4 4 4 4 36 
6 6 6 6 6 48 ii it 
2 2 2 ,2 2 22 
"1 
). 
66 63 68 66 64 568 
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Table 2-2 •. NASA MisSion Characteristics 
..... 
>\";. 
Launch I 
-
Orbit Orbit Mission 
.. Altitude Inclination On-Orbit llV Duration Azimuth 
: Mission 
. 
·(n. mi.) (deg) (fps) (days) (deg) 
i 
. .. 
. Space StatiQn Space Base Logistics 200 to 300 28.5 to 90 1000 to 2000 7 90 to 18'0 
, 
DeliverYc.of Propulsive Stage and 1'00 to 20'0 28.5 to 55 1'00'0 to 15'0'0 7 9'0 to 41 
: Payload 
Placement, Retrieval, Service, and, 100 to 8'00 28.5 to Sun 100'0 to 5'00'0 7 to 15 9'0 to 188 
I 
I Maintenance of Satellites Synch 
Delivery of Propellants 200 to 30'0 28.5 to 55 1'0'0'0 to 2'0'0'0 7 9'0 to 41 I . 
Short Duration Orbit 1'0'0 to 3'0'0 28.5 to 9'0 1'0'0'0 to 2'0'0'0 7 to 3D 9'0 to 18'0 
Space Rescue 27'0 55 2'0'0'0 to 5'0'0'0 7 41 
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Table 2-3. Routine Logistics Requirements 
Requirements 
Per Quarter 
Cargo Up, lb 
Personnel Up, men 
Cargo Down, lb 
Personnel Down, men 
Per Flight 
(Based on Traffic Model) 
Cargo Up, lb 
Personnel Up, men 
Cargo Down, lb 
Personnel Down, men 
Space Station 
(12 men) 
12,000 
12 
7,000 
12 
12,000 
12 
7,000 
12 
Volume VIII 
Space Base 
(50 men) 
48,000 
50 
28,000 
50 
9,600 
10 
5,600 
10 
The routine logistics mission is defined as a 55-degree inclined circular orbit at a 
270-n. mi. altitude, with rendezvous within 24 hours of launch. The main propulsion 
system on-orbit AV design requirement is 1800 fpsand the attitude control system 
(ACS) AV design requirenlent is 200 fps. 
A series of trajectories was prepared to determine the best orbiter burnout altitude. 
Typical results are shown in Figure 2-1. The payload weight Aincludes the effects 
of a Hohmann transfer to a 100-n. mi. orbit. Typical AV losses for a staging veloCity 
of 8400 fps and a staging dynamic pressure of 50 psf are: 
Burnout Altitude, n. mi. : 50 43 
Gravity, fps 520 412, 
Drag, fps 19 35 
Misalignment, fps 357 351 
Total 896 fps 798 fps 
As shown, there is a decrease of about 100 fps in gravity losses for the lower injection 
altitude. This more than offsets the higher drag losses and the additional AV to trans-
fer from the lower altitude. The effect of staging dynamic pressure (staging altitude) 
is small. 
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40 50 60 
STAGING DYNAMIC PRESSURE (psf) 
Figure 2-1. /l. Payload vs Burnout Altitude and Staging Dynamic Pressure 
Where possible, launches that require rendezvous with a space station or satellites 
will be made in-plane and in-phase. Where this is not possible, the launch will be 
made in-plane but out of phase. Table 2-4 shows candidate parking orbits and their 
characteristics. 
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Table 2-4. Candidate Parking Orbits 
Parking Orbit (n. mi. ) 
Circular E lipti cal 
43' 80 100 43 by 270 
16.9 20.6 23.1 32 Time for 360-degree 
PhaSing with 270 n. mi. t hr 
Drag, Ib 14,000 (const) 4 0.9 
1.7 
6.2 
14,000 (peak) 
All Loss/Day, n. mi. 
IlV Loss/Day, fps 
Heating 
No of Engine Starts 
Required 
110,000 + 
bad 
2+ 
7 
25 
good 
2 
good 
2 
4,000 
bad 
> 1., ~ 21 
*All inject at 43 n. mi. altitude. Times include Hohmann transfer to appropriate 
parking orbit plus Hohmann transfer to 270 n. mi. 
The lowest parking orbit (43 n. mi. circular) has the least waiting time (16.9 hours) 
to change phase of 360 degrees with a space station at 270 n. mi. However, this low 
altitude is impractical because of high drag and heating. The 43 by 270 n. mi. ellip-
tical parking orbit is also a poor choice because of perigee drag and heating and the 
time required to match phase. The 80 and 100-n. mi. circular orbits are both reason-
able, with the lower altitude slightly better because of reduced phasing time but worse 
in terms of drag. Because of drag, parking orbits below 80 n. mi. are not very prac-
tical if phasing angles up to 360 degrees are required. A 100-n. mi. parking orbit 
was selected for the baseline mission since it meets the 24-hr rendezvous requirement 
and requires less t:.Vfor drag makeup. 
Figure 2-2 presents the mission profile showing main engine burns. The main propul-
sion system t:.V requirements are shown in Table 2-5. The 1800 fps requirement i 
shown contains an allowance of 200 fps for insertion dispersions and out-of;';plane 
errors, and ~80 fps for flight performance reserve (FPR) and contingencies. 
The ACS furIiishes limit cycle attitude control to +45 degrees while :in orbit hold or 
during orbit transfers, orientation to ± 5 degrees prior to each orbit maneuver burn 
and during rendezvous, roll control to ±O. 5 degrees during each maneuver burn, Il V to 
transfer front 260 n. mi. to 270 n. mi. , rendezvous, dock, and lUldock, and orientation 
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Table 2-5. Main Propulsion !:t. V Requirements 
Maneuver 
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 
Transfer to 260 n. mi. 
Circularize at 260 n. mi. 
Entry 
F PR and Contingencies 
Insertion Dispersions and 
Out-of-Plane Errors 
Total System !:t. V 
!:t.V (fps) 
100 
280 
280 
450 
480 
200 
1800 
Volume vm 
to ±2 degrees during entry. The total ACS !:t.V for the mission is 157.9 fps. The!:t.V 
requirements for each mission phase are shown on Table 2-6. The design require-
ment of 200 fps indicates a reserve and dispersion allowance of 42.1 fps. 
2.3 ALTERNATE MISSION PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS GROUND RULES 
The alternate missions, shown in Table 2-2 below the baseline miSSion, must be 
assessed to determine their performance requirements relative to the baseline mis-
sion. The discretionary payload for these alternate miSSions is composed of propul-
sion capability for vehicle maneuvers above the baseline mission requirements, 
mission support equipment, expendable and reusable propulsion stages for payload 
transfer to high-altitude orbits, and the payload itself. 
An analysis to determine the sensitivity of FR-1 performance to changes in payload 
weight and total propellant loaded was conducted. The analysis was based on ascent 
trajectory and performance data of appropriate syntheSiS runs with the following 
ground rules: 
I 
Perigee Altitude 
Perigee Inertial Velocity 
Orbit 
Maneuver !:t.V 
(Main Propulsion System) 
260,000 ft (43 n. mi. ) 
25,897 fps 
550 Inclination (ETR) 
1800 fps 
Figure 2-3 shows the approximate decrease in ideal velocity at perigee injection as a 
function of IXlyload weight increase computed from the.impulsive logarithmic velocity 
formula: 
¥ j' 
i 51 
, ,. 
" 
pi 4 
ii 
I 
Task 
Limit cycle dur'!'" 
ing transfe:r; and 
orbit coast for 
20 hours 
Orbit 
Maneuvers 
Transfer from 
~60 to ~70 ~mi. 
Circ$rize ~t 
270 n.mi. 
r 
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Table 2-6. ACS AV Requirements 
Function 
Attitude 
Control 
to :t; 45 de~ 
Drag makeup 
Qrientation to 
±:5 deg for 20 
minutes prior 
to maneuver. 
Four maneuvers 
Control roll dur-
i~g maneuvers. 
*5 deg 
Transfer AV 
Alttitude Con-
t;rol to ± 0.5 deg 
for 22 seconds 
before and 
diIring burn 
Aittitude Con-
trol to ± 5 deg 
during 0.75 
hom.- transfer 
Transfer !l.V 
!J.V 
(fps) 
5.2 
5.9 
1.0 
16.9 
3.1 
3.3 
16.9 
Attitude Con- 3~ 1 
ti.-ol to ±O. 5 deg 
for 22 seconds 
.before and 
during burn .. 
2-9 
Task Function 
Rendezvous Translate 
and dock 
Undock 
Limit cycle 
for 24 hours 
Entry 
A ttitude Con-
trol to ± 5 deg 
for 15 minutes 
Attitude Con-
trol to ±O. 5 
deg for 20 
seconds 
Translate 
Attitude Con-
trol to ±0.5 
deg for 20 
seconds 
Attitude Con-
trol to ±45 deg 
Control to ±2 
deg with 2.5 
deg/sec2 
AV 
(fps) 
7.2 
1.1 
1.7 
8.3 
1.7 
11.6 
23.1 
Control to ±2 26. 0 
deg with 1.9-
2.25 deg/sec2 
Control to ± 2 11. 5 
deg with 0.75-
1.25 deg/sec2 
for 750 sec 
Total ACS av 157.9 
Requirement 
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20p-------~--------~------~ 
where 
16~--------+---------+-----~--~ 32.174 ft/sec 2 go = 
I] = Booster vacuum I sp 
12~--------4---------~--------_1 12 
= Orbiter vacuum I 
sp 
"'1 = Booster mass rati'o 
1J2 = Orbiter mass ratio 
8~---------+--~------+_--------~ 
• Use of this curve is subject to the fol-
lowing qualifications. 
a. 
4~----~~~-------+--------, 
o 0 -200 -400 -600 
~PERIGEE INJECTION VELOCITY (ft/sec) 
Use of the ideal velocity formula 
assumes constant velocity losses. 
The actual increase in velOCity 
losses resulting from the lower 
thrust-to-weight values (higher 
payload values) is about one fps 
per thousand pounds of payload. 
Thus the slope of the curve should 
be decreased by three percent. 
Figure 2-3. Injection Velocity Loss Due to 
Payload Increase 
b. The increase in payload above 
50,000 pounds was derived by 
analysis of the ascent trajectory 
only. The FR-l configuration is not designed to enter and land with the heavier 
payloads. Abort constraints may also require that heavier payloads be partially 
jettisonable. 
Figure 2-4 presents the change in orbital maneuver velOCity as a function of payload . 
weight and additional propellant tanked into the payload bay. The payload bay was 
taken as a cylinder, 15 feet in diameter and 60 feet long. If the payload does not 
occupy the entire bay, it was assumed that a cylindrical propellant tank could be 
placed in the remaining volume. In pe,rforming this portion of the analysis, thefol-
lowing assumptions were made: 
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1.6~------~------~--------~------~--------~------~ 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 
PAYLOAD LENGTH (ft) 
Figure 2-4. Man.euver Velocity as a Function of Payload Weight and Pro-
pellant Loading in the Payload Bay 
Propellant mixture ratio = 7: 1 
Maneuver Isp = 427 sec 
Hydrogen density = 4.2 Ib/ft3 
Oxygen density = 71.0 Ib/ft3 
0.051b of structural and tankage weight added per Ib of added propellant 
Two inches of insulation covering outside of propellant tank 
.(included in. structural weight) 
Single propellant tank with internal separating bulkhead and .J2 elliptic ends. 
The last assumption dictates that the smallest possible tank is 20. 7 feet long and is 
t~e limitUlg case of two elliptiC ends. Tanks smaller than this would have to take 
a$tother (undefined) shape. Since the amount of propellant per foot of Plyload bay 
length is unknown for this condition, the curves shown on Figure 2-4 are ,uncertain 
for payload length values greater than 38. 9 feet. 
2-11 
, "*. , " - .... ".·r;"!''::'t;.L''''''''·'.~~''--'''.''!'N''G~''io~~'!'lli' ..... ""~"""">!<-,,,,,,",~_%~~~_ ~.§ Mi~F • tivEr· 
.' i 
I I 
( 
:~ =~ L.' -.-~:-:::t:1. 
p p -'. ' 
Volume vm 
The maneuver velocity analysis was made with a series of trajectory simulations. The 
amount of propellant remaining for orbital maneuvering was calculated and translated 
into maneuver velocity using the impulsive velocity formula. Booster staging for all 
runs was held constant at a q of 50 psf. A linear partial of 15 fps per foot of propellant 
tank length was used for payload estimates. 
The inertial velocity due to launch azimuth is shown on Figure 2-5 for ETR and WTR. " 
The accuracy of the simple velocity addition used is compatible with the accuracy of 
the alternate mission on-orbit AV requirements. The data are also applicable for 
launches from 1800 to 3600 using a negative velocity component. 
1600 
-Ul a 
-
ETR 
400 
o 
90/90 120/60 150/30 180/ 0 
LAUNCH AZIMUTH (degrees from true north) 
Figure 2-5. Velocity Increment Due to Launch Azimuth 
All azimuth launch capability involves consideration of range safety, sonic boom, and 
rocket engine noise. Range safety for expendable laWlch'vehiGles is normally con-
cerned with impact of the launch vehicle during normal flights and impact of portions 
of the system due to failures. 
" ) 
Launch vehicle impact, however, is eliminated since the booster portion of the system 
is recovered by flyback to the launch site. No objects are jettisoned or released dur-
ing the flight. 
Vehicle subsystem failures should not result in vehicle or mission loss due to redun-
dancy incorporated in the basic design. Analysis of the critical subsystem for mission 
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loss (the rocket engines) shows a fail operational, fail safe design is possible permitting 
mission completion with one booster engine out, and vehicle recovery without mission 
completion for two booster engines out. With this concept it is possible to keep vehicle 
losses within the range of 0.1 to 1.0 per 1000 flights. The major parameter determin-
ing the exact value is single engine reliability. It is ,assumed for this discussion on all 
azimuth launch capability that the vehicle loss rate is low enough to relax normal range 
safety constraints. 
A typical boost trajectory was used to examine the sonic boom problem. As the boost 
configuration reaches Mach 1 the flight path is close enough to ver'tical that the shock 
wave propagates away from the ground and is thus not heard at ground level. As the 
boost continues and the flight path is depressed, a point is reached some three miles 
downrange where the shock wave does intersect ground level, and a very mild boom is 
felt (overpressure of only O. 7 psf). At a downrange distance of some six miles, the 
sonic boom is so weak that it is not heard at all at ground level. 
The noise generated by rocket engines during booster phase of the space shuttle is of 
concern because of the possible detrimental effects on the vehicle itself and persons 
near the launch site. Data from engine firings and expendable vehicle launches in 
conjunction with a typical trajectory profile were used to generate the noise level as a 
{unction of vehicle range. This relationship is shown on Figure 2-6. Noise at liftoff 
of approximately 180 db reduces to the threshold of pain (140 db) at a range of 1400 
feet and the threshold of discomfort (120 db) at 13,000 feet. Typical safety require-
ments require at least 9500 feet from the lalUlch pad to inhabited buildings due to the 
explosive hazard of the propellant weight in the sp~ce shuttle. The noise level at 
95QO feet is 123. 5 db and is assumed to be acceptable. The buildings at this range 
would be only those associated with the space shuttle operation. 
No apparent problems other than range safety release were uncovered in the analysis. 
The all-azimuth lalli"1.ch capability should be consi.dered in futul'e analyses of vehicle 
performance. 
2.4 DELIVERY OF PROPULSIVE STAGES AND PAYLOAD 
the space shuttle delivers propulsion stages and payloads to low Earth orbits to support 
~ variety of missions within Earth orbit and out of Earth orbit. Such missions range 
from high altitude Earth satellites to unmanned planetary probes. In this operational 
, . 
l)lode, the space shuttle delivers both the payload package and the propulsive stage to 
orbit in a single launch. Upon achieving a low Earth orbit (100 to 200 n.lIii. circular), 
the propulsive stage and payload are checked out and launched by the special 'two-man 
launch team carried on the orbiter. 
Ori-orbit staytimes of up to seven days are required to allow for on-orbit checkout and 
launch window phasing. The two predominant prop}l1sivestages to be used are Centaur 
and AJ-10-138. The Centaur characteristics are shown in Figure 2-7. 
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CENTAUR CHARACTERISTICS 
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Figur~ 2 ... 7. Centaur Payload Capability for Low Earth Orbit Launch 
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The l::..V requirements for the highest payload capability orbit (100 n. mi. at 28.5 de-
grees orbital inclination) and the lowest payload capability orbit (200 n. mi. at 55 de-
grees) are shown in Table 2-7 as a function of mission profile. No parldng orbit is 
assumed for phasing. The resulting payload capability range based on a linear partial 
of the orbiter of -30.8 pounds of payload per fps is 65,400 to 88,600 poands. The latter 
is for the due-east launch (inclination = 28.5 degrees) from ETR into a 100 n. mi. orbit. 
Table 2-7. Delivery of Propulsive Stages and Payload fl.V Requirements 
Orbital Altitude (n. mi. ). 100 200 
Orbital Inclinatio~ (deg) 28.5 55 
l\1:ain PropulSion ACS fl.V 
, 
Main PropulSion ACS fl.V 
!l.V (fps) (fps) fl.V (fps) (fps) 
. 
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 110 
- - -
Transfer to 200 n.mi. 
- -
160 
-
Circularize at 200 n. mi. 
- -
180 
-
Drag Ma.keup 
-
45 
- -
Undock 
-
10 
-
10 
Entry 300 50 380 50 
Dispersion 200 20 200 20 
F PR and Contingency 400 
-
400 
-
Total t:,.V 1010 125 1300 80 
- ~.,~;;t 
t:,.V Difference from Baseline -790 -75 -500 -120 
-,,-
~V Difference due to Launch -460 
-
0 
-
Azimuth change from Baseline 
2.5 PLACEMENT, RETRIEVAL, REPAm, AND MAINTENANCE OF SATELLITES 
The space shuttle can place unmanned sateIIites into vari()us Earth orbits. It can also 
revisit certain high,-priority or high-cost satellites and return them to Earth if neces-
sary. For such missions, the shuttle will be required to operate at altitudes up to 
800 n. mi. and orbit inclinations f;'s>m 28.5 degrees to polar. With this versatile 
operational capability, a wide variety of u.mD.anned satellites will be prime candidates 
for space shuttle support. 
• I - , 
These sate,llites are also logical candidates to be serviced andmaintaine(~ by the space 
shuttle. The orbiter would then require the capability to revisit modules and satellites 
and bring th~;m into an onbQard facility where a service, and maintenance 'crew could 
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work in a shirtsleeve environment. The orbiter service and maintenance facility 
would contain equipment, instruments, and supplies that would allow trained personnel 
to conduct: 
a. Routine Servicing and Maintenance. These periodic fmctions would include such 
. items as film changing and replenishment of attitude control propellants. 
b. Repair. Although highly automated satellites are designed for long-term opera-
tions, a capability to visit such satellites in case of malfWlctions is highly deSirable. 
The oribiter could provide for on-orbit replacement of instruments and components. 
The payload capa.bility range for the satellite placement mission is based on the AV 
requirements in Table 2-8. The two orbits defining ~e range are 100 n. mi. at 28.5 
degrees inclination and 800 n. mi. at 90 degrees inclinati.on. The satellite repair or 
retrieval missions will require more AV due to rendezuous requirements (within 24 
hours of lal.U1ch), as indicated in Table 2-9 for the same two trajectories. The payload 
range is 88,600 to 0 pol.U1ds for placement and 56,800 to 0 pounds for service or re-
trieval. 
Table 2-8. Satellite Placement AV Requirements 
Orbit Altitudes (n. mi. ) 100 800 
. 
Orbit Inclination (deg) 28.5 90 
Main PropulSion ACS,AV Main Propulsion ACSAV 
t:.V (fps) (fps) IlV (fps) (fps) 
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 110 i -i 
- -
Transfer to 800 n. mi. 
- -
1105 
-
Circularize at 800 n. mi. 
- -
1080 
-: 
Drag Makeup 
-
\45 
- -
Undock 
-
10 
-
10 
Entry 300 50 1225 .. aO 
F PR and Contingency 400 
-
400 
--
DispersionS 200 20 200 i 20 
TotalAV 1010 : 125 4010 -. I 90 
¢.V Difference from -7~0 -75 +2210 -110 
~aseline 
.. 
, 
AV Difference from , -460 
-
. +880 
-
Baseline due to Laun~h r, 
Azimuth .- .. 
, 
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Table 2-9. Satellite Service or Retrieve Mission !::t. V Requirements 
Orbital Altitude (n. mi. ) 100 800 
Orbit Inclination (deg) 28.5 90 
Main Propulsion ACS !::t.V Main Propulsion ACS Il.V 
f::t.V (ips) (fps) !::t.V (fps) (fps) 
Transfer to 250 n. mi. 260 
- - -
Circularize at 250 n. mi. 360 
- - -
Transfer to 100 n. mi. 260 ~ 
- -
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 260 
- - -
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 
- -
110 ~-
Transfer to 800 n. mi. ~ ~ 1130 
-
Circularize at 800 n. mi. 
-
-+ 1080 
-
Terminal Phase 
-
20 
-
20 
Braking/Stationkeeping 
-
90 
-
90 
Docking 
-
10 
- 10 
Drag Makeup 
-
I 90 -
-
Undocking . 10 - .- 10 
Entry 300 50 1225 5'0 
F PR and Contingency 400 
-
400 
-
Dispersions 200 20 200 20 
i. 
I 
Totalll.V 2040 290 4145 200 
Il.V Difference from +240 +90 +2345 0 
Baseline 
Il.V Differe1nce due to. -460 
-
+880 
-
Launch AzImuth 
2.6 DELIV1SRY OF PROPELLANT 
The space shuttle would operate as a propellant-delivery tanker in conjunction with a 
long-duration orbital propellant storage (OPS) facility. The OPS facility would act as 
a filling station to supply liqUid hydrogen and oxygen propellants for high-energy, 
large-payload propulsive stages for interplanetar~v miSSions which could not be launched 
from Earth fully loaded with the space shuttle,for space-based vehicles operative be-
tween Earth orbit and the moon, and within Earth orbit. Propellants "'ill also be 
delivered to· the spacebase/station. 
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When operating as a propellant tanker, the orbiter payload bay is configured differently 
depending on whether it is delivering all liquid hydrogen, liquid oxygen and liquid 
hydrogen, or a mix of dry cargo and propellants. The largest payload volume require-
ment will be for liquid hydrogen deliveries. Including the tankage, insulation, and 
propellant transfer mechanisms, 45, 000 pounds of liquid hydrogen would require about 
a 5.0, OOO-pound capability for the space shuttle. The VOIUl.le corresponding to 45,000 
pounds of liquid hydrogen is about 11, 000 ft3. With the volume required for liquid 
hydrogen, sufficient capability will exist for combined liquid hydrogen and oxygen loads. 
The space shuttle will rendezvous with the OPS facility and transfer propellant without 
crew EVA. Two lnen in addition to the crew will monitor the operation and provide 
manual override to the transfer systems. 
The lunar mission supply is composed of six men and 20,000 pounds of payload to be 
delivered to the OPS where the IW1ar tugs will be located, serviced, and fueled. 
Other payloads for interplanetary missions will also be delivered to the OPS for in-
tegration with the space tug or nuclear shuttle. 
The mission duration is seven days. Table 2-10 presents the AV requirements for the 
highest payload mission (200 n. mi. at 28.5 degrees inclination) and the lowest payload 
mission (300 n. mi. at 55 degrees). Rendezvous is within 24 hours of launch. The 
resulting payload range is 74,900 to 46,600 pounds. 
2.7 SHORT-DURATION ORBIT 
The space shuttle will be capable of operation as a short-duration orbital station for 
up to 30 days to exploit man's capabilities as a selective sensor and decision maker. 
The higher resolution obtained from a 100-n. mi. orbit as opposed to a 270-n. mi. 
orbit indicates a Wlique capability of the space shuttle short-duration orbital mission 
even in a 55-degree (or lower) orbital inclination. The large payload volume capabil-
ity of the orbiter provides an ideal platforIl/l for the development of advanced equip-
ment and instrumentation. 
A module or modules are reqlllred conta.ining appropriate instrumentation and pro-
visions for a 10-man crew in a shirtsleeve environment. This module can also be 
used as a flying test bed for sensor research, development, test, and calibration to 
support both marmed and WlIDanned satellite miSSions, to develop and test complete 
" 
experiment systems to verify their operational capabilities before being integ=ated 
into the space station, and to develop and flight test systems components in support 
of a manned planetary program. 
The payload capability ranges from 88, 600 pounds for a 100 n. mi. orbit at 28.5 de!'" 
grees inclination to 22,300 pounds for e~ 300~n. mi. orbit at 90 degrees. The AV re-
quirements associated with these missions are presented in Table 2-11. 
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Table 2-10. Delivery of Propellant Mission ll.V Requirements 
Orbit Altitude (n. mi. ) 200 300 
Orbit Inclination (deg) 28.5 55 
Main Propulsion ACSll.V Ma,in Propulsion ACS!l.V 
!l.V (fps) (fps) !l.V (fps) (fps) 
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 110 
-
110 
-
Transfer to 200 n. mi. 180 
- - -
Circularize at 200 n. mi. 180 
- - -
Transfer to 300 n. mi. 
- -
350 
-
Circularize at 300 n. mi. 
- -
350 
-
Transfer Phase 
-
20 
-
20 
Drag Makeup 
- -
-, 
-
Dock 0:- H) 
-
llO 
Undock 
-
10 
-
10 
Entry 380 50 500 50 
F PR and Contingency 400 
-
400 
-
Dispersions 200 20 200 20 
Total ll.V 1450 110 1910 110 
IlV Difference from 
Baseline ~350 -90 +110 -90 
, 
!l.V Difference from Base- -460 
- - -
line Launch Azimuth 
Change 
2.8 RESCUE 
The space shuttle capability for space base/station rescue requires rendezvous within 
24 hours of the rescut-) request. The ~V requirements in Table 2-12 reflect worst-
case phasing requiring a 16-hour wait for the launch window, with 8 hours remaining 
for the flight operation to arrive at the base. These ~ V requirements'-;result in no 
payload capability. 
An increase in the allowable time to rendezvous from launch, or a better space base 
location at the time of rescue request will result in improved payload capability. The 
_ use of a main engine propellant tank in a portion of the payload bay will also increase 
payload capability as discussed in Section 2.3. 
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Table 2-11. Short-Duration Orbit AV Requirements 
Orbit (n. mi. ) 100 300 
Orbit Inclination (deg) 28.5 90 
Main Propulsion ACSAV Main Propulsion ACSAV 
AV (fps) (fps) AV (fps) (fps) 
Circularize at 100 n. mi. 110 
- - -
Transfer to 300 n. mi. 
- -
370 
-
Circularize at 300 n. mi. 
- -
350 
-
Drag Makeup 
-
190 
- -
Station Keeping 
-
360 
-
360 
, . Entry 300 50 500 50 
FPR and Contingencies 400 - 400 -
Dispersion 200 20 200: 20 
TotalAV 1010 620 1820 430 
AV Difference from -790 +420 +20 +230 
Baseline 
AV Difference due to -460 
-
+880 
-
Launch Azimuth Change '~I 
.1. 
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Table 2-12. Rescue Mission AV Requirements 
Orbit Altitude (n. mi. ) 270 
Orbit Inclination (dee:) 55 
Main Propulsion 
AV (fps) 
Transfer to 550 n. mi. 750 
Circularize 550 n. mi. 720 
Transfer to 270 n. mi. 720 
Circularize 270 n. mi. 750 
Transfer Phase 
-
Braking/Station Keeping 
-
Dock 
-
Undock 
-
Entry 450 
F PR and Contingency 400 
Dispersion 200 
I 
Total/l.V 3990 
/l.V Difference from Baseline +2190 
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This section presents the launch to landing operations with emphasis on rendezvous 
and docking. The ascent, entry t and landing phases are straightforward operations. 
The major tradeoffs appear in the rendezvous, docking t and on-orbit payload handling 
phases. A summary of the on-orbit payload operation analysis is included here; this 
flight phase is covered in further detail in Section 4. 
3.1 ASCENT 
The events during this phase are almost identical with any expendable type system up to 
separation. For the space shuttle t of course, the booster also performs entry, man-
euver t and landing. The events are as follows: 
a. Liftoff. 
b. Monitor vehicle systems during ascent. 
c. Perform roll program to deSired azimuth. 
d. Perform pitchover program. 
e. Perform separation maneuver. 
f. Verify separation -
Determine trajectory for booster. 
Start attitude program for booster entry. 
Start booster entry. 
g. Start orbiter engines. 
h. Monitor orbiter thrust vector control and ascent trajectory. 
i. : Monitor environmental control system. 
j. I Initiate orbiter engine cutoff sequence. 
i 
k. Confirm safe Earth orhit. 
1. Activate attitude control as required for coast to 100-n. mi. apogee. 
mi.M~neuver vehicle in firing attitude. 
I 
n. Determine and activate thrust program for insertion into parking orhitJ 
o. Verify time required to achieve correct phasing. 
. . 
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p. Monitor onboard guidance and navigation data. 
q. Maneuver vehicle in firing attitude and settle propellants. 
r. Determine and activate thrust program for ascent to target. 
s. Acquire target during coast. 
t. Determine thrust program to achieve gross rendezvous. 
3.2 RENDEZVOUS AND DOCK 
Rendezvous and docking requirements vary significantly from mission to mission, and 
in some cases within missions, as illustrated in Table 3-1. 
Table 3-1. Rendezvous and Docking Requirements 
Mission Rendezvous Docking Cooperative Requirement Requirement Target 
Space Station Logistics Yes + Yes 
Satellite Placeme!lt No No Not Appl. 
Satellite Retrieval Yes Yes + 
Delivery of Stages Yes Subject of Yes 
and Propellants 
, 
Tradeoff 
Satellite Maintenance Yes Subject of + 
Tradeoff 
Short Duration Orbital No No Not Appl. 
Rescue Yes + + 
+Undetermined 
The requirement for rendezvous is impliCit in each type of mission. The requirements 
for docking, however, are not clear. For example, personnel and cargo transfer con-
cepts currently Wlder study include both docking and non-docking techniques. Tbe same 
is true for satellite maintenance concepts, as well as for experiment module transfer 
methods to the space station/base. 1 
For most missions, a cooperative target can be assumed, with corner reflectors as a 
mlmnlUm. Some target failure modes may preclude the use of active cooperative de-
vices on rescue-missions or satellite maintenance/retrieval missions. Retrieval 
. ~ 
might additionally impose a requirement for rendezvous with an Wlcooperare target. 
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In performing the rendezvous and docking functions operational options include alter-
nate methods of orbit transfer, manual vs. automatic techniques, active vs. passive 
targets, and highly accurate navigation vs. long range target acquisition. These op-
tions are discussed in the follOWing sections. 
3. 2. 1 COELLIPTIC vs ORBIT-TO-ORBIT TRANSFER. In the U. S. rendezvQus 
programs to date the coelliptic approach bas been employed. This is characterized by 
a plane change (when necessary) to a concentric orbit, phasing maneuvers at either 
a higher or lower altitude than that of the target t a slow catoh-up and final braking 
maneuver. The advantages of coelliptic transfer include the experience gained on past 
programs, lower risk due to relatively low AV per maneuver, and opportunity for 
rendezvous at least once per orbit. Tlhe primary disadvantages are higher propellant 
consumption and longer time to rendezvous. 
Orbit-to-orbit transfer is accomplished with only two maneuvers: the first to achieve 
target intercept and the second a braking maneuver. Advantages include shorter time 
to rendezvous and lower propellant expenditures. Disadvantages include higher risk 
due to high AV per maneuver, fewer opportunities for rendezvous (one in some cases) 
and a requirement for extremely accurate naVigation and guidance. 
In view of the high risk associated with orbit-to-oI'bit transfer, it appears desirable 
to initially rely on the co elliptic approach. The question then is whether to design for 
an eventual orbit-to-orbit capability, or to retrofit after confidence in orbit-to-orbit 
transfer has been developed on some other program. 
3.2.2 MANUAL vs AUTOMATIC TECHNIQUES. The use of automatic techniques 
for rendezvous and docking is attractive from the standpoint of propellant expenditure 
efficiency, less stringent astronaut training requirements, and suitability for either 
coelliptic or orbit-to-orbit transfer. Manual techniques, although less efficient and 
not well suited for orbit-to-orbit transfer, afford greater flexibility for a wide variety 
of targets, as well as using man's capability to react in off-nominal situations. The 
most efficient, flexible t and reliable approach ;is to provide both automatic and manual 
capability for the space shuttle. This would permit development of automatic tech-
niques at low risk. 
Assuming the dual approaoh, further options are available, ranging from conlpletely 
independent manual and automatic systems to a completely integrated man/machine 
system. Sensor tradeoffs include radars vs. lasers for an automatic system, direct 
vision (windows) vs. indirect vision (mirrors) vs.electro-optical techniques (TV, 'ffi) 
for ~ manual system, or some combination of sensors for an integrated system. 
These tradeoffs are discussed in more detail in Volume 7 of this report. 
3. 2. 3 ACTIVE '¥~ PASSIVE TARGETS. Design reqUirements for the orbiter will be 
less stringent if ilit is assumeq. that rendezvous targets Will be equipped with active de-
vices in the for:nilof radars, lasers, optical beacons or RF beacons. This will not 
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always be the case, however. Objects presently in orbit which rnay be targets for 
retrieval, as well ,as where failures preclude the use of active devices, must be accom-
modated. In addition, rendezvous with an actively cooperative target involves more 
operational complexity, which is to be avoided. 
For these reasons, as well as from the standpoint of multi-program costs, the use of 
passive target techniques is recommended. Rendezvous targets can be readily equipped 
with corner reflectors, significantly reducing apertu.re and/or power requirements for 
the orbiter. 
To accommodate retrieval rendezvous with targets now in orbit, provision of additional 
capability as part of the payload would reduce the requirement on the orbiter. Improved 
tracking accuracy and ephemeris data potentially available in the mid-70's coupled with 
orbiter naVigation accuracy, may simplify acquisition of non-cooperative targets. 
3.2.4 HIGH ACCURACY NA VIGA'TION vs LONG-RANGE ACQUISITION. The tradeoff 
l!";o. ! 
between highly accurate navigation and long-range search capability involves the obvious 
considerations of cost, weight, power, and reliability, together with the following items: 
a. Target ephemoris. Regardless of orbiter navigation accuracy, the search capabil-
ity must accommodate target ephemeris uncertainties. 
b. Navigation accuracy. A solution sub-optimized within the naVigation and guidance 
l3ubsystem may very well result in less than optimum system performance. 
c. Orbit transfer. Selection of orbit-to-orbit transfer techniques, or a decision to 
provide for future development of this capability, will impose more severe con-
straints on naVigation and guidance accuracy than the coelliptic method. 
d. Other mission requirements. Satellite placement missions and/or short duration 
orbital missions may require higher navigation accuracy than would be indicated 
on the basis of the rendezvous requirement alone. 
e. GroWld tracking and mission control. This is the subject of a major tradeoff, 
involving several other U. S. space programs. 
3.2.5 DOCKING vs NON-DOCKING TECHNIQUES. During the initial stages of the 
Space Station Program, the orbiter will be considerably larger than the space station. 
One approach is to dock the station to the orbiter, :rather than the orbiter to the station. ' 
After docking, the question of attitude control remains. Should the station have the 
capability for control of the combined mass of the station and orbiter, or should the 
attitude control function be handed over to the orbiter while docked? 
Another alternative is to eliminate docking of the orbiter with the space station.. Sim-
,:i1ar tradeoffs exist for missions other than space station logistics. A numb~r of con-
cepts have been investigated for payload handling with and without docking. These 
concepts, discussed in, detail in Section 4, ar~summarized in Section 3.3. 
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3. 2. 6 DOCKING APPROACH CORRIDORS. Restrictions will be imposed by space 
traffic in the vicinity of the space station/base; by nuclear radiation from power 
sources on the station, on the nuclear shuttle, and perhaps from nuclear experiments; 
by requirements for astronaut visibility; by space statil)n/base geometry; and by in-
terference from the sun when in the field of view. 
Most of these restrictions involve inter-progra~ interfaces which will require timely 
exchange of information between programs, interface definition, and interface control. 
3.3 DEPLOYMENT AND RETRIEVAL OF PAYLOAD 
The revised study plan designates Task 2.2.6, Cargo/Passenger/Handling as a 
special emphasis task. In Section 4 a module payload concept is developed to satisfy 
all mission requiremenb., with a minimum number of nl0dule configurations. The 
modules are then used in an analysis of deployment and retrieval techniques for each 
mission. The requirement for consideration of all missions in making a final selec-
tion of payload concepts and on-orbit handling techniques becomes apparent in this 
section. 
3.4 ENTRY AND LA~T])ING 
3.4.1 ENTRY. Entry is effected upon completion of the normal orbital operations, 
or in case of an abort situation. The events during entry are: 
a. Perform entry checklist. 
b. Check weather at destination ,and, alternate landing sites. 
c. Pressurize interfaces with helium. 
d. Maneuver vehicle into retro firing attitude with the attitude control system. 
e. Settle propellants. 
f. Start engines and rnodulate to required retro thrust pulse. 
g. Verify retro impulse. 
h. Yaw vehicle 180 degrees and assume required entry pitch angle. 
i. Monitor entry attitude and temperatures. 
j. Perform pitch change Inaneuversas required. 
1. Monitor lateral range. 
m. Perform banking maneuvers as required. 
n. Conduct glide to altitude at which terminal maneuver starts. 
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3.4.2 CREW ACTIVITIES DURING TERMINAL MANEUVER. After the velocity of 
the orbiter has slowed to subsonic, which will be at approximately 25,000 feet, the 
vehicle will be configured to conform to normal manned aircraft type of operation. 
The terminal maneuver and landing will be similar to any large cargo-type aircraft. 
The events during this phase follow: 
3.4.2.1 Entry Recovery 
a. Establish glide for engine start. 
b. Extend engines and perform air start procedure. 
c. Check controls and displays for system condition. 
d. Contact FAA flight services via radio to report position per filed flight plan. 
e. Establish cruise altitude per filed flight plan. 
f. Establish relative heading to terminal. 
3.4. 2.2 En Route Activities 
a. Check current geographic position -
Use inertial navigation equipment and radio aids. 
Use radio D:MI bearing to check and verify position. 
b. Set course to destination and alternatives. 
c. Report to FAA flight services in accordance with IFR or VFR flight plan. 
d. Report progress and pertinent facts to home base - request support if alternative 
is necessary. 
e. Perform onboard system checks, including fuel management. 
3.4.2.3 Landing Duties 
a. Contact terminal control for landing instructions and atmospheric conditions. 
b. Establish approach configuration -
High-lift devices in approach setting. 
Power set for desired rate of descent. 
c. Report to airport control upon entering base leg to landing -
Power and trim set for approach speed and rate of descent. 
d. Report to airport tower upon turning to final approach (active runway heading) ~ 
Extend landing gear - check down and lock indication. 
Extend high lift/drag devices to landing position. 
Adjust power and trim for desired landing approach flight path. 
Proceed to touchdown. 
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e. Touchdown and roll out -
Cut power on touchdown. 
Retract high lift devices. 
Volume VIn 
Use brakes, as weight is transferred from wing lift to landing gear, 
to decelerate to a stop or minimum. taxi speed. 
f. Contact airport ground control -
Clear active runway and prepare to taxi Ol~ accept tow to terminal area. 
: ): 
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SECTION 4 
PAYLOAD DESIGN AND OPERATIONS 
This: section documents the results of space shuttle payload studies. The payloads and 
their deployment with the space shuttle are based on the mission requirements discussed 
in Section 2. During this study a modular IXtyload approach was used to enhance space 
shuttle mission flexibility. The baseline space shuttle orbiter element is provided 
with a payload bay and mission-peculiar payloads are modularized for installation in 
this bay. Trade studies were made to compare this basic modula:r approach with 
integrating the payload into the basic space shuttle. 
4.1 GENERAL PAYLOAD REQUIREMENTS 
This section discussed the general approach to space shuttle payload design consider-
ing the missions described in Section 2. The remaining sections then describe pay-
loads for individual missions in greater detail. 
4.1.1 PAYLOAD IDEN'I'IFICATION. Referring to the mission requirements of Sec-
tion 2, the following types of payloads are considered: 
a. Passengers and cargo 
b. Propellant 
c. Propuls i ve stages 
d. Satellites 
e. Maintenance module 
f. Sensors and miscellaneous equipment 
Layouts of typical payloads listed above indicated that a modular approach was; feasible. 
The modular approach would offer the following advantages: 
a. Minimize space shuttle ground turnaround time as mission peculiar m,ooules 
could be quickly installaA in the payload bay with a minimum of modification to 
the orbiter. 
b. Maximize performance as mission-peculiar equipment would not be incorporated 
in the orbiter and carried on other missions .. 
c.Reduce the length of the orbiter .As i~lustrated in Figur_~4-1, if the passenger 
- . I 
section were moved forward and integrated into the. basic orbiter airframe, the 
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INTEGRATED PASSENGER SECTION 
r
GREW EASS. 
.. -r--1 r--CARGo--j 
AL I 
HWtna:n~-Facto;t"s~~~-- More -conventional regard-ing~closeness to 
captain 
'~;al:ety Advantage of single ingress/egress hatch 
Mission -Use Rate ?assenger section not filled!o capacity on 
most missions 
CREW 
r.- ---..-/ 
i I 
We~ght Weight penalty on alternatefulss-ions (16001b 
ECS & LSS, 7000lbstructure) 
Length Approximately 12 ft additional length 
Gomplexity _ Less complex for passenger missions 
@pe,pati0~ 
(common life support subsystems) 
Two docking ports required for unloading 
(or tunnel between passengers & cargo) 
MODULAR PASSENGER SECTION 
(IN PAYLOAD BAY) 
PASS., 
,Jy~1 
CARGO SPACE 
AVAILABLE 
PhYSical confinement may create increased 
passenger anxiety 
,,~ 
Possible disadvantage due to hatch in payload 
door as well as normal hatch on module 
Passenger module removed when not 
required 
No weight penalty on alternate missions 
(Approx. 5001b less on passenger miSSions) 
No ~dditional vehicle len;~th required 
Separate life support subsystems 
Common docking port for unloading passen-
gers & cargo 
Figure~4-1. Basic Passenger:Arrangements 
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additional volume could increase the vehicle length up to 12.0 feet with four 
abreast seating. This is because the payload bay is sized by cargo and the 
passenger module fits in the available space. 
d. The modular approach simplifies the interface control problems as clean inter-
faces can be defined between the basic orbiter and mission peculiar payloads .. 
The above considerations make the modular approach attractive for this phase of the 
program. 
4.1. 2 MODULE SIZING ANALYSIS. Payloads directly applicable to modularization 
are: 
a. Passenger compartment 
b. Cargo storage 
c. Propellant storage 
d. Service and maintenance facility 
e. • Experiment storage 
TIle group of modules should have sizes compatible with the 60..;ft payload bay and each 
other; i. c., module lengths of 15, 30, 45, and 60-ft long. 
A brief analysis was conducted to first identify candidate personnel module sizes. 
The mission requirements presented in Section 2 indicate the need for personnel in 
addition to the two-man orbiter crew to perform certain mission operations. In addi-
tiqn, other mission requirements include the delivery of personnel to in-orbit vehicles 
or manned satellites. All missions require that these additional personnel be pro-
vided with a shirtsleeve environment. Figure 4-2 sunlmarizes the size requirements 
for the personnel modules based on the Section 2 mission model. 
In an effort to reduce total costs associated with these modules, a limited number 
should be developed to handle all mission requirements. The five sizes are function-
ally separable. The 6, 10, and 12-man sizes are primarily delivery missions, with 
the 2 and 4-m~..o sizes associated with special personnel for on-orbit operations. The 
two module sizes which appear most desirable are therefore a 12-man module and a 
4 ... man module. The 12-man module, offloaded for 10- and 6-man missions, would 
;be used on210-missions. The4-man module, offloadedfor 2-man missions, would 
be used on 325 missions. 
The 4-man module is discussed further in the following section. The 12-manmodule 
is defined in detail in Section 4. 2. 1. -
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PROP ~ 
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PERSONNEL REQUIRED 
Figure 4-2. Personnel Module Size Requirements 
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4.1.3 COMPAIUSON OF 4-MAN MODULE AND 6-MAN ORBITER. The 4-man per-
sonnel module is used on 325 (57 percent) of the missions. This module introduces 
both a payload compartment volume reduction and weight reduction due to the struc-
ture and subsystems required. As shown in Figure 4-3, an alternative to the 4-man 
personnel module would be a 6-man orbiter cab. This provides the necessary per-
sonnel requirements, without payload volume being reduced by 17 percent, and a . 
probable reduction in weight associated with supporting sUbsystems. An increase in 
size of orbiter subsystems such as EPS, LSS, and ECS would take the place of the 
duplication cf these systems when a separate module is used. 
Use of the 4-man module has some advantages such as direct visibility for orbital 
operations. The 4-man module is used for personnel responsible for placing and re-
trieving satellites, delivering propellant, and delivering propulsion stages and pay-
loads. If these operations are performed from the orbiter cab, indirect viewing such 
as TV would have to be provided or an aft control station would be required. The 
module or aft control station would require a computer for checkout functions or use 
the orbiter avionics on a time-share basis. 
If a 6-man personnel (including crew) capability were designed into the orbiter, it 
could also be used for these missions requiring a 12-man module. The result is 
that the 12-man personnel module could be sized for eight men at 10 feet in length. 
It is estimated that this module would weigh 7200 lb. When used as a cargo module, 
it would weigh about 5000 lb. The orbiter 6-man cab capability would now be used for 
94 percent of the missiom~. The only exception is the experiment module delivery 
missions, which will be discussed below. 
A set of typical experiment modules is presented in the NASA Space Shuttle Task 
Group Report, Vol. 1, 12 June 1969. Figure 4-4 relates the diameter and weight of 
these modules to the length. All modules are 15 feet or less in diameter and weigh 
32,000 pounds or less. Of the 17 modules shown on the length/diameter cross-plot, 
six are less than 30 feet in length. These six modules could be part of a normal 
logistics mission when using a 12-man personnel module and cargo module. The use 
of the 8-man personnel module allows 13 of the 17 modules to be carried during 
normal logistics missions. The result is the reduction of the number of separate 
experiment module flights. The mission model shows 33 flights. If module sizes 
retain their current distribution, only 24 percent of the moduies would require separ-
ate flights. This means that the orbiter cab would be used for 98.5 percent of the 
flights. 
, 
4.'1. 4 COMBINED 8-MAN PERSONNEL/CARGO MODULE. The 8-man personnel 
module is used for 210t fligh~s. (The + represents rescue missions.) The cargo 
module is used for 188 missions. The difference is the 22 short-duration orbital 
mIssions. A combination of the two modules will save approximatel:17 2.2 feet of 
length and some weight by removing two blllkheads and hatches. Additional-weight is 
saved by reduction to one EPS, one ISS, one H20, one ECS, one communication 
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Direct viewing of payload 
U sed on 46% of flights 
Indirect viewing. by TV or 
direct by tunnel 
Used on 98.5% of flights Payload length reduced 10.0 feet 
Minimizes orbiter length 
:Liftoff weight reduced on alternate 
missions 
Possibly adds to orbiter length 
Liftoff weight reduced on mi.ssions 
requiring 4 men * 
*Approximately 400 lb saving in integrated environmental control and 
life suppor.t subsystems. 
,Figure 4-3. Alternate Location - 4 Men 
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Figure 4-4. Experiment Module Relationships 
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subsystem, and one cryogenic subsystem. These single subsystems will also result 
in usable internal volume increase. In addition, a five-foot-diameter and a three-
foot-diameter hatch can be eliminated, with subsequent weight saving and usa.ble 
volume increas e. 
4.1. 5 SUMMARY OF MODULE REQUIREMENTS. The payload identification and 
sizing considerations discussed in the previous sections can be summarized as 
follows: 
a. When "mission peculiar" personnel and/or equipment are modularized, 
of modules will be required similar to those summarized in Figure 4-5. 
liminary module design requirements are summarized in Table 4-1. 
a series 
Pre-
b. When the orbiter stage cab is increased in size to accommodate four mission 
personnel, the mission modules would be similar to those summarized in Figure 
4-6. The shaded area represents increased payload length compared with using 
a 4-man module. 
A new set of module requirements reflecting this configuration is shown in 
Table 4-2. The results are increased cargo length of 10 feet in 57 percent of 
the flights and five feet in 37 percent of the remaining missions. Additionally, 
weight savings should be apparent due to the elimination of the 4-man module on 
many flights. 
c. Combining the 8-man personnel module and the cargo module as discussed in 
Section 4.1. 4 appears attractive as it results in a length reduction of 2.2 ft and 
reduction of module weight and complexity. Table 4-3 summarizes the module 
arrangements when the .. combined personnel/cargo module is used. 
qn the basis of the studies to date, option b above appears most attractive. The 
basic reason is the increase of mission flexibility of the space shuttle; i. e., more 
experiment modules can be delivered when mission support personnel can be carried 
in the orbiter cab. Based on information to date, the additional number of passengers 
would be up to four and assuming two orbiter crew members, the maximum require-
ment is six. Additional crew function analyses of each mission may allow the total 
number to be reduced to four or five. 
The question of combining modules as suggested in c above requires additional 
system analyses. Converting modules from passenger to cargo is discussed further 
in the next s.ection. 
4.2 SPACE STATION/BASE LOGISTICS 
This section documents the baseline space station/base payload module developed 
during the study. Several experiment modules under development are also shown be-
cause they are candidate payloads. The dQJ:tking and orbital operatitins are also dis-
cussed to derive space shuttle requirements. " 
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Space Station Logistics ... r---------..--- 60 FT ------, ... 
12' men - 7 days ;-----..,...----....,~-------'.--_i____. 
12., 000 lb cargo 12-man Cargo Experiment Module or I 
Module Module Propellant Delivery 15 
Space Base Logistics FT 
10 men - 7 days 
9,600 lb cargo ~ 
Lunar Logistics 
6 men - 7 days 
20, 000 lb cargo 
Delivery of Propellant 
Stage and Payload 
2 men - 7 days 
Delivery of Propellant 
2 men - 7 days 
Satellite Placement or 
Retrieval 
2 men - 7 days 
Satellite Service or 
Maintenance 
4 men - 14 days 
Short Duration Orbit 
10 men - 30 days 
Rescue 
>12 men - 2 days 
4-man 
Module 
4-man 
Module 
4-man 
Module 
4-man 
Module 
12-man 
Module 
12-man 
Module 
Payload Propulsive stagr 
'~ 
" 
Propellant (I1I2 or L02) 
Satellite 
Pressurized Work Area 
Short Duration Orbit Module 
Propellant For~· 
Main Engines 
Figure 4-5. Mission Module Applications 
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Table 4-1. Mission Module Requirements 
Life Support Length Number of 
Module Pressurized Men Days (feet) Times Used Comments 
4-man Personnel Yes 4 7 10 325 Direct view of payload bay 
12-rnan Personnel Yes 12 7 15 210+ See Section 4.2 for detailed 
- design 
Cargo Module Converted Yes - - 15 188 9, 600 lb space base 
from 12-man Module 12, 000 lb space station 
2.0, 000 lb lunar 
Small Provella:nt No 
- - 30 <210 LH2 or 1.02 
Large Propellant No 
- - 50 252 LH2 or 1.02 
t 
co 
Pressurized Work Area Yes 6 7 50 <22 
Short-Duration Orbit Yes 10 30 45 22 Possible use as pressurized 
2 23. work area 
Experiment . "._"--""'" Module . Module ·.Module <30 33 60-ft length when not trans-
Dependent Dependent Dependent ported with personnel and' 
, 
cargo module 
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Space Station Logistics 
12 men - 7 days 
12,0001b cargo 
Space Base Logistics 
10 men - 7 days 
9, 600 lb cargo 
Lunar Logistics 
6 men - 7 days 
20, 000 lb cargo 
\ 
Delivery of Propellant 
stage and Payload 
2 men - 7 days 
Delivery of Propellant 
2 men - 7 days 
Satellite Placement or 
Retrieval 
2 men - 7 days 
Satellite Service or 
Maintenance 
4 men - 14 days 
Short Duration Orbit 
10 men - 30 days 
Rescue 
>12 men - 2 days 
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~r-.,-----------------60FT----------------~ 
8'-man 
Module 
8-man 
Module 
I 8-man 
~odule 
Cargo 
Module 
Experimental Module or 
Propellant Delivery / 
---Additional length available 
compared with 2-man cab 
Payload Propulsive Stage 
Propellant 
Pressurized Work Area 
8-man 
Module 
Propellant For 
Main Engines 
Figure 4-6. Mission l\tlodule Applications With 6-Man Orbiter Cab 
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Table 4-2. Module Requirements Using 6-Man Orbiter Cab 
- -- Life Support Length Number of 
---Module --- Pressurized Men Days (feet) Times Used Comments 
8-man Personn~l Yes 8 7 10 210 
Cargo Module Yes 
- -
10 188 
Converted from 
8-man Module 
, 
Small Propellant No 
- - 40 <210 Ul2"or'~, 
Large Propellant No 
- - 60 252 Ul2 or L02 
Pressurized Work Yes 6 7 60 <22 
--
Area 
Short-Duration Yes 12 23 50 22 Possible use of pressurized 
Orbit work area 
Experiment Module Module Module <40 <33' 60-foot length not trans-
Dependent Dependent Dependent ported with personnel and 
cargo module 
_ .. _-- .. _. 
-
~ 
-B (D 
::i" 
--, 
"",1111101111111 I IIItrili~!IIIWJIU)f'I1~""iiliillllililiiil'C~;r-- i ;i]lifiiiliiiiiiOlf_ii~iiiiiTliiiiiiik'i:' 1!1I">iiii!iiii--iiiiiiijii~i;;-;;_i;;;;-iii;;!,i.;;;,;.:;;:~J.l;rl;~,~,,,;;:';;;,::~,;,;,,;:""',,,..,. ,.,,_,~, <"''''''''"'~,r_, ,t"'~, ",~, :t~;'1'~-.:,-t:-~" Y,*, .. ;' 
" 
, . ~~ 
,I 
I, 
" 
I' 
" j 
~ 
·:1 
--01111 
- ,- -_... "'.' 
-. 
AtIodule 
i 
8-man Personnel/ \ 
, Cargo 
Small Propellant 
Large 'Propellant 
-
Pressurized Work 
Area 
Short-Duration Orbit I tit ~ I 
.... 
Experiment till I.\j 
r 
I 
i 
"--~~::----~T---
(t' , 
~; ~, 
( 
\ 
~.k. 
.',. 
""" " 
~~t 
<J !.\ ....... 
Table 4-3. Module Requirements Using 6-Man Orbiter Cab 
and 8.-Man Personnel/Cargo Module 
- .~~ 
--"- - - --~- Life Support Length Number of 
-"~-;'" 
Pressurized .rvlen Days (feet) Times Used 
Yes 8 7 17.8 210 
No - - 42.2 <210 
No 
- -
60 252 
Yes 6 7 60 <22 
Yes 12 23 42.2 22 
Module Module Module <42.2 <33 
--- -
Dependent Dependent Dependent 
i 
, ... 
Comments 
Can be used for over 18 
people or all cargo 
L02 or LH2 
L02 or liI2 
60-foot length not trans-
ported with personnel and 
cargo module 
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4.2. 1 BASELINE MODULE. A convertible 12-man personnel/ cargo module was de-
fined to support the payload study. The convertible 12-man personnel/ cargo module 
requi.res a flexibility to handle the logistics for a 12-man space station of 12,000 
pounds and 12 men (up) and 7,000 pounds and 12 men (down) quarterly, a 50-man 
space base of 9,600 pounds and a 10 men (up) and 5600 pounds and 10 men (down) every 
18 days, or a lunar mission of 6 men and 20,000 pounds every two months. The types 
of cargo include food, experiment modules (docked and free flying), liquids, opera-
tional ~uipment, gases, personne~, and spares. Cargo mixture may include cargo, 
personnel, experiment modules, and propellant deliveries on the same flight. 
A preliminary layout was performed to verify the feasibility of carrying 12 men in a 
container 15 feet in diameter by approximately 15 feet long (Figures 4-7 and 4-8). 
Ground rules used to generate the concept are: 
a. The shuttle would be hard-docked to the space station or space base. 
b. Transfer connection to the station or base would be via an extending tunnel 
originating on the station or base. The hatch does not have docking provisions. 
This permits the lightest weight module and hence greatest useful payload. 
c. All hatches will be five feet in diameter, clear. 
d. All parts of system will have maximum reusability (convertible to cargo). 
e. Airline-type system operation will be used (convertible to cargo). 
f. The module will not be removed from the shuttle bay. 
g. Cargo can be mixed internally. 
h. Cargo and passenger loading and unloading can be performed directly. 
i. Intact mission abort capability will be designed in. 
j. Personnel transfer to base or station will be "shirtsleeve ". 
The probable operational mode is to carry 6 to 12 passengers on a mission of one day 
up, one day back, and four to five days at the station or base for loading, reloading, 
or standby. Salient features of the module are: 
a. Seli-sustaining (only interface to shuttle vehicle is at physical attachment to 
longeron). 
b. Meteoroid protection open end only. Shuttle vehicle provides remainder of 
protection inherently. 
c. Seats only, no bunks. 
d. Fi ve-foot-diameter tunnel with hatch for connection to docked vehicle such as 
space station or space base. 
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Figure 4-7. 12-Pas s engeir Self-Sustaining Module-
External Configuration 
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e. Five-foot-diameter tunnel with hatch for interconnection to similar personnel 
or cargo modules. 
f. Center core unobstructed to permit free passage of personnel or cargo to limit 
of hatch sizes. 
g. Removable seats to convert to cargo hauling in controlled environment or mixed 
material/ personnel cargo. 
h. Change from passengers to cargo or cargo to passengers can be accomplished 
in orbit as well as on ground. ~ 
i. No airlock. 
j. Water ditching provisions. 
k. Quick evacuaton on pad. 
1. Mixed gas atmos phere· at '10 ps ia. 
m. LSS/ECS sized for 12 men for seven days.· 
n. 
Consumption rates: 
Food consumption 
Metabolic 02 us ed 
H20 consumption, drinking and food prep. 
Personal sanitation H20 
. Atmos phere leakage a.llowance 
No 02 recovery 
NoH 20 recovery from waste 
CO2 removal by LiOH 
Odor removal by activated charcoal 
Heat rejection radiatqr, H20/ethylene glycol 
Heat rejection on' pad and entry by fluid boiloff 
EPS 
2 lb/man/day 
1. 68 lb/man/day 
6.99 lb/man/day 
2.3lb/man/day 
10 percent gross vol/day 
Two fuel cells used for primary power and redundancy. Each rated at 1. 5 kW 
continuous, 2500-hour life. 
Estimate continuous power level is 1. 0 kW 
o. Cryogenic Stores 
Supercritical storage 
Usage Temperature = 40°F 
Combined LSS and EPS storage, 
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Integrated requirements for 12 men, seven days are shown in Table 4-4. ' Table 4-5 
presents a weight summary by subsystem. 
Table 4-4. Cryogenic Stores Surnmary 
Activity Unit Usage Factor 
°2 N2 H2 
Module Pressure 33~3 lli02/pressure 1 time 3:3. 3 
75.7 lliN2/pressure 1 time 75.7 
EVA None 
-
_. 
-
Module Leakage 3.3 lb 02/day 7 days :l3.1 
7.6 lb N2/day 7 days 53.2 
Metabolic 02 20. 2 lb 02/ day 7 days 141. 4 
Power 24. 4 lb 02/ day 7 days 169.4 
3.0 lb H2/day 7 days 21. 0 
Total Weight (lb) 367.2 128.9 21. 0 
Typical module design problems .are: 
a. Hatches. The five-foot-diameter hatch presents a problem of rem,oval and 
storage. Each hatch, which weighs approximately 12.0 pounds, must be restrained 
and guided to stowed position. Stowed position requires considerable volume. 
Hinged or swinging hatches sweep out excessive internal volume. It was neces-
sary to offset bulkhead hatches from module centerline to permit stowage without 
taking excess volume. 
b. Environmental Control. Preliminary estimates to remove excess heat generated 
by 12 people and electrical equipment when enclosed behind exterior doors show 
that 1800 pounds of water would be required to boUoff the total heat load. Design 
of radiators in shuttle skin is complicated due to materials and the high skin 
temperature (over 700 0 F) at entry. 
c. Floor Arrangement. The gravity vectors at takeoff and landing ar~, 90 degrees 
to each other. ,Floors at launch are walls when landing; hence t walking surfaces 
and ladders are necessary. This factor influences abort capabilities relative to 
ease and speed. The single ground access door used becomes inclined 90 de--
grees after landing. In the FR-1 configuration, a special ground-use door is 
necessary because of the stacked configuration on the pad. 
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Table 4-5. Weight Summary by Subsystems 
Subsystem 
Structure 
Primary 
Secondary 
Hatches and Doors 
EPS 
Fuel Cells (2) 
Batteries 
Conditioning and Distribution 
LSS 
Atmosphere Control 
Food and Processing 
Water Management 
Waste Management 
Personal Hygiene 
ECS 
Cabin Control 
Radiator System 
Insulation 
Communications 
Cryogenic Stores 
Expendable Gases 
Tankage 
Plumbing, Controls, Supports 
Furnishings 
Seats (12) 
Attachments , Padding, Holds 
Payload (Useful)* 
Passengers (12) 
Luggage 
Total Module Weight 
*135 ft3 of cargo storage available 
4-18 
2244 
507 
449 
136 
50 
564 
581 
173 
163 
105 
32 
335 
658 
90 
517 
192 
101 
1040 
60 
2040 
240 
Volume VIII 
Weight, lb 
3,210 
750 
1,054 
1,083 
130 
810 
1,100 
8,137 
2.280 
10,417 
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d. Cargo Handling. The problem is to achieve an arrangement which permits ease 
of access and to avoid clogging by bulky items. Also, emergency priorities 
may develop between ground loading and orbit transfer. When loading on the 
ground or in orbit, the back sides of packages against walls are generally in-
accessible. Therefore, securing of cargo must be accomplished from the front 
,face. This is achieved on the example module by keeping the central core clear. 
A variation of this module has no hatch in the forward (airplane reference) bulkhead. 
Instead, a 32-inch-dia1neter hatch is installed in the lower forward cylindrical sur-
face and mated to the tunnel connecting the module to the cockpit. This module would 
be used much more frequently than that shown in the figures since it is always needed 
for interconnection to the cockpit. No preliminary layouts were nlade because of its 
Similarity to .the baseline design. 
The pressurized cargo module does not require design or manufacture of a specific 
module. In the payload concept exampled, the personnel module is convertible to a 
full cargo configuration (Figure 4-9). The basic subsystems of the personnel module 
are retained to provide power, environmental control, and atmosphere control. The 
seats are rernoved as well as the food storage and preparation buffet. Cryogenics 
and H20 can be offloaded to match the cargo requirements. A weight breakdown of 
subsystems is shown on Figure 4-9, reflecting a total cargo module. Overload 
capability or outsize cargo can be accommodated volun'letrically. 
An analysis was conducted to verify the desirability of only a mechanical interface. 
Table 4-6 shows the 12-man module subsystem weight breakdown. The first column 
reflects the recommended mechanical interface and shows a total module weight,in-
cluding passengers and luggage, of 10,414 lb. 
If an electrical interface is added, the fuel cells and fuel will be moved to the orbiter. 
The orbiter power output will then be increased to 5.7 kW from 4.5, and there will be 
an increase in weight in the conditioning and distribution system. In addition, the 
backup battery can be removed. The weight savings for the module will be approxi-
mately 1000 lb with a weight increase of approxilW1tely 500 lb on the orbiter. This is re- i ' 
flected in columns 2 and 3. Column 4 indicates an approximate 500 lb weight savings for 
the logistics !l1ission with one module for an electrical interface. The 500-lb orbiter 
weight increase is a weight penalty for those alternate missions not requiring an electri-
cal interface. The penalty to the orbiter electrical system increases if it must be sized 
to handle four 12-man personnel modules, which represents a doubUng of the original 
power requirements. Even if this is done there is no guarantee that adequate electrical 
power is available for alternate missions. 
Similar effects are noted in columns 5, 6, and 7 for a mechanical, electrical, environ-
mental control system (ECS), and life support system (LSS) interface. Although the 
single module weight decreases, the orbiter is penalized. Sizing is again a problem 
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Subsystems 
Structure 
EPS Fuel Cells 
Batteries 
Conditioning and Distribu-
tion 
LSS Atmosphere Control 
Food and Processing 
Water :Management 
Waste Management 
Personal Hygiene 
ECS Cabin Control 
Radiator System 
Insulation 
Communications 
Cryogenic Stores - Expendable 
Gases 
Tankage 
Plumbing, Controls, 
Supports 
Furnishings 
Payload - Passengers 
Luggage 
Total Weights 
--
r .... 
'.'::"':::,~"-- . .... -;: ,-c; • 
Table 4-6. Twelve-Man Personnel Module Interlace Analysis 
(Based on Orbiter Carrying One Personnel Module) 
Interface 
.. 
Mechanical, Electrical, 
Mechanical Mechanical and Electrical LSS, and ECS 
Module Module AOrbiter Total Weight Module 6.0rbiter Total Weight 
Weight Weight Weight Savings Weight Weight Savings 
(lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) (lb) 
3,210 3,210 3,210 
136 -- +136 -- +136 
50 -- 50 -- 50 
564 
-- +94 470 -- +94 470 
581 581 - <+581 
173 173 173 
163 <163 
-- <+163 
105 105 105 
32 32 32 
335 <335 
-- <+335 
658 658 658 
90 90 90 
130 130 130 
517 327 +190 327 
1H2 120 +72 120 
101 101 101 
1,100 1,100 1,100 
2,040 2,040 2,040 
24:0 240 240 
10,414 <9»402 +492 520 8,323 <1,310 520+ 
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WEIGHT SUMMARY 
STRUCTURE -- - 2,960 
EPS - ---- 600 
LSS -- - - - 636 
ECS - _. - -- - 1,083 
COMlVI - - - - 130 
CRYOGENICS -- - 360 
FURNISHINGS- -- 80 
PAYLOAD 
5,849 
12,000 
17,849 
GROSS INTERNAL 
VOLUME = 2,190 FT3 
Figure 4-9. Cargo Module Converted From 12-Man Module -
Self-Sustaining, Pressurized 
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if capacity for four 12-man modules is required as the LSS/ECS weight is roughly 
proportional to capacity. The orbiter would then have a system which is approximately 
five times its nominal capacity. In addition the interface now has to consider tr~nsfer 
of fluids and gases between the orbitel'.' and each of the modules in parallel or from the 
orbiter to the forward module and then between modules in series. For passenger and 
cargo transfer concepts utilizing module removal this more complex interface is not 
desirable. 
The use of mechanical interface is recommended. It allows the orbiter to be sized 
to firm requirements and payloads to be sized to their unique mission requirements as 
they are developed. A mechanical interface is also the most desirable when consider-
ing personnel and cargo transfer concepts. 
4. 2. 2 EXPERIMENT MODULE. A study to develop experiment modules is currently 
underway at Convair. Figure 4-10 shows a typical module being studied. Two im-
portant features are that the free flying module has both an attitude control system 
and a docking mechanism. The propulsion submodule is required to provide the 
necessary acceleration for the experiments. Docking with the space station is re-
quired for experiment servicing and propellant resupply. 
4.2.3 DOCKING AND ORBITAL OPERATIONS. The logistics mission requires dock-
ing the orbiter with the space station and/or experiment modules. This section discus-
ses orbiter docking concepts and orbital operations associated with docking. 
4. 2. 3. 1 Docking Requirement~. The general requirements for docking systems are 
to: 
a. Reduce the relative angular and lateral velocities to zero. 
b. Minimize the impact loads. 
c. Correct augular and lateral misalignments. 
d. Secure the vehicle to the space station. 
e. Seal the area around the transfer hatch. 
t Release the vehicle for the return trip 
The parameters selected for docking based on space station studies are: 
Axial Relative Velocity 
Lateral Relative Velocity 
Angular Relative Velocity 
Lateral Miss Distance 
Angular Misalignment 
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Functional requirements of docking systems have resulted from consideration of the. 
advanced mission requirements experience gained during the Gemini and Apollo Pro-
grams. The advantage of an androgynous system, in which each spacecraft has 
identical docking hardware, is to allow a maximum degree of flexibility in mission 
definition and planning. Androgynous, in this case, means that the docking system of 
each vehicle can perform any mechanical function required foX' docking or separation 
without active aid from the docking systmn of the other vehicle. The docking-hard-
ware configuration would no longer be a constraint on mission operations. The androg-
ynous system also provides inherent redundancy, which is unobtainable from normal 
"male-female II type systems. 
Good dynamic performance is not simply a desirable characteristic. It will be a 
definite requirement if one docking system is to be able to accommodate the wide 
range of vehicle configurations and weights involved in a space station program. Off-
center docking will require a mechanism with a high degree of compliance to avoid 
structural dynamics problems and to allow captune latching to be readily obtained 
during impact. The II compliance II of a mechanism is the ability of the mechanism to 
compensate for misalignment between the docking vehicles at initial contact and to 
avoid rebound. High compliance is achieved by providing long-stroke energy ab-
sorbers and by avoiding the storage of large amounts of energy in undamped springs. 
Becaus~ of the requirement for routine transfer of crewmen and/or cargo from one 
vehicle to another through a pressurized interface, it will be mandatory to avoid 
removal of the docking mechanism from the interconnecting tunnel. Therefore, the 
docking mechanism for advanced missions will be located outside of the pressurized-
interface area. The interface pressure seal and the structural interconnecting 
mechanism will be separated so that the function of one will not affect the function of 
the other. The two basic reasons for this separation are as follows. ~irst, separa-
tion will avoid the problem of the distortion of the sealing interface as a result of 
high structural preloading of the latch and as a result of differences in pre loading 
from one latch to another. Second, the proper location and arrangement (diameter, 
etc. ) of each system can be optimized independently with a minimum interaction be-
tween functions. 
4.2.3.2 Docking System Location. Figure 4-11 shows three alternate docking arrange-
ments. The concepts are based on the orbiter hard docking to the space station. Con-
cept A of Figure 4-11 shows the location of the docking mechanism in the nose section 
of the space shuttle. The advantages of this concept are: 
a. The pilot can perform the docking maneuver without leaving his normal flight 
position. 
b. A separate docking station with console and crew member is not required. 
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The disadvantages are: 
a. A long, relatively large cargo transfer tunnel between the payload area and the 
nose section requires added volume and weight. 
b. This location requires a removable nose cone and may affect the nose shape. 
c. The docking port is part of the basic vehicle and will be carried on all missions. 
Concept B shows the docking port relocated to the area of the flight deck. The advan-
tage of this concept is that a swing nose is not required. 
The disadvantages are similar to A; in addition: 
a. The pilot's orientation and visual reference during docking is impaired and a 
special docking control station and/or display may be required. 
b. The docking port is in a poor location regarding the flow of cargo and passengers 
from the payload bay to the docking port. 
Concept C locates the docking port in the payload bay area. The advantages are: 
a. The docking port can be made part of the payload modules and will not be carried 
on miss ions not requiring docking. 
b. The existing payload bay doors will cover the docking mechanism and separate 
doors will not be required. 
c. The location is ideal for unloading cargo and a cargo transfer tunnel is not required. 
(A smaller tunnel is required to provide the crew access to the payload area. ) 
The disadvantage is: 
A separate docking control station is required (or a docking display in the cockpit). 
4.2.3.2 Baseline Docking System Description. Figure 4-12 illustrates the double 
ring and cone concept which could be used for the docking mechanism. The docking 
mechanism is identical on each vehicle and consists, basically, of a ring which is 
mounted to the spacecraft (payload module) through four or more pairs of shock 
absorbers. 
Guide fingers are located at intervals on the ring and project outward at an angle of 
approximately 45 degrees. The fingers are elements of a cone. During impact, the 
rings on each vehicle are guided into concentric contact by the fingers. Capture 
latches built into each guide finger interconnect the rings. The capture-latch geom-
etry is designed so that at least two diametrically opposite latches must engage to 
prevent subsequent separation of the rings. The shock-absorbers arrangement provides 
a high degree of compliance so that the ring may displace both laterally and angularly 
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to compensate for misalignments between the vehicles at contact. All impact loadings 
are attenuated through the shock absorbers with resultant energy absorption to prevent 
energy storage and subsequent rebound. Shock-absorber peak loads will be only a few 
hundred pounds because of the long strokes of the shock absorbers. A cable and winch 
system is a proposed type of ring-retraction mechanism which could be used to bring 
the vehicles into position for final structural interconnection. 
In the double ring and cone concept, the crew-and-cargo transfe:e tunnel, the docking 
mechanism, and the structural interconnecting mechanism are ooncentric but are in-
dependent of each other. 
The selection of the interface diameter (baseline = 5.0 ft) will involve tradeoffs with 
several parameters during the pro cess of integrating the docking system with the 
space station and other space system configurations. Other variables dependent on the 
station configuration will be the number of shock absorbers and the number of guide 
fingers. The guide fingers may also be arranged to provide roll indexing, if required. 
Several proposed concepts for final structural latching and tunnel interface sealing 
exist; however, at this time, no one concept is favored above the others. A major 
design goal will be to minimize the need for close tolerances. The docking, structural 
latching, and separation functions can be performed with the system on one vehicle 
inactive; i. e., docking-ring retracted and, thus, immobilized. Both docking mech-
anisms may be active, but the performance is not necessarily improved. 
4. 2.3.3 Docking Operations. The delivery of personnel and cargo to the space station 
can be handled in a variety of ways. Several concepts under investigation are shown 
in Figure 4-13 and are based on the use of modules described in Section 4.2.1 
Concept A "hows the space shuttle personnel module docked to the space base logistics 
area. All cargo in modules directly behind the personnel module are transferred to 
the space base via the single docking port. This requires interconnecting module 
mating hatches. Module removal is not required with this concept. 
Concept B uses a rotating adapter which allows attaching the modules at the end for a 
more direct cargo transfer operation than Concept A. The vehicle could hard dock at 
the docking port using the system described in Section 4-13 or the auxiliary docking 
members could be used for vehicle alignment with the space station. 
In Concept C the payload modules are removed from the orbiter payload bay by (1) a 
mechanical manipulator in the bay, or (2) a space station manipulator. The end of the 
payload module is then coupled to the space station port. In this concept, a separate 
docking systeln will probably be required between the space shuttle and the station (in 
addition to the coupling between the module and the station). 
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Concepts D and E do not require space shuttle space station docking. 
Concept D uses a space tug. The tug attaches to the module, removes it from the 
orbiter, and finishes the operation. This method requires that a space tug be at the 
target or that the orbiter carries a space tug as part of its payload. 
Concept E uses modules equipped with their own attitude control system. An operator 
in the personnel module can handle all transfers in a manner similar to the space tug. 
The modules will be removed from the payload bay and then flown to the station to 
finish the operation. 
It should be noted that combinations of the above concepts are feasible; for example, 
Concept A for personnel and Concept E for cargo modules. Such variations have not 
been evaluated but appear to warrant further investigation. Selection of a concept 
requires complete analysis of all alternate mission requirements. 
4.2.4 GROUND OPERATIONS. Space station;base dry cargo will be packaged in the 
modules within the logistic handling area. Upon arrival of the orbiter element at the 
logistic area (the element is towed in the horizontal mode) the cargo doors open and 
the modules are inserted by means of a loading device (monorail or overhead crane). 
The module is properly secured within the orbiter element, the cargo doors close, 
and the element is towed to the launch pad. For a dual type payload, one later re-
quiring wet cargo (cryogenic), the dry cargo procedure is followed until the element 
is erected and total fueling cOInmenced at the launch pad. 
Passenger modules will be treated as dry cargo and loaded into the orbiter vehicle in 
the payload logistic area. The passengers will not be embarked until the vehicle is 
erected and the launch sequence commenced at the launch pad. 
Preliminary tradeoff analyses have considered both horizontal payload insertion at a 
special logistic facility and on-pad payload insertion with the vehicle in the vertical 
position. These tradeoffs are discussed in Volume IX, Ground Turnaround Operations 
and Facility Requirements. 
4.2.5 MULTI-MISSION CAPABILITY. The multi-mission payload capabilities of the 
space shuttle using the modules developed in this section are illustrated in Figure 4-14. 
The payload mixes shown are limited to space station logistics and related experiment 
modules. The passenger/cargo module shown is the baseline module defined in Section 
4.2.1, and the loading conditions assume a space shuttle payload capability of 50,000 
pounds. 
This matrix illustrates the many module combinations available to obtain space shuttle 
multi-mission capability. The module loadings shown are based on maximum payload 
capabilities, and many other combinations are possible in off loaded conditions and/or 
when other missions discussed in Sections 4.3 through 4.7 are considered. 
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LOADING CONDITIONS 
(MAXIMUM) 
48 Men - 43,700 lb total 
36 Men - 12, 900 lb 
available for cargo 
12 Men - 12, 000 lb cargo -
21, 700 lb available for 
experiment module 
26, 600 lb available for 
cargo 
32,1001b available for 
experiment module 
1200 lb for cargo 
50,000 lb available for 
experiment module 
I P ~ ... __ E_(_4_5_F_T_) __ ~112 Men - 39,600 lb avail-
. ~ . able for experiment module 
Figure 4-14. Typical Multi-Mission Module Loadings 
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4.3 PROPE LLANT DE LIVERY 
The delivery of propellant represents 44% of the missions on the NASA Nominal Space 
Shuttle Traffic Model. It is the most frequent mission providing primary support to 
the lunar program. This section discusses mission requirenlents, orbital operations, 
location of orbital operation crew, interfaces, and mission capability of the FR-1 
configuration. 
4.3.1 SIZING REQUIREMENTS. The mission requirements consider delivery of L02 
and LH2 to the orbital propellant supply facility (OPS). The propellants are used for 
nuclear shuttle and space tug operations. A typical lunar mission requires 200, 000 lb 
of LH2 for the nuclear shuttle and 68,000 lbs of L02 and 13,000 lb of LH2 for two space 
tugs. Propellant size versus propellant weight for three delivery methods is shown on 
Figure 4-15. The curves are for all LH2' all L02' and combined L02/LH2 deliveries. 
Diameters of 13, 14, and 15 ft are shown to allow for tank structure and insulation as 
required. LH2 payload limits are based on volume whereas L02 and L02/LH2 limits 
are based on weight. For a 50, OOO-ib payload capability, 60 feet of length available, 
and transfer of 100% of the propellant to the OPS, the nuclear shuttle will require five 
sp:l.ce shuttle trips and the space tugs will require one trip each with the ~02/LH2 com-
bined load. The available payload carrying capability is dependent on the tank diameter 
for the LH2 delivery, but insensitive to tank diameter for the L02 or L02/LH2 delivery. 
4.3.2 ORBITAL OPERATIONS. The mission can be performed in three basic ways 
with regard to propellant transfer from the space shuttle to the OPS: the propellant 
tank can be transferred to the OPS to become part of the OPS; the propellant tank can 
be transferred to the OPS, be emptied immediately into the OPS and returned to the 
space shuttle; or the propellant only can be transferred to the OPS. These options are 
shown on Figures 4-16, 4-17, and 4-18. 
Figure 4-16 shows delivery to an OPS facility within the context of producing maximum 
protection to the payload container within the shuttle bay. The 4-man personnel module 
configuration is shown with a 50-foot propellant tank; an alternative is the 60-foot pro-
pellant tank with the 6-man orbiter crew cab discussed in Section 4.3.3. Hard-docking 
to an existing unmanned OPS is required. Propellant transfer is through the line lo-
cated in the stabilization boom. The use of the 4-man personnel module provides di-
rect visibility of the transfer line hookup. In this concept, the OPS has an attitude 
control system which can be commanded from the orbiter or by its own preprogrammed 
commands. The orbiter-carried propellant tank requires its own propellant expulsion 
device in this concept. 
An alternative configuration is shown in Figure 4-17. An unmanned OPS with attitude 
control capability as in Figure 4-16 is assumed in orbit. This concept, however, 
differs in that the orbital propellant supply tank is removed from the payload bay and 
attached to the OPS for propellant transfer. The orbiter can remove the empty tank 
shown at the top and return to Earth, or wait until propellant transfer is complete and 
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Figure 4-15. Propellant Volume/Weight Relationships 
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DESCRIPTION 
1. OPS IS ASSEMBLED VIA LAUNCHES OTHER THAN SPACE SHUTTLE. 
2. OPS HAS ACTIVE ACS, COMMANDED BY GROUND, SPACECRAFT AND 
OWN PROGRAMMED TOLERANCE LEVELS. 
3. OPS IS NOT MANNED. 
4. RESUPPLY TANK HAS OWN EXPULSION SYSTEM. 
5. HARD DOCKING OF SPACE SHUTTLE. 
6. STABILIZATION HOOK-UP AT BOOM BY OPERATOR. 
7. TRANSFER LINE CONNECTION UNDER CONTROL OF OPERATOR. 
8. RESUPPLY TANK DOES NOT LEAVE BAY. 
9. THIS CONCEPT CAN HANDLE VARIOUS TANK SIZES OR MIXTURES. 
10. BOOM TRANSFER LINE IS 150 FT LONG. 
Figure 4-16. In Situ Tank, Transfer Propellant Only 
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DESCRIPTION 
1. OPS IS ASSEMBLED VIA LAUNCHES OTHER THAN SPACE SHUTTLE. 
2. OPS HAS ACTIVE ATTITUDE CONTROL, COMMANDED BY GROUND, 
SPACECRAFT, AND OWN PROGRAMMED TOLERANCE LEVELS. 
3. OPS IS NOT MANNED. 
4. RESUPPLY TANK HAS OWN EXPULSION SYSTEM. 
5. NON-IMPACT DOCKING FOR TANKER. DOOKING OF CONTROL 
MODULE. OPS IS ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE ALTHOUGH ATTITUDE 
CONTROL CAN BE EXERCISED BY OPERATOR 
6. 29, 000 LB LH2 PER TANK. 
EXTENDABLE BOOMS 
RETRACTED DURING 
FUEL FLOW. RE-ENGAGED 
TO RETRACT TANK INTO BAY 
CONTROL OPERATOR'S--
BUBBLE 
Figure 4-17. Transfer Tank 
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RA,l:;>IOISOTOPE POWER & RADIATOR 
EXTENDABLE BOOMS 
4. OPS BillLDUP 
EXTENDABLE BOOMS 
(4) PER TANK MODULE 
EXTENDABLE BOOMS (4) 
FIXED TO TANKER 
5. TANK RETRIEVE 
CONTROL OPERATOR ---
DESCRIPTION 
1. "BEEHIVE" CONe. 
2. CORE MODULE 
RENDEZVOUSSP 
3. QPS IS NOT MANN 
4. NOINTERCONNEC 
5. EACH TANK HAS 
BEING SERVICED. 
6. NON-IMPACT DOC 
CONTROL MODUL 
EXERCISED BY OP 
7. 28,000 LB LH2 PE 
Figure 4-18. Accumulative Tanks 
i 
FOLDout FRAME I 
4-36 
\ v . ~ .. --'-
- .,,-==.:.-::---'_'''''. . :w ... ~":~,~:::-.~.:::'::":~_:: . .':::!~1!:.!fi ::'':': .:.. •• ~~.?;z-~~---:= :.:._,' :::: :::.1?..£::-;;I1£\. '': ~~~'!'llll'"l'?"\'r~.\ j 
p . - r --',-, . 
Volume VIn 
lADIATOR 
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4. OPS BUILDUP 
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CONTROL OPERA TOR --____ 
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DESCRIPTION 
1. "BEEHIVE" CONCEPT OF ACCUMULATED CELLS (TANKS). 
2. CORE MODULE HAS ACTIVE ATTITUDE CONTROL, COMMANDED BY GROUND, 
,RENDEZVOUS SPACECRAFT, AND OWN PROGRAMMED TOLERAN~E LEVELS. 
3. QPS IS NOT MANNED. 
4. NO INTERCONNECTION OR PUMPING BETWEEN TANKS. 
. ~ '" ~ 
5. EACH TANK HAS EXPULSION SYSTEM SUBJECT TO COMMAND OF ~PACECRAFT 
BEING SERVICED. 
6. NON-IMPACT DOCKING. DOCKING UNDER CONTROL.OF OPERATOR AT STATION OF 
CONTROL MODULE. OPS IS ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE ALTHOUGH CONTROL CAN BE 
EXERCISED BY OPERA TOR. 
7. 28,000 LB LH2 ,PER TANK. 
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r~turn with the ~ame tank it brought u.p. The tank is shown being transferred by extend-
able booms under direct control of the operator in a 4-man personnel module. Following 
transfer of the tank, the booms can be retracted and propellant expulsion initiated. Fol-
lowing propellant transfer, the booms are engaged and the tank is removed from the OPS 
and replaced in the payloa.d bay. 
Figure 4-18 illustrates a buildup of an OPS facility using the orbiter to supply the tanks. 
Tl1e first delivery is a control core which contains ACS tanks and motors, power supply, 
and a docking ring for future servicing and for spacecraft being tanked at the OPS. The 
ne~t deliveries are propellant tanks, which are attached to the control core and then 
removed from the orbiter. Each tank has an expulsion system subject to command of 
the spacecraft being serviced. Following emptying of the propellant tanks, the orbiter 
retrieves the tanks for refill. 
In general the same problems exist in varying degrees for fluid transfer in orbit as for 
fluid transfer on Earth, such as: 
a. Explosive, toxic, and chemiCal hazards. 
b. Chilldown and external heat transfer of lines, tanks, and other hardware where 
cryogenic fluids are involved. 
c. Fluid contamination, such as from the absorption of pressurant gas . 
i\ d. Loss of fluids due to boiloff, leakage, and general inefficiency of the transfer 
process. 
e. Tradeoff between fluid transfer through lines and fluid transfer by tank replace-
ment or other intermediate steps. 
f. Determination of the most efficient hardware and expulsion methods. 
The effects of transfer in orbit on these problems, as compared to normal Earth con-
ditions, are: 
a. Absence of natural one-g force field. The basic problem arising from this fact 
is that special methods are required to maintain gas/liquid separation, orientation 
and/or acquisition of liquid for transfer. Low-g fluid statics, dynamics and heat 
transfer are not completely understood and test data are very limited. One ad-
vantage, however, is that items are essentially "weightless'! and large masses 
can be physically moved short distances with relatively little effort. 
b. Vacuum environment. The main disadvantages are in sealing requirements, effect 
of high vacuum on materials, and the lack of protection from radiation and micro-
meteorites. One advantage is that explosive, toxic and chemical hazards are re-
duced since there is no oxidizer naturally present and shock waves are not trans-
mitted. Also, escaped fluid pressures are so low and dispersion so complete that 
4-37 
---'-
-==_, '.~" .. ,~"''',·4 .... "~.j, .. 
~_~_._ _ ."_~.,""",-_. ' ___ .. ,,:._ '.~._ •. L.._.~ •• '_ . _____ .~ .. ~ _". __ ~.~ __ - ---"."-..... ,,,"""- ••. ~ ---- .• ---
.,,"1-, 
.. ------------.,.-p -------~~~~ --- -~- -- -~ p • 
I 
,j 
:\ 
J , 
:J 
1! 
'1 ~ 
d 
:7 
; ~ 
;j 
1 
1 
; 1 , 
~ , i 
, , , 
\ 
Volume VIII 
many potential hazards are non-existent; e.g., unless confined, any gas will com-
pletely disperse at zero pressure since the mean free path of the molecules be-
comes essentially infinite. In addition, fouling of instrumentation due to condensa-
tion of water vapor from the surroundings will not be a problem. 
c. Transfer hardware weights are very important due to the cost of putting a pound 
into space. Brute force methods and equipment would not be as practical as on 
Earth. 
d. The use of personnel to perform transfer functions is somewhat more limited in 
orbit than on Earth. 
Table 4-7 presents a summary of the areas to be discussed in more detail herein. 
A rapid comparison is made of the three transfer techniques shown on the previous 
figures ( The following subsections cover propellant orientation and transfer, and 
transfer efficiency. 
Table 4-7. Concept Comparison 
Transfer Tank, Transfer Tank 
Transfer Propellant Empty, Return Which Becomes 
Only to Orbiter Part of OPS 
Fluid Orientation - Linear acceleration Not required Not required 
For Transfer to OPS Rotational acceleration 
Fluid rotation 
Mechanical-B ladde r 
Propellant to OPS Pump/Pressure Pump/Pressure Mechanical 
Transfer Efficiency <100% <100% 100% 
to OPS 
Chilldown of Transfer Yes Yes Not required 
Lines 
OPS Venting Required Possibly Possibly 
During Transfer 
Cooldown of Receiver Possibly Possibly No 
Tank Required 
Weight of Orbiter Lightest Heaviest 
Delivered Tank 
Insulation 
Expulsion Equipment Part of Payload Part of Pay load OnOPS 
for Propellant 
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4.3.2.1 Propellant Orientation. For those concepts requiring transfer of propellant 
only, a primary problem is to obtain the fluid for transfer in a single state, since in 
the absence of applied settling forces, the liquid and gas can be mixed within the tank. 
Normal vehicle disturbing forces from attitude control, drag, and gravity gradient will 
be present but are not necessarily conductive to positioning the fluid where transfer 
can be easily accomplished. The use of linear acceleration, tank rotation, fluid rota-
tion, and positive containment will be discussed. 
Linear acceleration consists simply of applying an accelerating force along the axis of 
the propellant tank in order to position the liquid at one end of the tank. In this method 
of transfer both the OPS and orbiter must be accelerated. The main disadvan.tage of 
this method is that orbital perturbations are created during tanking unless special ori-
entation is accomplished. The orbital perturbation can be minimized by thrusting con-
tinuously perpendicular to the original orbit plane for one orbital period while trans-
ferring propellants. 
For other than orbiting transfer the displacement from norriinal path through increase 
or decrease in velocity as it affects the overall mission must be considered. This 
could be an advantage for some missions where transfer could be accomplished during 
a normal mission acceleration period. 
Quite a bit of study has been done on the operational aspects of the linear acceleration 
system under NASA contracts. The main advantage of this system is in its similarity 
to orientation as encountered on Earth, allowing for conventional vehicle designs and 
a fairly high state of the art in transfer procedures and equipment. 
Givan enough acceleration, the method is bound to work; however, it will probably be 
desirable to keep the acceleration as low as possible in order to minimize orbital 
perturbation and expended propellants. The rnain developmental problem is in deter-
mining the minimum acceleration and time required to satisfactorily settle the propel-
lants and ensure a minimum of trapped gas in the liquid outflow and/or the transfer 
efficiency as a function of acceleration. 
In the rotational acceleration method, the propellant tank is rotated about its longitudinal 
axis to cause liquid to exist around the side of the tank. Both OPS and supply or only 
the supply may be rotated. Where only the supply tank is rotated, a slip or rotating 
transfer joint is required. Such joints are sometimes used with fluid test set-ups on 
ground-based centrifuge machines and could probably be adapted to space use. 
One of the main considerations with this system is the time it takes to get the fluid 
rotating. If time is an important factor baffles can be installed to decrease this time, 
but this will add weight. Also, resi.duals can be significant unless special side traps 
are used. 
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This method has low fuel requirements (once spin-up is obtained no further accelera-
tion is needed) and minimum orbital or trajectory perturbations. 
Fluid rotation is based on the same physical phenomenon as tank rotation except only 
the fluid itself is rotated, thus eliminating the need for rotating the OPS or providing 
for a rotating transfer connection. Three methods of providing tIle necessary vapor / 
liquid separating vortex are by using mixers, pumps, or vortex type separators. 
Positive containment methods, as defined herein, include all items such as bladders, 
bellows, pistons. With these methods, the liquid to be transferred is separated from 
the ullage gas by a positive physical barrier. The use of such a device is straight-
forward for storable fluids. In using one with cryogenics, boiling can occur within the 
positive expUlsion device and fluid orientation within the device may be unknown. At 
initiation of transfer, however, the ullage pressure can be raised above the trapped 
fluid vapor pressure such that essentially all trapped vapor is condensed. Mixing of 
the trapped fluid may be required to assure complete condensation and prevent excessive 
stratification. It should be noted that condensation of trapped vapor may not be neces-
sary for transfer, depending on the required efficiency and the expulsion method used. 
4.3.2.2 Propellant Transfer. Propellant transfer can be handled by expulsion methods 
or mechanical transfer of the tank itself to the OPS. The types of expulsion methods 
which can practically be considered for a particular application depend in part on the 
type of liquid acquisition or containment device being considered. The use of most 
pumping and pressure-feed methods are applicable to essentially all the liquid contain-
ment 'methods of Section 4.3.2. 1. There are, however, limitations on the type of 
pressurants and pressurant temperatures when the expulsion gas is to come into contact 
with the propellant as opposed to cases where bladders, diaphragms, bellows, or simi-
lar positive separation devices are used. The various expulsion methods are discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
The following types of pumps can be considered for the space transfer application: 
a. Centrifugal 
b. Axial 
c. Mixed flow 
d. Positive displacement 
e. Jet pumps 
Most of the pump work which has been done which is applicable to fluid transfer in 
space has been done in connection with feeding propellants to vehicle engines including 
chilldown and recirculation pumps. Some consideration should be given to the possi-
bility of using such a pump already present on the receiver or supply v~hicle to also 
perform the transfer function. The main difference in the transfer application. is that 
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pressure rise requirements will in general be significantly lower than for tlie engine 
application. This allows the consideration of axial flow and all-inducer types of pumps. 
The main engine pump stages for present day space and booster vehicles are of the 
centrifugal type, sometimes with an inlet high specific speed inducer section designed 
to operate at close to inlet saturation pressures (low NPSH). Operation with low inlet 
pressures is important to the minimizing of pressurant requirements. 
The use of a gas or vapor to expel fluid from a storage tank is a fairly well established 
technology. Methods used for engine feed will also be applicable to the space transfer 
of fluids with, however, the increased potential of gas blow-through during the low-g 
draining. Analytical studies have shown this to be a potential problem. 
Another potential problem is that a sudden tank pressure reduction can occur at initia-
tion of pressurization at low-g. This is caused by the injected gas inducing liquid spray 
into the ullage space and cooling the ullage gas. The gas inlet momentum must be kept 
at a minimum. For this purpose the Centaur has a 10 1/2 in. diameter screened inlet. 
This is especially critical where pressurant is used to provide pump NPSH. A sudden 
reduction in pressure may also be harmful to the structural rigidity of the tank. 
Two areas of j,nterest in the application of expulsion techniques are the required inter-
face between the propellant tank and the OPS and OPS receiver tank venting versus non-
venting operation. 
The OPS interface is defined as the piping and hardware connecting the receiver tank 
to the supply through which the fluid is transferred. Connection can be either flexible 
or rigid. Basic problems are in general the same as in ground transfer, except hard-
ware weights, reliability, and remote operation are more critical. The OPS interface 
needs reliable leak-tight coupling connections and shutoff valves. A shutoff function 
can b.~ built into the coupling, but one or two additional valves would probably be needed 
to control flow while connected. 
Where cryogenic fluids are involved, cooldown of hardware mass and insulation re-
quirements are important considerations. 
Tanker studies which have been performed indicate a rigid connection as being the best 
method. The main reasons are: 
a. Automatic hookup is more feasible. 
b. Minimum attitude control sequencing is required. 
c. Propellant transfer lines at not subject to structural stress. 
d. Would work better where transfer uses linear acceleratiort. 
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Further consideration should, however, be given to the flexible or non-rigid type of con-
nection since th:a need for final docking of the two vehicles would then not be required. 
The mechanics of coupling would be similar to that used for airplane refueling. Coupling 
make and break latching and valve mechanisms could be similar. The method of boom 
extension and guidance could also be similar, only simpler, since aerodynamic pertur-
bations are absent. Extensible metal tape booms, which could be used to extend a line 
to another vehicle, are useful for space application. 
The design of the OPS must consider venting or non-venting during fill with a tradeoff 
between tank pressure rise (structural weight penalty) and cOInplexity. 
If venting is required, a method for venting only gas will probably be needed. Even 
where acceleration is applied to both receiver and supply it has been calculated that 
instabilities of the liquid surface during filling can be significant. The sloshing of fluid 
entering the tank can be reduced by providing proper baffling. Assuming the possibility 
of liquid occurring at the vent inlet and a requirement to vent only gas, a vapor /liquid 
:j separator would be needed. 
:1 
il 
:-: 
Cooldown of the receiver tank is an important consideration in determining allowable 
fiU rates, venting rate requirements, and pressure levels expected, especially where 
cryogens are involved. Overpressure due to excessive vaporization rates during fill 
will be the primary consideration; however, an initial reduction in pressure can occur 
due t~ heat transfer from the ullage gas to liquid spray within the tank. This should 
not be a significant problem, but could cause a loss of structural rigidity if the pres-
sure were reduced far enough. Such a reduction in pressure cannot occur when signi-
ficant amounts of liquid spray are kept from the ullage. 
4.3.2.3 Transfer Efficiency. Transfer efficiency is defined, herein, as the ratio of 
the amount of liquid transferred to the original amount stored. The overall transfer 
efficiency is not really a technology in itself, but is a function of the type and efficiency 
of individual items di6Lussed in Sections 4.3.2.1 and 4.3.2.2. The following factors 
contribute to efficiency or inefficiency of the overall transfer process. 
a. Leakage Through Joints and Interconnections. Most hardware can contribute to 
this problem. Vacuum and space environment can have a detrimental effect on 
static and dynamic seals. 
b. Venting. During storage due to heat leaks from insulation, supports, tank inlet 
and outlet lines, and internal power generation. Chilldown of transfer line and 
receiver tank also causes propellant vaporization. 
c. FluidResiduals. Dependent upon positioning and/or pumping methods used. Pri-
mary consideration is vapor pull-through at low-g; 1. e., the point at which sufficient 
vapor enters the transfer line such that pump cavitation can occur (if applicable) or 
that no more liquid can he transferred. The remaining liquid represents residuals. 
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Pull-through and blow-through for a given expulsion and orientation configuration 
depends on transfer rate and flow velocities. It may be advantageous to reduce 
flow rates toward the end of transfer. 
The transfer efficiency effect on mission requirerLlents is shown on Figure 4-19. With 
100% efficiency and an assumed 45, OOO-ib delivery capability the basic lunar mission 
requires 4.7 flights of lli2 and 1. 5 flights of L02 . W 2 transfer efficiency can drop 
to 76% before more than two flights are required. LH2 transfer efficiency can drop to 
only 96% before more than five flights are required. The effect of transferring from 
the orbiter to OPS and OPS to the nuclear shuttle and space tugs is shown by assuming 
identical efficiency for each transfer. The baseline mission for 80% efficiency and two 
transfers would require over 10 flights. This compares to only eight flights if the tanks 
are mechanically transferred and only one propellant expulsion operation takes place. 
It is therefore recommended that mechanical transfer of the tank be considered at this 
time as the primary candidate for the OPS operation. 
4.3.3 WCATION OF ORBITAL OPERATIONS CREW. The desirability of locating 
the orbital operations crew forward with the orbiter crew is best illustrated by Figure 
4-20. The baseline number of flights to support a lunar mission, 2 L02 deliveries and 
5 lli2 deliveries, would increase by one if a 10-foot personnel module were inch:.ded in 
the payload bay. Figures 4-16 through 4-18 all illustrate transfer concepts using a 2 
to 4 man personnel module. Figure 4-21 illustrates a variation of the tank transfer 
method. The OPS is different, but more irnportant is the small aft docking control 
station shown in the payload bay. This is reached from the orbiter crew cab by the 
transfer tunnel and is positioned to allow operator visibility without reducing payload 
volume. The small size of this control station is possible due to its use only during 
the transfer operation. 
The decision on location of the operations crew should be based on a more detailed 
analysis of the selected transfer operation and the OPS orbiter interface. At this point 
it seems that transfer of the propellant module using the small aft-control station is 
the most desirable technique. 
4.3.4 INTERFACES. This section will deal primarily with the orbiter, propellant 
module, and launch pad interfaces. 
Two basic interface concepts have been investigated for the removable propellant 
module concept. The first fully integrates the propellant module servicing lines with 
the orbiter propellant system, while the second system has completely independent 
service systems. There are other concepts which are combinations of these two, bu.t 
for relative comparison purposes these two types of. systems have been evaluated. 
The separated system locates the internal disconnect panel aft of the propellant module. 
This location provides space envelopes for panel assembly, flex line sections, activa-
tion mechanisms, and structural supports. The overboard umbilical connections, 
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Figure 4-19. Propellant Transfer Efficiency 
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Figure 4-20. Personnel Module Length vs. Required Orbital 
Flight for LH2 Delivery 
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REFUELING DOCKING RING 
" , 
•••• , •• ··'}.I 
AFT DOCKING CONTROL STATION 
Figure 4-21. Tank Transfer Concept 
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however, are mounted on a separate panel which may require additional weight and 
ground actuation systems. Tradeoffs exist when considering common or separate over-
board umibilical panels. In some cases, the vehicles may be penalized with additional 
line lengths to accomplish common panels. Efforts should be made to place the burdens 
on the ground systems rather than on the vehicles. 
Fill and drain shutoff valves are located near the propellant module. The fittings at 
the internal disconnect panel are also equipped with shutoff devices for preventing 
spillage. When the disconnects and shutoff valves are activated, propellants are 
trapped in the duct-section routing between the fill and drain valve and the panel. 
This requires a relief circuit, which is accomplished by routing a relief tube equip-
ped with a check valve between the duct and the propellant module. 
The disadvantages of the separate plumbing arrangements are duplication of line rout-
ings, increased number of ground umbilicals, and increased weight. Emergency dump-
ing will use the fill-and-drain line ground umbilical connection. Because this connection 
will close after umbilical disconnect, a mechanical means will have to be provided to 
open the valve for in-flight jettisoning. 
No spillage is allowed when the internal panel is actuated; therefore, each disconnect 
fitting is equipped with dual unsymmetrical poppets which are actuated prior to panel 
separation. The small reservoirs of fluid trapped between the poppet closures are 
purged with helium gas prior to disengagement. This is accomplished by routing a 
helium purge tube to the orbiter side of each disconnect. The helium requirements 
are small and may be supplied through the propellant ground umbilical or from the 
orbiter systeln. 
A low pressure, ambient helium prelaunch purge is provided through the umbilical 
disconnect. The purge conditions the propellant module insulation by removing virtu-
ally all air and moisture within the shroud interior. Purge helium is fed through a 
manifold of external lines through the insulation blanket layers and out the seams. 
The vent system must provide the capability for ground venting of propellants as well as 
in-flight venting. 
The ground vent is routed directly to the ground umbilical island. A mechanical means 
will have to be provided to allow venting after launch if tank lockup is not possible dur-
ing this storage period. This will be dependent on the duration and cargo bay thermal 
environment. 
The internal disconnect panel between the propellant module and the orbiter must dis-
connect with no leakage, accommodate line pressures, and absorb misalignments due 
to temperature gradients and tolerances. The assembly must also be capable of re-
connecting in emergencies with no spillage. Several design approaches involving multi-
point linkages, hinged panels, track roller combination, and a telescopic beam are 
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available for the retracting system. Actuation can be accomplished pyrotechnically or 
electromechanically. This is a major area which should be exposed to tradeoff studies 
before a final selection is made. The integrated system design must provide for sepa-
ration from and reloading into the orbiter, jettisoning propellant in case of an emer-
gency, and ground vent capability. 
The integrated installation conveys propellants from the ground umbilical, through 
an internal disconnect panel, through the orbiter, to the propellant module. The pro-
pellant module fill-and-drain system and vent system is interconnected with the orbiter 
circuits. For emergency conditions, the propellant module propellants may be dumped 
into the orbiter and subsequently burned through the main engines. The vent ducts are 
routed through the orbiter circuits to the ground umbilical panel. The basic concepts 
of the separated system disconnect panel and purge requirements are similar to that 
of the separate system. 
Structural attachments between the propellant module and the orbiter are required 
which adequately transmit loads between the two while still allowing for deployment 
and retrieval of the propellant module. 
The structural members available to carry the propellant module loads are two lon-
gerans, each running the length of the cargo bay along each side. Thus, the distributed 
axial load about the 47-ft circumference of the propellant module must be transferred 
to two points in the orbiter. This requires the addition of special structure to transfer 
the loads which may be included either as a part of the propellant module or a part of 
the orbiter vehicle. 
A method of adding the special structure to the cargo bay consists of a distributed 
load ring which mates with the aft adapter ring of the orbiter and a set of oblique skin 
stringer frame cone segments to transfer this distributed load to two axial load pin 
sockets located approximately 6 ft aft of the ring. This configuration is chosen for 
maximum structural efficiency (minimum weight) and is about 75 percent effective in 
transmitting the two point loads to a fully distributed loading on the adapter ring. 
Latches are included on the mating ring of the orbiter to engage and hold the propel-
lant module during orbiter manetnrering, entry, and landing. These structural latches 
must be reusable for multiple deployment and recovery of the propellant module. The 
latches are normally open and pneumatically actuated to the holding position. This 
provides a fail-open mode so that the propellant module can still be deployed or re-
covered should one or more latches become inoperable. 
The load transfer between the orbiter and propellant module is accomplished by axial 
and lateral load pins. These load pins are supported from the orbiter longeron struc-
ture on each side of the cargo bay and are actuated by either electric motor-driven 
ball-·screws or pneumatic cylinders. The actuators must retract the aft lateral pins 
far enough to allow unrestricted movement of the propellant module deployment linkage. 
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The axial pins mate with the sockets located on the propellant module and are loaded in 
single shear. The lateral pins provide resistance to vertical and side loads. These 
pins provide complete stability for the tank in the cargo bay during orbi ter launch, 
orbital maneuvering, entry, and landing. 
A method of extracting the propellant module from the cargo bay of the orbiter while 
in orbit is required. Many mechanisms are capable of performing this separation. 
Among those considered were slider, rotating arm, and four-bar linkage mechanisms. 
Figures 4-18 and 4-21 show typical linkages . Since these linkages operate only in a 
zero-g environment, the only forces applied are those due to inertial loads. No specific 
deployment time has been specified, but a gradual egress taking approximately 60 sec-
onds will result in very low loads and linkage members with relatively small cross-
sections. 
A proposed NASA universal docking ring is desirable for capture and mating of the 
orbiter and empty propellant modules. This docking ring concept allows either iden-
tical half of the device to be active while the other half is passive. 
4. 3. 5 MISSION CAPABILITY. The ranges of launch azimuths and orbit altitudes for 
this mission are shown in Figure 4-22 and illustrate the payload capability. The all 
LH2 delivery is volume limited at less than 45,000 lb. The L02 or LH2/L02 deliveries 
will be weight limited based on the capability shown in this figure. 
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Figure 4-22. Delivery of Propellant Mission Capability 
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4.4 PROPULSIVE STAGE PAYLOADS 
This section describes payloads that are additional propulsive stages carried in the 
payload bay to increase the mission capability of the basic space shuttle. The propul-
sive stag~e is designed to perform a wide variety of missions after being injected into a 
100-n. m.L orbit by the space shuttle. 3ince it is initially injected into orbit in the 
cargo bay of the space shuttle and, in the reusable mode, returns to the cargo bay 
after completing its mission, there are unique structural and fluid jlnterface require-
ments between the two vehicles which are defined in the following subsections. 
Two point designs have been conducted using L02/LH2 as the propellant combinations. 
One design is sized for an ETR launch and the second is sized for a WTR launch. The 
stage sizes chosen are representative of sizes required to accomplish the placement of 
a minimum of 5, 000 lb of payload at synchronous altitude and return of the propulsion 
system to 100 n. mi. altitude for rendezvous with the Earth-orbit shuttle. The purpose 
of the design analysis was to identify areas where the unique launch conditions of this 
system result in design concepts different from standard space launch vehicles. The 
engine system used for this study is the Pratt and Whitney RL10A3··3A, which provides 
an excellent baseline since the operating characteristics of this engine are well known. 
4.4.1 STAGE CONFIGURATION - ~TTR LAUNCH. The vehicle design is shown in 
Figure 4-23. The primary objective of the design study was to achieve a stage of mini-
mum weight and length consistent with the mission requirements and Earth-orbit shuttle 
cargo bay volume. 
Preliminary sizing studies indicate the stage size required to lift a Ininimum of 5, 000 
lb of payload from 100 n. mL to synchronous altitude is approximately 39, 000 lb (32,500 
lb L02 and 6, 500 lb LH2). This represents a stage sized for a WTH launch capable of 
placing over 5, 000 Ib of payload into a synchronous inclined orbit from either WTR or 
J~TR, with a return of the propulsion system to 100 n. mL 
Since the maximum vehicle diameter is limited to 15 ft, the propellant tanks were con-
strained to a diameter of 14 ft, allowing only six inches for super-insulation, structural 
support, and meteoroid bumper shield. 
4.4.1.1 Propellant Tanks. In-line positioning of the two propella.nt tanks and the 
engine creates a long-stage length resulting in a greatly reduced cargo bay length 
available for payload. Solution to this problem was found by locating the engine aft 
of the hydrogen tank and surrounding it with toroidal oxygen tanks. This results in 
an extremely efficient stage geometry. 
A 14-ft diameter LH2 cylindrical tank with 1. 38 elliptical bulkheads was chosen. This 
bulkhead ratio is the maximum value which can be used without the possibility of creat·-
ing compression zones in the bulkhead. The hydrogen tank was sized with 5 percent 
excess volume to allow for ullage, hydrogen boiloff and residuals, zero-g vent valve/I 
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Figure 4-23. Propulsive stage, 39,000 lb Propellant 
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and helium storage bottles. The total tank volume is 1, 606 ft3 and holds 6,500 lb of 
liquid hydrogen. The cylindrical section of the tank is 44.2 in. in length. The tank 
wall thickness was determined with 27.0 psia tank pressure and a full 1--g liquid head. 
A greater head pressure occurs during space shuttle boost of 4g, but the propulsive 
stage tankage can be maintained at a considerably lower pressure during this phase of 
the mission. The allowable design stress used is 1.0 times the ambient yield. of 2219-
T81 aluminum, 44,000 psi. This results in an elliptical bulkhead crown thiclmess of 
0.0362 in. and a cylindrical section thickness of 0.0525 in. 
Toroidal propellant tanks have been proposed for use on many conceptual designs, but 
their actual use at this time has been very limited. Propellant residuals are held to an 
acceptable level by canting the torus. A simple tilt will result in excessive c. g. lateral 
off-sets at low prop.ellant lev~ls, but a flat V or bi-canted torus eliminates this problem. 
A bi-canted torus employs two propellant feed lines, one at each low point. 
The tank is fabricated by spin forming the top and bottom halves of the torus and butt 
welding them together. Canting is accomplished by cutting a small wedge out of oppo-
sing sides of the torus, inserting a shear web, and butt welding the two torus halves 
back together. 
4.4.1. 2 Structural Supports. The structural support for the propellant tanks and 
engine is provided by trusses and vee truss segments. The engine is mounted to a 
small titanium thrust cone which provides mounts for the gimbal block and ghnbal 
actuators. The thrust cone is then connected directly to the hydrogen tank by two 
bays of 12 member trusses which form a 45-degree cone and tangentially intErsect the 
hydrogen tank's elliptical bulkhead. This 45-degree cone is continued from the hydro-
gen tank to the structural/meteoroid protective shell with six pairs of struts arranged 
in truss segmented vees. Lateral support is provided at the forward end of the hydrogen 
tank by four pairs of struts attached from the st:ructural shell to the elliptical bulkhead 
and oriented horizontally. The oxygen tank is supported by two tru.ncated cone truss 
bays. One 12-member truss cone is located tangent to th~ inboard surface of the. torus 
and slopes inward to its termination point on the thrust cone. The other structural 
shell. The oxidizer tank is thus supported by two Itredundant" load paths. This pro-
vides a saddle for the propellar1t tank which supplies adequate axial, lateral, rotaUonal, 
and torsional restraint. 
All tank support struts and thrust cone truss members are low conductive tubes manu·-
factured of unidirectional fiberglass epoxy. These provide excellent thermal isolation 
of the cryogenic propellant tanks from the structural shell and engine. Prototype struts 
of this type have been built and tested by Convair and have shown that design stresses 
in excess of 100 ksi are acceptable. 
Table 4-8 shows a weight breakdown of the 39,000 lb propellant version shown in 
Figure 4-23. 
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Table 4-8. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown 
(Wp = 39,000: Synchronous ·Equatorial Mission) 
Basic Structure 
Cylindrical shell - Al corrugation 
. Aft conical section - H/C 
Aft platform 
Thrus t section 
Miscellaneous 
Secondary Structure 
Equipment supports 
Tank supports - LH2 = 16, L02 = 20 
Support fittings 
Insulation (1 in. Superinsulation) 
Shroud 
Hangers 
Forward closure 
Aft closure 
Main Propulsion 
RL10A-3-3A (1) 
Mounts /harness 
Purge system 
Fuel System 
LH2 tank 
Lines /plumbtng 
Baffle 
Anti-Vortex web 
Fill and drain 
Heat exchanger plumbing 
Oxidizer System 
L02 tank/weldments - torus 
Anti-Vortex web (2) 
Lines /pl umbing 
Fill and drain 
Shear,\Veb and Baffle (2) 
Propellant Loading 
Propellant Utilization 
Sensors/harness 
Computer 
Actuators/plumbing 
4-53 
976 
152 
53 
111 
50 
60 
36 
12 
194 
20 
12 
8 
290 
6 
4 
461 
22 
20 
10 
15 
8 
234 
8 
44 
15 
12 
30 
25 
14 
1,342 
108 
234 
300 
536 
313 
10 
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Table 4-8. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown, Contd 
Thrust Vector Control (Electric) 
Battery ,-
Actuator /supports 
Harness 
Attitude Control System (N204/A-50) 
Tanks (2) (280 lb total cap.) 
Mounts /yokes 
Plumbing, valves regulators 
Harness 
Reaction Motors 
Th~usters (4 clusters) 
Mounts/supports 
Pressurization System 
Helium System 
(2) Cryogenic bottles/supports 
(1) Ambien~ bottle/supports 
Plumbing 
Oxidizer System 
"0" G vent unit 
Ground vent tube 
Plumbing/harness 
Fuel System 
"0" G vent unit 
Ground vent 
Plumbing /harness 
Guidance and Control 
Guidance 
Controls 
Electrical System 
Main System - (4) Fuel Cells 
Harness 
Telemetry and Instrumentation 
(1) TLM Unit - Transmitter 
(1) P&W Inst. Box 
Antennas /landlines 
(1) Receiver 
Separation SystelTI 
Space Shuttle - truss adapter/docking ring 
Payload separation 
4-54 
79 
20 
28 
8 
3 
7 
8 
5 
10 
53 
15 
33 
5 
110 
70 
14 
20 
6 
72 
40 
32 
168 
127 
18 
23 
183 
113 
70 
430 
400 
30 
104 
50 
14 
10 
30 
65 
55 
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Table 4-8. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - \Veight Breakdown, Contd 
Special Installation - Payload 
Relays /harness 
DRY WEIGHT 
Residuals 
Oxidizer - Trapped 
Tank 
Lines 
Fuel - Trapped 
Tank 
Lines 
Propellant Utilization Bias 
Gaseous Propellant 
GH2 
002 
Helium 
H2 tank 
02 tank 
Bottles (3) 
ReS 
Reaction Control (N204/ A-50) 
JETTISON WEIGHT 
32 
40 
20 
2 
178 
220 
13 
13 
9 
4 
Propellant Weight Summary 
Expendables - Main 
Ground Run 
Boost Phase 
Orbit Phase 
Chilldown 
1st burn 
2nd burn 
3rd burn 
4th burn 
Engine Start 
1st burn 
2nd burn 
3rd burn 
4th burn 
Loss es assumed negligible 
4-55 
6,500 
-15 
-15 
-15 
-15 
-5 
-5 
-5 
-5 
72 
22 
25 
398 
38 
29 
£g 
32,500 
-45 
-45 
-45 
-45 
-27 
-27 
-27 
-27 
25 
(4,122) 
585 
(4, 707) 
Total 
39,000 
-60 
-60 
-60 
-60 
-32 
-32 
-32 
-32 
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Table 4-8. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown, Contd 
, 
,i 
., 
Engine Shutdown 
1st burn -3 
2nd burn -3 
3rd burn -3 
4th burn -3 
Coast (7 days) -168 
Leakage (7 days) -1 
Main Impulse Expendables 6,239 
Auxiliary Propellants ~ 04/ A-50) 
Start Settling (4) 35/30/17/17 
Shutdown Da mping (4) 
Roll Control during Main Burn (4) 
Attitude Control - Coast Orientation 
Initial 
5-1/4 hour coast-up 
Sync. Eq. Coast - 1 
Sync. Eq. Coast - 2 
5-1/4 hour coast-back 
Rendezvous orbit 
Rendezvous (150 ft/sec) 
Payload Separation 
Minimum N20 4 /A-50 Expended 
Reserve and Contingency* 
Residual* 
Minimum N20 4 /A-50 Required 
Gross Weight Summary (w /0 payload) 
Stage jettison weight 
Expendable propellants - main 
auxiliary 
helium 
Gross Weight at Space Shuttle Launch 
*Included in Jettison \Veight 
4.-56 
-7 
-7 
-7 
-7 
0 
-3 
32,181 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-10 
-168 
-4 
38,420 
4, 
39, 
43, 
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20 
24 
100 
8 
251lb 
25 
4 
280lb' 
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4,4.2 STAGE CONFIGURATION - ETR LAUNCH. This configuration is shown in 
Figure 4":24. Preliminary sizing studies indicate that the stage size required to lift 
a minimum of 5,000 lb of payload from the inclined 100 n. mi. orbit to a synchronous 
equatorial orbit and return is approximately 65,000 lb (54,170 lb L02 and 10,830 lb 
LH2). Launch of this stage from WTR can only be achieved by off-loading propulsive 
stage propellants. 
4.4.2 i' 1 Propellant Tanks. The only LH2/L02 tankage configuration which results in 
a stage length short enough so that both the stage and payload will fit in the 60 ft space 
shuttle cargo bay is a stretch version of the 39,000 lb propulsive stage. Stage lengths 
not utilizing a toroidal oxygen tank configuration are all several feet too long. 
The hydrogen LH2 tank is identical in shape to the 39,000 lb propulsive stage LH2 tank, 
except for its increased cylindrical length. The tank is 14 ft in diameter, with a 128-
in. long cylindrical section and 1.38 elliptical bulkheads. The total tank volume is 
2, 680 ft3 and it holds 10, 830 lb of liquid hydrogen. The tank wall thicknesses were 
again determined for 2219-T81 aluminum, a 1-g liquid head, and an operating tank 
pressure of 27 psia. The resulting elliptical bulkhead crown thickness is 0.0365 in. 
and the cylindrical section is 0.053 in. thick. 
The toroidal L02 tank chosen for the oxygen propellant is a unique shape which pro-
vides the maximum possible volume obtainable for an internally pressurized torus 
without inducing compressive stresses. It is best described as a zero-hoop-stress 
meridional torus. If this tank is assumed pressurized by a weightless gas, the hoop 
membrane forces are zero in all portions of the shell except for a short (38.9 in.) 
cylindrical section on the outer radius. The resulting toroidal ~onfiguration is one 
which may eliminate the possibility of buckling failures, since the remaining meri-
dional forces will be tensile. The cross-section of revolution has a kidney bean ap-
pearance. It has a total length of 84 in., an outside dialneter of 14 ft, and an inside 
diameter of 59.4 in. The torus is also bi-canted to reduce the propellant residuals. 
The total tank volume is 814 ft3, which contains 54,170 lb of liquid oxygen. 
The tank skin gage was determined as before. The thickness on the i.nside surface of 
the torus is 0.0512 in. and the cylindrical outer portion is 0.0414-in. thick. 
4.4.2.2 Structural SUpports. The propellant tan.k structural support system is simi-
lar to the 39, OOO-Ib propulsive stage with several minor exceptions. The first is the 
configuration of the thrust cone/barrel. The oxygen tank is of sufficient depth that two 
45-degree truss cones sloping inboard from tangency points on the tank meet approxi-
mately on the vehicle axis. To obtain a distributed load transfer in this region, a 30-in. 
diamet~r barrel is inserted between the two truss cones. The thrust cone is identical 
to the 39K model and is atta,ched to the aft end of this barrel. The second difference is 
the configuration of the truss cone which is tangent to the aft bulkhead of the hydrogen 
tank. This structure of six strut pairs is arranged in three bays on a 45-degree cone, 
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as was the similar structure on the 39, OOO-lb vehicle. This cone, however, passes 
tangent to and attaches to the oxidizer tank. This is done to provide adequate lateral 
support for the longer tank and to decrease the stage length by moving the oxygen tank 
as far forward as possible. One additional difficulty results from transmitting this 
load path through the oxygen tank. Because the tank is bi-canted, this truss does not 
lie exactly within a 45-degree conical surface, thereby inducing some slight bending 
loads into both propellant tanks at the tangency point. A ring, integral with the propel-
lant tank, has been added on both tanks to properly react these loads. 
4.4.2.3 Structural Shell. The structural shell for the 65, OOO-lb propulsive stage is 
-again similar to the 39, OOO-lh shell. The structure is primarily designed to meet 
meteoroid penetration and structural load requirements. Here again, a shielding 
factor of 0.5 was used. For the appropriate tank wall gages and meteoroid bumper 
shields above 0.013, the probability of no penetration of the tanks for a seven-day 
space residence is 0.9958. 
The shell is corrugated 2024-T3 aluminum 0 .. 016-in. thick. A O. 025-in. doubler is 
used under this bumper shield aft of the thrust cone ring to react tank support ring 
loads. The frames and their spacing are again dictated by general stability criteria 
and handling considerations. They are 3. O-in" deep Z sections 0.040-in. thick, spaced 
30 in. apart. The forward end of the hydrogen tank is again supported by four strut 
pairs which attach to an I cross-section frarne on the structural shell. 
The propellant tanks and thrust cone are supported by struts which attach to the shell 
at two rings. These rings are each three in. wide and 12 in. deep, with O. I25-in. 
thick walls. The aft ring also serves as the interface with the orbiter support structure. 
The cargo bay interface support beam and longerons shown on the 39, OOO-lb propulsive 
stage are not included in the 65, OOO-lb design. The configuration shown employs a 
distributed load transfer to an interface support structure in the orbiter, rather than a 
point load transfer from the propulsive stage. However, if a non-optimum load distri-
bution occurs in the orbiter interface ~upport structure, some small longerons may be 
required between the tank support rings. 
4.4.2.4 Thermal Protection System. The superinsulation and purge system used on 
the 65, 000 lb propulsive stage is an identical scaled-up version of the 39,000 lb con-
figuration. A I-in. multi-layer radiation shield blanket encapSUlates both propellant 
tanks. The vehicle structural shell serves as the purge control volume. 
The weights summary for this stage is given In Table 4-9. 
4.4.3 SPACE SHUTTLE/PROPULSIVE STAGE INTERFACES. One of the major areas 
where the propulsive stage differs from standard high energy upper stage vehicles is 
the interface definition between the propulsive stage and orbiter. This subject can be 
divided into two categories. The first deals with the fluid interfaces and the second 
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Table 4-9. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown 
(Wp = 65, 000 lb: Synchronous Equatorial Mission) 
Basic Structure 
Cylindrical shell 
Aft conical section 
Aft skirt - platform 
Thrust section 
Disconnect Pinel 
Miscellaneous 
Secondary Structure 
Equipment supports 
Tank supports - LH2 = 27, 1.,02 = 33 
Support fittings 
Insulation (1" Superinsulation) 
Shroud 
Hangers 
Forward closure 
Aft closure 
Main Propulsion 
RL10A-3-3A (1) 
:Mounts/harness 
Purge system 
Fuel System 
LH2 tank 
Lines/plumbing 
Baffle 
Anti-Vortex web 
Fill & drain 
Heat exchanger plumbing 
Oxidizer System 
L02 tank/weldments - torus 
Anti-Vortex web (2) 
Lines/plumbing 
Fill & drain 
Sheer webs & baffles (2) 
Load Transfer webs 
4-60 
1,331 
82 
51. 
144 
15 
53 
60 
60 
20 
302 
30 
12 
8 
290 
6 
4 
746 
24 
20 
10 
17 
10 
476 
8 
51 
15 
15 
18 
1,676 
140 
354 
300 
827 
583 
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Table 4-9 .. L02/lli2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown, Contd 
Propellant Loading 
Propellant Utilization 
Sensors/harness 
Computer 
Actuators/plumbing 
Thrust Vector Control (Electric) 
Battery 
Actuator /supports 
Harness 
Attitude Control System (N204/A-50) 
Tanks (2) (400 lbs total cap.) 
Mounts/yokes 
Plumbing, valves regulators 
Harness 
Reaction Motors 
Thrusters (4 clusters) 
Mounts/supports 
Pressurization System 
Helium System 
(3) Cryogenic bottles/supports 
(1) Ambient bottle/ sUPIX>rts 
Plumbing 
Oxidizer System 
"0" G vent unit 
Ground vent tube 
Plumbing/harness 
Bubbler manifold 
Fuel System 
"0" G vent unit 
Ground vent 
Plumbing/harness 
Bubbler manifold_ 
Guidance & Control 
Guidance 
Controls 
Electrical System 
Main system - (4) Fuel cells 
Harness 
4-61 
120 
25 
38 
8 
6 
10 
8 
8 
10 
15 
12 
50 
25 
15 
15 
33 
5 
LJO 
20 
26 
8 
40 
32 
183 
32 
45 
113 
70 
400 
30 
17 
90 
53 
154 
72 
260 
183 
430 
~'*' 
ii , .... '/.. 
) ',' 
j' 
F 
I, 
H 
Volume VIII 
Table 4-9. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown~ Contd 
Telemetry & Instrumentation 
(1) . Transmitter 
(1) P&W inst. box 
(1) Receiver 
Antenna & support 
Separation System 
Orbiter - truss adapter/docking ring 
Payload separation 
Special Installation - Payload 
Relays/harness 
DRY WEIGHT 
Residuals 
Oxidizer - Trapped 
Tank 
Lines 
Fuel - Trapped 
Tank 
Lines 
p. U. Bias 
Gaseous Propellant 
GH2 
. 002 Helium 
H2 tank 
02 tank 
Bottles (4) 
ReS 
Reaction Control (N20 4/A- 50-) 
JETTISON WEIGHT 
Propellant Weight Summary 
Expendables - Main 
Ground Run } 
Losses assumed negligible Boost Phase 
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32 
45 
20 
4 
297 
367 
21 
20 
13 
5 
50 
14 
30 
15 
85 
10 
77 
24 
40 
664 
59 
41 
°2 
54,167 
109 
95 
25 
(5,368) 
905 
(6)>273) 
Total 
65,000 
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Table 4-9. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Br€:akdown, Contd 
Total 
Orbit Phase 
Chilldown 
1st burn -15 -45 -60 
2nd burn 
-15 -45 -60 
3rd burn 
-15 -45 -60 
4th burn 
-15 -45 -60 
Engine Start 
1st burn 
-5 -27 -32 
2nd burn 
-5 -27 -32 
3rd burn 
-5 -27 -32 
4th burn 
-5 -27 -32 
Engine Shutdown 
1st burn 
-3 -7 ... 10 
2nd burn 
-3 -7 -10 
3rd burn 
-3 
-7 -10 
. 4th burn 
-3 
-7 -10 
Coast (7 days) 
-168 0 -168 
Leakage (7 days) 
-1 -3 -4 
Main Impulse Expendables 10,572 53,848 64,420 
Auxiliary Propellants (N204/A-5O) 
Start Settling (4) 56/48/27/27 158 
Shutdown Damping (4) 0 
Roll Control during Main Burn (4) 27 
Attitude Control - Coast Orientation 36 
Initial 6 
5-1/4 hour coast-up 6 
Sync. Eq. Coast - 1 6 
Sync. E qt Coast - 2 6 
5-1/4 hot"!r coast-back 6 
Rendezvous orbit 6 
Rendezvous (150 ft/sec) 125 
Payload Separation 13 
Minimum N20 4/A-50 Expended 359 
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Table 4-9. L02/LH2 Propulsive Stage - Weight Breakdown, Contd 
Reserve & Contingency* 
Residua1* 
Minimum N20 41A-50 Required 
Gross Weight Summary (w/o payload) 
Stage jettison weight 
Expendahle propellants. - main 
- auxiliary 
Helium - expendable 
Gross Weight at Booster Launch 
*Included in Jettison Weight 
35 
6 
400lb 
6,273 
65,000 
359 
22 
71,654 
deals with the mechanical/structural interfaces. The interface discussion included 
herein is essentially independent of propulsive stage size and is applicable to both 
previously described stages. 
4.4.3.1 ~uid System Interfaces. Two basic concepts have been investigated. The 
first fully integrates the propulsive stage fluid servicing lines with the orbiter, while· 
the second system has completely independent service systems. There are other 
concepts which are combinations of these two, but for relative comparison purposes 
these two types of systems have been evaluated. 
Separated Systems (Figure 4-25). Two arrangements are shown for the separate 
servicing line concept. Figure 4-26 locates the internal disconnect panel forward of 
the transfer stage oxidizer tanle This location permits the mounting of the overboard 
ground umbilical fittings on the same umbilical panel used by some of the orbiter cir-
cuits. A limited space envelope for the support and activation of the internal discon-
nect panel is the primary disadvantage. 
The second method shown in Figure 4-27 locates the internal disconnect panel aft of 
the transfer stage oxidizer tank. This location provides larger space envelopes for the 
panel assembly, flex line sections, activation mechanisms, and structural supports. 
The overboard umbilical connections, however, are mounted on a separate panel which 
may require additional weight and ground actuation systems. Tradeoffs exist when 
considering common or separate overboard umbilical panels. In some cases, the 
vehicles may be penalized with additional line lengths to accomplish common panels. 
Efforts should be made to place the burdens on the ground systems rather than on the 
vehicles. 
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Integrated SYEtems. In addition to the usual need for optimum routing of lightweight, 
flexible propellant ducts the design must provide for separation from and reloading 
into the orbiter, propellant jettisoning in case of an emergency, and ground vent 
capability. 
The fill and drain installation conveys propellants from the ground umbilical, through 
an internal disconnect panel, through the orbiter stage, to the transfer stage propellant 
tanks. The transfer stage fill-and-drain systems and vent systems are interconnected 
with the orbiter circuits (see Figure 4-28). An installation drawing is shown in Figure 
4-29. Fo'!: emergency conditions, the transfer stage propellants may be dumped into 
the orbiter stage and subsequently burned through the main engines. The vent ducts 
are routed throu.gh the orbiter circuits to the ground umbilical panel. The basic concepts 
of the separated system disconnect panel, GN2 tank pressurization, and purge require-
ments are similar to that of the separate system. 
4.4.3.2 Propulsive Stage/Orbiter Structural Interfaces. Structural attachments be-
tween the propulsive stage and the orbiter are required which adequately transmit 
loads between the two vehicles while still allowing for deployment and recapture of 
the orbital stage. 
The structural attachment is complicated by the configuration of the orbiter cargo bay. 
The only structural members available to carry the propulsive stage loads are two 
longerons, each running the length of the cargo bay along each side. Thus, the distri-
buted axial load about the 47-ft circumference of the propulsive stage must be transfer-
red to two points in the orbiter. This requires the addition of special structure to trans-
fer the loads which may be included either as a part of the propulsive stage or a part 
of the orbiter. 
A method of adding the special structure to the cargo bay of the orbiter is shown in 
Figures 4-30 and 4-31. This structure consists of a distributed load ring which mates 
with the aft adapter ring of the propulsive stage and a set of oblique skin stringer frame 
cone segments to transfer this distributed load to two axial load pin sockets located 
approximately six feet aft of the ring. This configuration is chosen for maximum struc-
tural efficiency (minimum weight) and is about 75 percent effective in transmitting the 
two point loads to a fully distributed 19ading on the adapter ring. Latches are included 
on the mating ring to engage and hold the propulsive stage during orbiter maneuvering, 
reentry, and landing. These 24 structural latches (shown in Figure 4-30) must be re-
usable for multiple deployments and recoveries of the propulsive stage vehicle. The 
latches shown are normally open and pneumatically actuated to the holding pOSition. 
This provides a fail-open mode so that the propulsive stage can still be deployed or 
recovered should one or more latches become inoperable. The use of an external 
interface support structure of this type is not limited to the transport of the propulsive 
stage. All projected orbiter payloads will have a load transfer problem identical to 
the propulsive stage. This structure will work equally well for these other payloads. 
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The load transfer between the propulsive stage and the orbiter is accomplished by two 
axial load pins and four pairs of lateral load pins. These 10 load pins are supported 
from the orbiter longeron structure on each side of the cargo bay and are actuated by 
either electrical motor-driven ball-screws or pneumatic cylinders. The actuators 
must retract the aft lateral pins far enough to allow unrestricted movement of the pro-
pulsive stage deployment linkage. The axial pins mate with the sockets located on 
the support structure and are loaded in single shear. The lateral support pins are 
located one on each side of the two propulsive stage propellant tank support rings, the 
forward end of the propulsive stage, and the payload center of gravity. They provide 
resistance to vertical and side loads. These 10 pins provide co'mplete stability for 
the propulsive stage in the cargo bay during space shuttle launch, orbital maneuvering, 
reentry, and landing. 
4.4.4 PERFORMANCE. The performance of the propulsive stage on the baseline 
mission and alternate missions is summarized below. 
The initial performance analYSis for the propulsive stage is based upon varying pro-
pellant type and propellant weights for the purpose of rough sizing. An oxygen/hydrogen 
stage at a gross weight of 50,000 lb is the first configuration selected for the purpose 
of more detailed performance analysis. The propellants investigated, with their spe-
cific impulses, are: 
!' ropellant Type 
Fluorine/Hydrogen, F 2/H2 
Oxygen/Hydrogen, 0 2/H2 
Oxygen Difluoride/Methane, OF2/CH4 
Nitrogen Tetroxide/ Aerozine 50, N204/ A-50 
Specific Impulse (sec) 
460 
444,454 
395 
292,340 
Performance is based upon a flight performance reserve (FPR) at 2 percent of stage 
total ideal velocity. Stage burnout weight (scaling laws) for the sizing study is presented 
in Figure 4-32 as a function of stage propellant weight. 
Two mission modes and four vehicle operational modes were considered during the 
study. The two mission modes considered were the synchronous equatorial circular 
orbit mission and the synchronous inclined circular orbit mission. Vehicle operational 
modes include payload placement (payload is placed into orbit by the vehicle) with (1) 
an expendable vehicle (vehicle does not return to the orbiter) and (2) a recoverable ve-
hicle (vehicle returns to the orbiter). The recoverable vehicle is also used for (3) 
payload retrieval (vehicle without payload goes to orbit to retrieve an orbiting payload), 
and (4) payload placement and retrieval. Table 4-10 identifies the performance curve 
for each of the mission and operational modes. 
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A single design was selected for analysis using a 50, OOO-ib gross weight single engine 
02H2 configuration with specific impulse of 444 sec. The weight statement for this 
configuration (including engine start and stop :loss, propellant venting, and attitude 
control requirements) is presented in Section 4.4.1. The payload for the synchron-
ous equatorial and synchronous inclined orbit is 3, 880 and 7, 970 lb respectively. 
A curve of payload versus excess circular velocity for a single burn mission is pre-
sented in Figure 4--33 based on the 02H2 point design configuration. The discontin~ 
uous break in the curve results at the point at which propellant is off-loaded to keep 
the gross weight from exceeding 50,000 and 80,000 Ib, respectively. As the weights 
for the specific configurations are developed, the performance curves will be revised. 
Table- 4-10. Performance Curve Identification 
Mission Mode 
Synchronous Equatorial 
Circular Orbit 
Synchronous Inclined 
Circular Orbit 
Operational Mode 
Payload placement - expendable vehicle (Figure 4-34) 
Payload placement - recoverable vehicle (Figure 4-35) 
Payload retrieval (Figure 4-36) 
Payload placement and retrieval (Figure 4-37) 
Payload placement - expendable vehicle (Figure 4-38) 
Payload placement - recoverable vehicle (Figure 4-39) 
Payload retrieval - recoverable vehicle (Figure 4-40) 
Payload placement and retrieval - recoverable vehicle 
(Figure 4-41) 
Payload partials are presented in Table 4-·11. These partials are valid only for the 
conditions for which they were calculated and should not be assumed valid for other 
conditions. 
4.4.5 ORBITAL OPERATIONS. Thi.s section discusses the orbital operation of de-
ploying the propulsive stage payload with the space shuttle and docking after the pro-
pulsive stage has completed its mission. 
4.4.5.1 Propulsive Stage Deployment. A method of extracting the propulsive stage/ 
payload from the cargo bay of the orbiter while in orbit is required. The propulsive 
stage attitude control system could possibly be used for this purpose, but the space 
available for maneuvering inside the cargo bay is very limited and exhaust impinge-
ment on internal orbiter hardware is not desirable, which makes this approach appear 
impractical. Some mechanical method of deploying the propulsive stage is therefore 
needed. lVIany mechanisms are capable of performing this separation. Among those 
considered were slider, rotating arm, and four-bar linkage mechanisms. Figure 
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Voluem YIn 
4-30 shows a typical four-bar linkage with a rotating arm follower. The linkage rota-
tion points and drive (either electric ball-screw or pneumatic/hydraulic cylinder) are 
fixed to the orbiter cargo bay longerons, and the driven points are attached to the ex-
ternal interface support structure. The linkage shown results in an almost linear 
"straight out" travel of the front of the payload, clears the main structural frames at 
the fore and aft end of the cargo bay, and completely removes the propulsive stage/ 
payload from the orbiter cargo bay. Since this linkage operates only in a zero-g en-
vironment, the only forces applied are those due to inertial loads. No specific deploy-
ment time has been specified, but a gradual egress taking approximately 60 sec will 
result in very low loads and linkage members with realtively small cross-sections. 
The deployment linkage used with an internally supported propulsive stage will be very 
similar to the linkage just discussed. Instead of being attached to the support struc-
ture, however, it will be connected to a ring used to support the propulsive stage 
docking mechanisms. 
4.4.5.2 Propulsive Stage Docking. A universal docking ring is desirable for capture 
and mating of the orbiter and its payload. This docking ring concept allows either 
identical half of the device to be active while the other half is passive. It is particu-
larly attractive for use with manned payloads since pressurized personnel tunnels 
can be coupled through the inside of the ring. For the propulsive stage, no personnel 
transfer is envisioned, particularly at the aft end. This ring configuration fits well 
about the engine, however, and uses very little cargo bay space. 
The docking ring shown on the propulsive stage, Figure 4-23, is completely passive, 
while that in the orbiter, Figure 4-30, is the active ring. 
In addition to the normal docking requirements of impact absorption, capture, and 
mating, another special action is needed during the docking sequence. This is rota-
tional positioning. Lateral structural support between the propulsive stage and the 
orbiter is required during reentry, nlaneuvering, and landing. These lateral supports 
are located on the horizontal axis of the propulsive stage and are engaged by support 
pins attached to the cargo bay longerons. The propulsive stage must be carefully 
positioned with respect to the orbiter to enable proper pin engagement. 
A positioning ring is used to provide both the translational and rotational motion to the 
docking ring. The positioning ring is constructed of two interconnected concentric 
rings which are free to turn in their supports and with respect to each other. There 
are four supports holding the positioning ring; one is a drive unit and the other three 
are follower units. These support guides are attached to the external'support struc-
ture by shock mounts to absorb impact loads during docking. Three pairs of support 
struts connect the positioning ring to the docking ring. Of each pair, the left leg is 
connected to the outer half of the positioning ring and the right leg to the inner half. 
Therefore, when the positioning ring halves are counter rotated, an in-and-out trans-
lational movement of the docking ring is obtained. When the ring halves are both rota-
ted together as one, the docking ring also rotates but does not translate. 
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Volume VIII 
The propulsive stage deployment/docking sequence is: 
a. Deployment and Release 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Demate propulsive stage/orbiter electrical/fluids disconnects. 
Unlatch axial and lateral structural support attachments. 
Remove propulsive stage from the orbiter cargo bay with the four-bar deploy-
ment mechanism. 
Deploy propulsive stage attitude control system thruster clusters. 
Unlatch propulsive stage/external interface support structure structural 
latches (24). 
Translate propulsive stage away from the interface support structure with 
docking positioning mechanism. 
Unlatch docking ring capture hooks. 
Move propulsive stage away from the orbiter with ACS engines. 
b. Docking and Storage 
1. Propulsive stage is positioned slightly ahead of the orbiter in proper docking 
attitude with the propulsive stage ACS system. 
2. Interface support structure is in deployment/recapture position with struc-
tural latches released. 
3. Docking ring is fully extended with capture hooks open. 
4. The propulsive stage is driven to the orbiter using its ACS engines. 
5. Positioning for docking is accomplished by aids such as closed circuit tele-
vision. 
6. Capture hooks on the propulsive stage docking ring engage orbiter docking ring 
and latch. 
7. Docking ring is retracted and rotated to proper propulsive stage/orbiter 
orientation. 
8. Propulsive stage is mated with the internal support structure and the Etruc-
tural latches are engaged. 
9. The ACS engine clusters are retracted, nitrogen purge connected, and pro-
pellant tanks blown down and refilled with GN2' 
10. The propulsive stage is retracted into the cargo bay by the deployment linkage. 
11. The axial and lateral structural support attachments are engaged. 
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4.4.6 GROUND OPERATIONS. Propulsive stages using solid engines and/or stor-
able propellants could be installed in the orbiter payload section at the logistics area 
as illustrated in Figure 4-42. The orbiter element will be towed to this area in the 
horizontal mode, the cargo doors opened, and the stage installed by means of a loading 
device similar to that shown in the figure. The orbiter then is towed to the launch pad. 
When the propulsion stage contains cryogenic propellants, such as the baseline defined 
in this section, the stage is installed dry at the logistics area and propellant added at 
the launch pad. This servicing requirement was discussed in Section 4.4.3.1, Fluid 
System Interlaces. 
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4.4.7 MULTI-MISSION CAPABILITY. This payload extends the mission flexibility 
of the space shuttle basically by adding another stage to the orbiter. 
The baseline payload vehicle described in this section, for example, can place payloads 
in synchronous equatorial or inclined circular orbit. In addition, the system has the 
following operational modes available: 
a. Payload placement - expendable propulsive stage 
b. Payload placement - rec,Jverable propulsive stage 
c. Payload retrieval (from synchronous orbit) 
d. Payload placement and retrieval 
The performance (payload weight, etc.) on both missions, in the alternate modes of 
opera tion is shown in Section 4.4.4. 
I 4.5 SATELLITE DELIVERY, MAINTENANCE, AND RETRIEVAL 
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This section documents a brief study to determine space shuttle requirements resulting 
from the satellite mission. Alternate maintemmce and deployment concepts are shown 
as well as a method of retrieving an inoperative unmanned satellite. 
4.5.1 BASIC MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS. As shown in Figure 4-43, severalcon-
cepts were considered for servicing a satellite in Earth orbit. 
Concept A would retrieve the inoperative satellite, return it to Earth for maintenance, 
and then redeploy it in orbit. This approach eliminates the problems associated with 
performing maintenance in orbit, such as pressurized work areas and having 'equip-
ment available. However, two space shuttle round trips are required and the costs 
involved make this an unattractive concept. This approach could be used with minimum 
modification to the space shuttle after the addition of a docking adapter (provided the 
satellite had docking provisions). 
Concept B assumes that the satellites deployed during the time period of interest have 
in-orbit maintenance provisions incorporated. Such provisions would include a pres-
surized work section containing components most likely to fail and a docking port. In 
this case, the maintenance personnel and equipment could enter the satellite after 
docking. This concept wo~ld also minimize special space shuttle requirements. The 
primary disadvantage is that this concept requires all satellites have maintenance 
provisions incorporated. 
Concept C requires a pressurized payload bay to permit maintenance in a shirtsleeve 
environment. It was estimated that this would result in a 15, OOO-Ib penalty to the 
basic space shuttle orbiter on all missions not requiring a pressurized payload bay. 
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Concept D uses a pressurized maintenance module in the space shuttle. The module 
is installed in the payload bay and rotated to the position shown. The end of the module 
opens and the satellite is maneuvered into the module. The end then closes and the 
module pressurized. Workmen enter from the small personnel module. This concept 
would not unduly penalize the satellite or the basic space shuttle and is recommended as 
a baseline concept. 
4.5.2 DEPLOYMENT AND RETRIEVAL CONCEPTS. Satellite deployment is a con-
siderably easier task to accomplish than retrieval because the payload is directly con-
nected to the orbiter throughout the deployment phase giving absolute control of the 
separating bodies. Retrieval presents the most formidable problems particularly 
when encountering a random tumbling,rolling payload of the size and weight that the 
orbiter is designed to carry. The following discussion, therefore, is directed pri-
marily towards the retrieval operation. 
Two satellite retrieval docking concepts were analyzed: non-impact and impact. The 
non-impact concept is performed with a winch drawing the two bodies together against 
the resisting force of an RCS at low closing velocities; the impact concept employs a 
"double ring and cone" docking system with shock absorbers. (See Figure 4-43. ) 
With the large inertia loads and satellite bodies of relatively lightweight structure it 
is apparent that there is a somewhat greater risk to impact dock than to soft dock. 
The winch/RCS docking system is considered a non-impact docking system since there 
can be very accurate control of the closing rate between the two bodies. The impact 
docking is considered to be a standard double ring and cone where hookup would be 
analogous to freight .car couplers with the impact energy being absorbed by the coupl-
ing device as discussed in Section 4.2.3. 
4.5.2.1 Non-Impact Docking Concept. This concept is based on the capability of 
stabilizing the payload and orbiter at some distance from each other. A structural 
member with a direction detector such as TV will then be extended from the orbiter 
to engage the satellite. The light structural member is slowly retracted to bring the 
vehicles together for structural connection. 
The extendable member" a boom tape, is capable of transmitting tension loads pri-
marily and only a minor amount of compression. Compression would be used to extend 
the member for attachment to the payload at a distance of about 20 feet. 
The winch would accelerate the bodies toward each other with retro-thrust on both the 
payload and orbiter providing counterforce. The non-impact docking concept depends 
on achieving very low relative velocities between the tw'O bodies. This is in compari-
son with the current Apollo impact conditions. Winches in g;eneral provide slow smooth 
positive pull and are ideal for meeting the docking requirements. 
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Figure 4-44 shows schematically a non-impact docking operation. The sequence of 
events required to accomplish this mission is described in the, next paragraphs. A 
time graph, Figure 4-45, shows a two-minute llon-ilnpact docking operation. This 
graph assumes the payload has maneuvered 20 feet from the orbiter I s deployment/ 
retrieval (D /R) mechanism and the winch boom is connected to the payload. The 
final docking sequence begins at this point. 
The graph shows that the payload is accelerated by the winch pull against the small 
retro-thrust (50 lb) of the orbiter'S and payload's stabilization systems. The winch 
pulls at 0.25 fps until the payload is three feet above the n/R mechanism. At this 
point either the retro-thrust is applied which exceeds the winch's slip clutch capacity 
or the retro-thrust remains the same and a variable speed winch slows down as the 
payload decelerates. This depends on the winch concept as discussed. 
After payload deceleration, the payload is two feet above the n/R mechanism and pos-
sesses a closing velocity of 0.05 fps. At touchdown the closing rate is reduced to 
zero and the payload is at rest on the D/R mechanism. The payload is then checked 
to see if automatic latching has been successfully achieved before releasing winch and 
deactivating the ACS system. Propellant required by the payload's ACS systern is 
shown in Figure 4-46. 
Once the payload is on the telescoping D IR mechanism, it is very slowly retracted 
into the payload bay where it is latched to the orbiter's structure as described in the 
next section. 
The D IR mechanism is mounted on a track that rides on rails along the inboard side 
of the payload bay longerons. This allows adjustment to accommodate various c. g. 
positions of the payload and placement of several smaller payloads in the same bay. 
The retraction winch is mounted on an under carriage or on its own track to align 
with the payload's retrieval cone receptacle when its lugs are lined up with the D/B 
mechanism receptacles. 
Two types of winch concepts have been considered~ (1) a constant speed reel with a 
slip clutch, which during the docking ope ration sl:ips against the decelerating thrust 
of the payload docking pack RSC, and (2) a variable speed reel which slows down as 
the payload is decelerating and which also has slip clutch capability during accelera·· 
tion of the payload. 
The- constant speed reel provides a positive pull at all times. This prevents the possi-
bility of buckling the winch tape column and ruining it for future operations. The vari-
able speed reel may inadvertently be set to reel-in slower than the payload's deceler-· 
ating velocity and buckle the column. However, the variable speed winch operation 
requires about half the propellant from the docking pack that the constant speed winch 
operation consumes (21 lb to 55 lb). This means that doing the same job over the same 
time more loss work is dissipated as heat energy by the constant speed winch operation. 
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The variable speed winch requires no thruster adjustment during docking operation. 
The constant speed winch varies the thruster output to control docking operation but 
does not require winch control. 
Although there are advantages to both types of winches it appears at present that the 
variable speed winch has more advantages than the constant speed. The speed change 
must be smooth to eliminate the chance of negative loads occurring in the tape boom. 
In order to accomplish the retrieval task the following list of equipment in the satellite 
or in the orbiter is necessary: 
ACS or maneuver pack (satellite) 
Cone receptacle (satellite) 
Winch system (orbiter) 
Tie down receptacles ana chocks (orbiter) 
Deployment/retrieval mechanism (orbiter) 
Control station (orbiter) 
4.5.2.2 Impact Docking Concept. The two mating bodies are positioned and the pilot 
slowly flys the orbiter to connect with the satellite. This technique is Concept A shown 
in Figure 4-43. In this concept a payload adapter is employed which is attached to the 
aft end of the satellite using a standard docking system mechanism. The adapter would 
be the same diameter as the payload and would include a mating docking system with 
periphery latching to match the payload. Various mechanisms can be attached to the 
adapter to translate the satellite module in and out of the payload storage bay. Since 
the payload is at zero-g during this operation a low-speed screw jack can be used for 
actuation. Launch and landing loads will be taken by fittings attached to the main 
longerons. 
The payload is positioned at an angle above the orbital vehicle to provide for maximum 
cleara.nce during docking maneuvers. It is a.ssumed that the payload will be maneuvered 
into this docking positiol\ by either its own ACS or the maneuver pack system described 
in Section 4.5.3. 
The sketches show the adapter and mechanism at the aft end of the payload bay; how-
ever, it could be reversed if desired. The rationale behind this concept is to position 
the payload being retrieved out ahead of the vehicle where it can be seen by the pilot 
who can then ''fly'' the orbital vehicle under the payload (analogous to the flying boom 
and receptacle in airplane refueling operations). If, however, the adap1~er is located 
in the forward bay, the payload being retrieved would be behind the orbital vehicle 
which would seriously hinder the pilot's view and also enhance collisions with the tail 
surfaces. 
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The fina.l docking maneuvers would be monitored by a member of the crew stationed 
in the payload bay area. He would operate the mechanism for latching the payload to 
the adapter and for translating the payload into the bay. He would then check that the 
payload has been securely locked into the structural support fittings. 
4.5.3 MANEUVERING ~?ACK (MP). A general philosophy that has a great influence 
on deployment and retrieval methods is investigated herein for the handling of free-
flight recoverable satellites. This philosophy postulates that all payloads to be re-
trieved Tnust possess an active on-board maneuvering system. This system is able 
to perform all the tasks of a space tug with the additional, most important advantage 
that it can stabilize a random tumbling and wobbling payload. It is believed that many 
satellites to be retrieved will have motion that is nearly impossible to control without 
an internal system. Besides having the ability to stabilize the payload for retrieval, 
the MP also can translate the payload to the orbiter and assist in the docking operations. 
The payload MP is to be in addition to and· independent of the operational system allow-
ing it to be activated when the payload is malfunctioning. Generally, the payload will 
have its operational ACS. This ACS may be inadequate in size or may be the malfunc-
tioning system. 
The MP would be remote-controlled by an operator in the orbiter. A link to the ground 
station would be used to activate the system and check it out before the recovery lnis-
sion is initiated. 
The MP, considered as part of the payload, would consist of the following equipment: 
stability and control equipment 
Command and telemetry subsystem 
Power supply 
Reaction control subsyste.m and tankage 
An alternative to a MP is having the orbiter provide all motion to close-in on the pay-
load. This system may be practical as long as the payload is motionless but the prob-
ability is that the inactive payload in free flight will not be motionless but may be tum-
bling or rolling or the combination which would produce a wobble. This could easily be 
a result of a malfunctioning stability system which could impart erratic motion to the 
orbiting payload. 
One method of approaching a random tumbling body would be to send up a capture ve-
hicle which would entangle the payload and itself by means of a net, then with the cap-
ture vehicle's ACS, the erratic motion could be damped out. Another method would be 
to secure the tumbling payload with grappling hooks mounted on the rotating end of a 
pole, the rotational rate of the grappling hook assembly being the same as the payload's 
rate. Thi.s system has a serious limitation where the payload is rolling and tumbling 
at the same time which would more than likely be the case unless considerable time has 
elapsed. 
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Volume VIII 
An additional vehicle required to perform an arresting task or to maneuver the payload 
around in space is bound to be heavier and more complex than a built-in system that 
can perform the identical task. More than likely, the built-in system is more flexible 
than a separate craft in arresting and maneuvering the payload and can perform its 
tasks far more quickly with less propellant expended and without the risk of collision. 
A highly reliable present state-of-the-art MP system appears more economical to 
develop than a separate entire vehicle. It also has little or no maintenance or service 
requirements. It is flexible in its ability to be adapted as a standard unit to all shapes 
and payload forms. 
With large future payloads being delivered to orbit, the basic weight of the MP to the 
total weight of the payload becomes an increasingly smaller portion of the payload 
weight. The dry weight is 320 pounds. Loaded with 300 pounds of usable propellant 
increases the weight to 620 pounds. 
Space allocation in the orbiter is of prime importance. A separate craft requires a 
parking space. Therefore the payload no longer can be the nominal 60-ft long cylinder 
but must be shortened to accommodate the additional craft volume. The MP on the 
other hand is distributed thrroughout the payload and requires only a small portion of 
its volume. 
The maneuver jets with the MP system are located efficie~tly about the payload's c. g. 
A separate craft would have all its maneuver jets located at one end of the payload 
which results in less control and far more expenditure of propellant. 
Since the maneuvering pack is used for stabilizing and translating free flight payload~ 
operation time and amount of propellant expended were studied. Figure 4-47 shows 
the amount of propellant required to stop the motion of the payload about its pitch and 
roll axes. The payload assumed is a 15 ft diameter by 60 ft long, 50, OOO-pound cylin-
der. Its mass is assumed homogeneous. 
Four banks of four thrusters each are assumed as standard with 150-pound-thrust jets 
at the cylinder ends to react tumble and 50-pound-thrust jets near the c. g. to react 
roll. Further, the storable propellant burned in the thrusters provides a specifiC 
impulse of 290 seconds. 
It can be seen that considerable amount of energy is required to stop a payload of this 
size froln tumbling or rolling . Figure 4-48 shows the time required to perform the 
stabilizing task. In addition to the use of 150-pound-thrust units to arrest tumbling, 
the time required using 100 and 200 lb units is shown in comparison. 
Figure 4-49 shows the amount of propellant required using the maneuvering packto 
move a 50, 000 pound payload from one position in space to another. The times in-
cluded acceleration and deceleration time. The minimum time limit, shown by the 
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dotted line, is the point where the payload accelerates half way then decelerates for 
the remaining distance. It can be seen that minimunl time operation would be costly 
from the standpoint of propellant expenditure. The curve in the upper right corner 
shows how far the payload must accelerate to ach.ieve coast velocity. The same dis-
tance is required to decelerate the payload. Coast velocities are shown for the corre-
sponding total propellant expended. 
4.5.4 CAPTURE METHODS FOR NONCOOPERATIVE SATELLITE RETRIEVAL. For 
most missions! rendezvous and docking will be accomplished with a stable target. In 
some situations, however, the target may be tumbling about an arbitrary axis, due 
either to the absence or malfunction of attitude control. Such a condition could exist 
in a satellite retrieval, satellite maintenance, or rescue mission. 
Several techniques have been suggested for arresting the angular momentum of such 
targets. One method would be to provide an independent, redundant attitude control 
subsystem (MP) on every target, to be activated by the orbiter during rendezvous in 
the event of a failure in the target primary attitude control system. This would be a 
safe, simple solution, but does not provide for targets already in orbit. 
An approach for existing targets without an MP is to deploy a damping device which 
would reduce the angular momentum of the target by energy dissipation. Although rel-
atively safe, this approach might require a relatively long time to reduce the target 
angUlar. velocity to a satisfactory level. In adciitioL, individual solutions may be re-
quired for each target type. 
Deployment of a device to increase the moment of inertia of the target and thus to re-
duce angular velocity without affecting angular momentum suffers from disadvantages 
similar to those of damping devices. 
A promising technique involves alignment of the orbiter with the rotational axis of the 
target, spinning up to the target velocity, grappling the target and then de-spinning. 
A less risky variation of this method would be to deploy a small tug with a grappling 
device or net, with an attitude control subsystem controlled from the orbiter. 
It is quite likely that more than one technique will be employed for capture of coopera-
tive targets by the orbiter. The optimum method may vary with type of target and 
target spin rate. In addition, the capture technique may depend on the mission; that 
is, whether the intent is to retrieve the target, dock with the target, or perform in-
spection and/or maintenance. 
4. 6 SHOHT-DURA TION ORBIT MODULES 
The orbiter stage of the space shuttle can serve as a short term,orbitallaboratcry or 
,Sensor platform. In this mode of operation the experiment module or sensor equipment 
would remain in the payload bay as shown in Figure 4-50. When required, sensor view-
ing can be accomplished by opening the payload doors. 
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4.6.1 CANDIDATE MODULES. Candidate short duration missions for the space 
shuttle include: 
a. Material science and processing experiments 
b. Human factors (onboard centrifuge) 
c. Component test and sensor calibration 
d. Earth surveys. 
Modules for the first three are similar to the experiment modules discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2.2 except the module would remain in the payload bay during the experiment. 
A summary of candidate Earth survey missions, shown in Table 4-12, indicates the 
nature of the survey and type sensor required. The sensors and required support 
equipment would also be in modules for installation in the payload bay. 
4. 6.2 ORBITER REQUIREMENTS. When used as an orbiting laboratory the orbiter 
will require additional ACS propellant for stabilization and orientation during the op-
erational period. In addition the life support and environmental control system will 
have to be increased from 7 days to 30 days for both the experiment operators and 
basic spaqe shuttle crew. This will be provided in the short duration orbit module. 
4.7 RESCUE 
Since many aspects of a space station design and operation (from the space environment 
through the crew behavior) are treated on a probability basis, provisions must be made 
for the occurrence of improbable events. Emergencies on board the space station could 
require emergency flights of the space shuttle to deliver cargo or evacuate passengers. 
The cargo flights--w:.dlbe required to deliver spares and components to repair system 
failur~s.,~errd~mage due to meteoroid impact or collision with other vehicles or space 
" ... ~ 
d .. ~!M1s. It may also be necessary to deliver expendables such as 02/N2 and propellant 
,: to make up losses due to the failure. The time available to deliver this cargo cannot 
be specified due to the multitude of possible emergencies and alternative courses of 
action available to the station crew. However, if the malfunction or damage is repair-
able, the crew is probably not in serious danger for at least a few days, due to the 
compartmentized space station design. 
The more critical situations are those requiring the emergency evacuation of crew 
members or abandonment of the station entirely. Some of the major events which 
could result in such emergencies are listed in Table 4-13, with possible courses of 
action. The availability of a rescue vehicle is necessary if the station is to be aban-
doned immediately. 
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Table 4-12. Earth Resources Instrumentation and Applications 
Cultural Resources Natural Resources Earth Sciences 
Agricultural 
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Metric Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Panoramic Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Tracking Telescope X X X X X X x. X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Synoptic Cameras X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Radar Imager X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Radar Altimeter /Scatterometer X X X X X X 
Wide-Range Spectral Scanner (0-M) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
R Spectrometer X X X X X X X X X X X •• • .. • ... lo' ,. 
R Radiometer X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Microwave Imager (Passive) ""T X X X X X X X X X ;. 
Microwave Radiometer X X X X X X X X X X X X 
UV Imager/Spectrometer X X X 
Laser Altimeter/Scatterometer X X X X X 
Absorption Spectrometer X 
Radio Reflectometer X X X X X 
Magnetometer X X X X 
Gravity Gradiometer X X X X X ! , / 
Ground Sensors X X X X X X X X X X 
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Table 4-13. Major Space Station Emergencies 
-,._-------------------------------------
Abandon the Station Immediately - Onboard Rescue Vehicle Required 
1. Excursion of nuclear power source. 
2. Major explosion and/or fire. 
Quick Rescue Required (within hours) 
1. Severe solar flare. 
2. Nuclear burst. 
3. Major failure of power subsystem. 
4. Major failure of life support subsystem. 
5. Sick or injured crew member. 
6. Station damaged due to meteroid impact. 
Planned Rescue Possible (within days) 
1. World situation - threat of war. 
2. Major failure of critical subsystem(Le., station maintenance). 
These emergencies impose stringent requirements on the space shuttle if it is to oper-
ate as an efficient rescue craft. The first and perhaps the most critical requirement 
is rapid response. The space shuttle should be capable of being loaded with emergency 
carg.o, where necessary, and launched at the first available window. After the contact 
is made in orbit, it should be capable of returning immediately. 
It may he ,necessary to transfer personnel from an unpressurized station. This requires 
either an airlock 0 r the ability to depressurize the space shuttle for the transfer. In 
addition, the mobility of the personnel will be severely reduced by the inflated space 
suit. The personnel modules would be used for this rescue mission. 
The capability for rendezvous and possible docking with a non-cooperative target may 
be required when the station is damaged. The only assistance which could be antici-
pated from the target vehicle would be a simple beacon. Extra-vehicular transfer of 
personnel and sonle cargo may be required if the station hub is inoperative. 
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Safety (probability of success of intact abort) and probability of mission success goals 
were established cons ide ring safety and cost effects as follows: 
Safety 
Mission 
0.999 (lloss/1000 flights) 
0.97 (30 aborts/1000 flights) 
The analysis shows that these goals can be approached or met by fail-operational/fail-
safe and fail-safe design approaches and through minimization of fire and explosion 
hazards . 
Safety in flight operations of the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicle concepts is achieved with in-
tact abort. Safety and cost require that the crew, passengers, payload, and vehicle 
be returned intact following failures requiring abort. The safety and abort analyses 
show that intact abort is a feasible approach. The basic approach for treating the 
majority of failures is to provide redundancy to produce a fail-safe system or a fail-
operational system. For the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicles, mechanical/electrical subsys-
tems have fail-operational/fail-safe characteristics and the integrated avionics system 
has fail-operational/fail-operational/fail-safe,chara,::teristics. When a failure occurs 
in a system with fail-operational characteristics there is no abort since the mission 
can be completed. When a failure occurs in a system at the fail-safe level it is nec-
essary to go to an abort procedure. 
The once-around abort procedure reflects action to achieve a high probability of suc-
cessful intact abort fro.m all failures. For failures during liftoff to staging the booster 
and orbiter elements will complete the boost phase and stage when the booster propel-
lants are depleted. The vehicles separate and the booster returns to the launch site in 
a normal manner while the orbiter continues once around the Earth and returns to the 
launch site. 
There are failure situations, however rare, which require immediate abort. Typical 
of these types of failures are structural failure, thermal protection system failure, 
and catastrophic situations such as a fire which may require early separation. Fol-
lowing separation, a throttle;burn-dump/reverse flight operation can be used. All 
remaining propellant is expended through the rocket nozzles and a flight profile is 
selected to allow the vehicles to return to the launch site. 
The FR-3 vehicle, with a 15-3 booster-orbiter engine arrangement, has a relatively 
low number of mission aborts because it incorporates fail-operational/fail-safe pro-
visions for engines in the booster. The FR-3 can achieve staging with one engine out 
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because the 7% overthrust capability of the booster engines allows the performance 
thrust-weight ratio to be maintained. The FR-3 ean achieve intact abort with two en-
gines out at liftoff. As the veh1.cle advances along the boost phase, more engines can 
be out and intact abort is still possible. 
The FR-3 and the ]~R-4 orbiter engines do not have fail-operational/fail-safe capability 
during the staging to orbit phase because the weight penalty to provide a 50% over-
thrust in the three-engine orbiter is prohibitive. The FR-3 and FR-4 orbiters do have 
fail-operational/fail-safe capability for all on-orbit Inaneuvers. 
The FR-4, with a 9-,3-9 booster-orbiter-booster engine arrangement, can achieve 
staging with one engine out; however, there is a weight penalty because a 13% over-
thrust is required. This amount of overthrust is outside the presently designed engine 
propellant utilization control capability. Uprated or added engines are required with 
associated weight penalties. Because the FR-4 with the 9-3-9 arrangement does not 
have fail-o~erational/fail-safe capability for booster engines, mission losses are 
higher than for the FR-3. The FR-4 has fail-safe provisions for engines and basically 
the same abort procedures as the FR-3 described above. The intact abort success 
probability (safety) of the FR-4 is therefore approximately the same as for the FR-3. 
Both the FR-3 and FR-4 vehicle concepts incorporate inert gas purging provisions for 
fuel tank surrounds, rocket engine bay, and payload bay to suppress potential fire or 
explosion resulting from leakage and subsequent vaporllzation of fuel (LH2). Purging 
with an inert gas is provided during ascent and des\cent to an 02 concentration < 2% 
by volume for these areas. 
Sealed, gas-tight bulkheads separate compartments containing fuels and/or ox:idizers 
and diaphragms seal off hot air and isolate hot surface sources. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Safety and cost in reusable launch vehicles are the real drivers leading to requirements 
for a high probability of successful abort. Crew, passengers, payload, and the vehicles 
must be returned intact to mr.ke the reusable launch vehicle concept economically 
attractive. A safety and cost analysis conducted for the space shuttle (Section 5.2) 
was accomplished on this premise; i. e., intact abort. This analysis established 
safety and mission success goals which were used as a guide for the study. Basic 
questions which must now be addressed are: 
What makes the space shuttle unsafe? 
What action must be taken to change an unsafe situation into a routine abort 
operation? 
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How is safety improved? 
What are the interfaces of safety with weight, operations, and mission success? 
These questions were answered by conducting a gross failure and mission termination 
analysis (Section 5.3) with consideration given to: 
a. Probability of occurrence of failures of subsystems, propulsion systems and 
structure during the mission. 
h. Abort options following these failures. 
c. Availability of landing sites for aborted flights for several launch azimuths. 
d. The fire and explosion hazard potential of the stored propellants. 
e. Intact abort, redundancy, and escape. 
This analysis leads to: 
a. Definition of abort procedures from the various flight trajectory phases (Section 
5.4), 
b. Design requirements for the vehicle (Section 5.5), and 
c. Design requirements for the minimization of the fire and explosion hazard (Sec-
tion 5.6). 
The effect of engines on safety and mission success was studied using a range of as-
sumed engine reliabilities and the application of fail-operational and fail-safe criteria 
to th~ booster and orbiter engines (Section 5. 7). 
Finally, the safety, abort, and mission success characteristics of the FR-3 and FR-4 
vehicles are defined (Section 5.8). 
5.2 SAFETY, MISSION SUCCESS, AND COST INTERFACE 
The following analysis and philosophy were used to establish goals for the initial FR-l 
safety study. The information presented in this section also applies to the FR-3, and 
FR -4 concepts. 
Safety for space shuttle concepts introduces a new factor, not found in expendable 
systems, of determining the probability or successful recovery of the vehicles since 
the vehicles are a priori designed for reuse. Expendable systems are evaluated basic-
ally in terms of probability of mission success and safety; reusable systems must con-
sider in addition the recovery of vehicles following abort. 
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A vehicle that can execute an abort and intact return represents a safe vehicle for crew 
and passengers. Further, operational costs are minimized if vehicles are returned 
intact and are available for reuse. The relationship between safety and cost is shown 
in Figure 5-1. which is a plot of the cost of vehicle losses, the cost of payload losses, 
and the cost to relaunch (incompleted missions) versus losses per 1000 flights. These 
data-were based on preliminary cost data for a smaller payload FR-1 and should be 
viewed qualitatively. 
As shown, operation costs_ are reduced as safety is increased. Vehicle losses and 
lost payloads are a major cost factor while the cost of relaunch (incomplete Inissions) 
is a small cost consideration. Figure 5-1 was developed on the basis of 1000 flights 
using lower cost vehicles and higher cost (2% of vehicle cost) relaunch to emphasize 
the point. Both safety and cost tend to drive the vehicle design toward lower losses, 
approaching zero as a limit. However, this is not the complete story because, as 
shown in Figure 5-2, there is a minimum cost vehicle design which tends to bucket at 
losses slightly less than 1/1000 due to the added cost of RDT&E to achieve lower 
losses (higher reliability). Figure 5-2 shows the cost of vehicle losses, and RDT&E 
added cost. 
A goal in the range of 1 to 2 losses per 1000 flight (0.998 to 0.999) is indicated by 
Fig-Ilre 5-2 on the h:1sis of O'osts. However, when considering the lives involved, the 
design objective should be for lower losses per 1000 flights. A goal of 1/1000 is used 
for discussion purposes to show safety and cos~ sensitivities. 
This analysis established the goals given in Table 5-1. They include failures due to 
mechanical and electrical malfunctions as well as the hazard of fire and explosion: 
Safety 
Intact Abort Success 
Mission Success 
Table 5-1. Reliability Goals 
> O. 999 (110sses/1000 flights) 
> O. 999 (110sses/1000 flights) 
> O. 97 (30 aborts/lOOO flights) 
The safety/cost interface in reusable launch vehicles can be summarized: 
a. The cost of lost vehicles and lost payloads is a major operational cost factor. 
b. 
c. 
The cost of incompleted missions (aborted mission) is a minor operational cost 
factor for vehicles having a high probability of successful intact abort. 
To be economically feasible, reusable launch vehicle concepts must achieve a 
probability of successful intact abort ~ 0.999 (losses < 1/1000). 
5-4 
i ,,"t·;". 
~ ;o' 
\ 
.-,.-.. -.. ~ 
· • l 'f"1 
f 
I 
I, 
f 
J 
'1 
r 
t. 
i t 
, I 
i ~i 
f. 
, ;', 
! I i !, 
· " : I 
t I r-, ; 
\~ 
(' '-1 
! lj 
! " \ ~ 
~ ;1 
II 
'i L F , 
; i ; . -' 
\i i:I' ~l I' 
f~ 
K If 
· ,I, 
, II. 
t· 
~d 
ii 
(;) 
'I 
1t 
~ji; 
:1 
I 
1<.£,1':-
JZ~ "lj,,~ 
~\\ 
I ;f \1 
'. 
"jj 
II 
i 
I., 
I 
~ \ 
f; 
CJ1 
I' 
0'1 
'I 
t 
I 
I 
! 
! ~ ~ " . j, f.: 
. 
> 
ti 
~. 
i 
(R-
~ 
o 
rn 
- r .... 
~-->~- .. -.--~--"'-----~-
4r i i 
3 
1000 FLIGHTS 
VEHICLE::: $50M 
REUSE = 2% 
NOTE: THESE DATA SHOULD 
BE USED AS QUALI-
TATIVE DATA 
~2 COST OF 
LOST 
,.;:j 
H 
~ 
~ PAYLOAD " 
1 
COST TO 
0' -. _ -. RELAUNC 
0.1 ' I (ABORT) , I 
COST OF 
LOST . 
VEHICLES 
1 10 
LOSSES/IOOO FLIGHTS 
INCREASING SAFETY 
Figure 5-1. Cost of Los t Vehicles 
100 
li:;~~;;;J~-::;':;:;:~;;;~~~~:~9-::~~!~;;:=:~: ::-~:~::c-~···_---'---_··_"·, . -.-- , ,-, 
" .1Il' ..... 
:-:'''.!~' . 
(. b_~ 
":. !l:i 
~. 
< c 
a-
S 
en 
< 1-4 
1-4 
1-4 
'1 
d 
F • 
I 
I ~ 
j-i 
" d , 
n 
li 
" i:
~ i 
, 
., 
I' 
11 il 
;1 
:J ;; 
i ~ 
r; 
;1 
·f 
'i 
,: 
~ 
~ 
0 
Cll 
Z 
9 
H 
H 
~ 
P=l 
d. 
; 
Volume VIII 
4----------------------------------~~~~~ NOTE: THESE DATA SHOULD 
BE USED AS QUALI-
TA'rIVE DATA 
MINIMUM 
3 COST 
2 
1 
1 10 
LOSSES/1000 FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-2. Minimum Cost System 
A vehicle designed with losses <1/1000 has the potential for improved safety at 
an order of magnitude cost reduction compared with vehicles designed for 20/1000 
losses, which is norm.ally an acceptable mission goal for an expendable system. 
One of the desired vehic Ie characteristics for this study was intact abort. This is 
a reasonable requirement for the following reasons: 
a. Safety. Safe intact return of the vehicles represents safety for crew and pas-
sengers. With a high probability of success of vehicle recovery, safety objectives 
can be achieved without the use of escape systenls. 
b. ~. Operations cost and safety are major drivers leading to the intact abort 
concept. To make the fully reusable concept economically feasible, vehicle re-
turn success must approach ~ 0.999 ( < 1/1000 losses), which provides a base 
for evaluation of improved safety. 
c. Reusability. Unlike expendable launch vehicles the reusable vehicles have re-
use capability whi.ch inherently provides intact abort potential. 
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5.3 FAILURE AND MISSION TERMINATION ANALYSIS 
A gross failure and mission termination analysis and a hazards analysis were conducted 
on an early FR-l configuration. The basic objective was to establish basic abort phi-
losophies, mission termination procedures and subsystem design requ.irements includ-
ing redundancy. The data a.nd information developed is qualitatively but not quantita-
tively applicable to the FR-3 and FR-4. The basic once around abort and immediate 
abort concepts were developed from, this analysis using previously established mission 
success goals and safety goals. 
The data and information developed were used to guide the vehicle and vehicle systems 
design tasks including an investigation of propellant dumping. 
The approach used in the gross failure and mission termination analysis for mechanical 
failures in subsystenls was: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
Establish failure rates from historical data and estimates. 
Apply weighting factors to aecount for differences in mission phase stresses. 
Determine points in the mission when failures are most likely to occur (distribute 
failures into the mission phases). 
d. Determine the consequences of major subsystem failures andinvestiga'te abort pro-
cedures which lead to successful intact recovery of vehicles. 
e. Make design improvements and develop operational abort procedures. 
5. 3.1 HISTORICAL FAILURE DATA AND ENVIRONMENTAL WEIGHTING. Failure 
data for the failure analysis Wtr€ developed using failure rates based on mean-time-
between failure (MTBF) values obtained from: 
a. Historical data on, for example,engines (F··-1, J-2J RL-10, H ... 1) .. 
b. Previous study reports such as: ALSS, Saturn V .Reliability Analysis Model, 
SA-501 (Marshall - Sept. 7, 1~65), Atlas-Centaur AC-1,3 Reliability Assessment 
Report. 
c. Estimates 111ade for unique components and systelns such as wing deploymentJ 
turbojet engine deployment, and the separation systern. 
Operating time (t) for each subsystem is based on required .Operating time to perform 
the specified mission. Figure 5--3 shows values used in the analysis. 
Environmental weighting factors were applied to account for the effect of different 
environmental stresses on failure rate. Weighting factors (k) were applied for each 
mission phase as shown in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-2. Environmental Weighting for Mission 
Trajectory Phase Time = t (hr) Weighting 
Factor = k kt 
'" 
Boost to Staging 0.05 500 25.0 
Staging to Orbit 0.061 500 30.5 
Orbit (Coast) 24.04 1 24.0 
Orbit (Rocket) 0.041 100 4.2 
Orbital Missions 144.0 1 144.0 
Docking 0.50 1 0.5 
Entry from Orbit 0.59 100 59.0 
Flyback and Landing 1.17 1 1.2 
The 'expression kt/~ t was used to distribute failures throughout the different mission 
phases. 
5.3.2 MISSION FAILURE DISTRIBUTION. Failures were distributed into the mission 
phases as shown in Table 5-2. 
Figure 5-4 shows the total expected failures distributed among the ~ission phases. 
Failures are for the baseline vehicle subsystems before evaluation of the consequences 
of the failures and before incorporation of recommended operational and design im-
provements and therefore do not represent vehicle losses. Failures in each mission 
phase were calculated using the following basic expression: 
n 
Failure = I; (n.) 
J 
l 1 ) (~t.) ~ MTBFj 1 
where 
n. 
J 
MTBF. 
t. 
1 
k. 
1 
J 
i, j = 1 
= jth' component or subsystem operating in series (i. e., engines) 
= Mean-time-between failures of the jth component or subsystem in 
hours/ failure (from historical d~ta) . 
= operating time (hours) in ith mission phase 
= environmental weighting factor for the ith mission phase (accounts 
for the stress level of a given trajectory phase) 
. : 
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FAILURES/1000 FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-4. Failures In Subsystems During Mission Phases 
Failures in subsystems of about 84 per 1000 are predicted. Vehicle losses are sub-
stantially less .. Abort and safe recovery are therefore of primary concern. 
5.3.2.1 Boost-to-Staging Failures. Failure distribution is shown in Figure 5-5 for 
the first boost phase (liftoff to staging). Shown here are total expected failures per 
1000 flights before evaluating the consequences of the failure and before incorporation 
of recommended operational and design improvements. 
BOOSTER 
BOOSTER 
ORBITER 
H = HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
ECS = ENVIRONMENT AL 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
[ ENGINES 
ENGINES 
ENGINES 
j I 
0 2 
FEED AVIONICS 
FEED AVIONICS 
AVIONICS IHI ECS 
I I 
4 6 
FAILURES/lOOO FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-5. Boost-to-Staging Failures in Subsystems 
IHI ECS 
IHI ECS 
I 
8 
5.3.2.2 Staging-to-Orbit Failures. Figure 5-6 shows total expected failures before 
evaluation of the consequences of the failures and before incorporation of recommended 
improvements. The first stage boost cycle and stage separation have been completed. 
ORBITER ENGINES FEED AVIONICS IHI ECS 
H = HYDRAULIC SYSTEM I I I , 
ECS = ENVIRONMENTAL 0 2 4 6 8 
CONTROL SYSTEM 
FAILURES/lOOO FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-G. Staging-to=--Oxbit Failures in Subsyswrns 
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5.3.2.3 In-Orbit Failures. Figure 5-7 shows expected failures for the orbit phase. 
In the figure: 
E = engine 
F = feed system (propellant), 
ACS = attitude control system for orbiter 
ECS = environmental control system 
A V = avionics 
D = docking 
ORBITER ~~I~ij~ __ A_V ____ ~ ________________ A_C_S_&_D ______________ -L ________ ~E~C_S ______ ~ 
o 10 20 30 
FAILURES/lOOO FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-7. Failures in Orbit in Subsystems 
5.3.2.4 Entry Failures. Figure 5-8 shows total expected failures before evaluation of 
the consequences of the failure and before incorporation of recommended improvement. 
In the figure: 
T /S = thermal protection system and structure 
E = environmental control system 
S = structure 
H = hydraulic system 
A V = avionics and electronics 
BOOSTER I AV II I E I 
BOOSTER I A v II I E I ' 
ORBITER AV & ELECTRONICS 
I 
o 
I 
2 
I 
4 
T/S 
I 
6 
FAILURES/lOOO FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-8. Entry Failures in Subsystems 
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5.3.2.5 Flyback !:nd Landing Failures. Figure 5-9 shows total expected failure 
before evaluation and improvement. 
BOOSTER 
BOOSTER 
ORBITER 
I wi 
[wi 
I wi 
I 
o 
E 
E I G I 
E I G I 
I G I 
I 
2 
FAILURES/IOOO FLIGHTS 
I 
4 
Figure 5-9. Flyback and Landing Failures 
in Subsystems 
In the figure: 
w = wing deployment 
E = turboj et engine dep loy-
ment and operation 
G = landing gear system 
5. 3. 3 CONSEQUENCES OF FAIL-
URES AND ABORT PHILOSOPHY. 
Each mission phase was examined and 
the failures were evaluated to deter-
mine the effect on the vehicle and what 
corrective action in the way of changes 
in operation or design changes (e. g. , 
adding an engine) could be taken if the 
consequences of the failure meant an aborted mission or loss of life. Emphasis in the 
failure analysis was on crew and vehicle recovery (crew recovery from a safety stand-
point and vehic Ie recovery from an economic standpoint). 
Systems were examined to assure that no single failure resulted in loss of life. This 
was done using the airplane systems design approach wherein backup systems are used 
to accomplish safe return. Investigations were also made to eliminate or reduce the 
number of time critical failures. 
The abort philosophy used in the failure analysis is summarized below. Priority for 
crew and passenger safety was the first consideration. 
a. First priority: Save crew and passengers. 
b. Second priority: Save payloads. 
c. Landing site priority: 
1. Return to launch site. 
2. Once around-return to launch site. 
3. CONUS landing sites. 
4. Available landing sites. 
~S. Survival/rescue. 
d. Prior to docking: Return by earliest (low stress) route. 
e. After docking: Continue to landing. 
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5. 3.4 ABORT GLIDE FOOTPRINTS. One of the consequences of failure is avail-
ability of landing sites. 
Figure 5-10 shows the abort/glide footprints, when launching from ETR, for launch 
azimuths 0 to 90 degrees. A hypersonic lift drag ratio of 1. 9 is assumed. Example 
footprints are shown for abort velocities of 6,000, 10, 000 and 15, 000 fps for a direct 
injection into a 55-degree inclination orbit, with a launch azimuth about 37 degrees. 
For this orbit, landing sites are avaHable along the Eastern sea board; however, 
more easterly launches are entirely over water. Landing site availability is there-
fore strongly dependent on launch azimuth and abort velocity. 
Figures 5-11, 5-12, and 5-13 present landing site availability 'for three launch 
azimuths from ETR. 
.----" 
L/n :=: 
w/S = 
300 2000 
Figure 5-10. Abort/Glide Footprints 
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5.3.5 FAILURES. Th(;, situation, effect, corrective action, and results were inves-
tigated for each major zailure that has a bearing on safety and vehicle recovery. This 
information is present.ed on the following pages. 
5.3.5.1 Loss of Booster Engine. Failure of a boost engine results in reduction of 
thrust to weight (T /W) from 1 0 32 to 1.13, and in a requirement for a 5 degree gimbal 
angle trim capability to hold thrust vector through vehicle c. g. With this T /W, vehicle 
cluster can accelerate to some suitable staging velocity and attitude; however, struc-
tural failure will occur (increased angle of attack caused by 5 degree gimbal angle) if 
the engine is lost before maximum wind shear is encountered, and some propellant 
will be trapped in the booster with the failed engine. The probability of occurrence 
(Po) of loss of one booster engine is estimated at about 5/1000 flights (a significant 
number), which for the baseline design would result in loss of crews and vehicles. 
Recommended corrective action is: 
a. Provide propellant crossfeed capability, which will deplete all booster tanks equally. 
b. Provide structui"al beefup to withstand increased loads during travel through the 
maximum wind-shear loading condition. 
The results expected with these recommendations incorporated are: (1) the five fatality 
failures become aborts (no fatalities), (2) orbiter will go once around Earth and land 
at the launch site, (3) boosters will continue to burn off propellant uniformity, separ-
ate, and return to the launch site, (4) added structural beefup will allow cluster to pass 
through maximum aq without failure, and (5) all crews and vehicles are recovered. 
Loss of two boost engines (0.02/1000) is considered negligible. The following alternate 
solution was investigated, but is not recomm,ended: 
a. Provide propellant dump capability in boosters and orbiter. 
b. Deplete propellant in both boosters at equal rate by burning and dumping (booster 
with failed engine). 
c. Continue flight to some staging velocity and separate with boosters empty. 
d. Boosters return to launch site. 
e. Orbiter executes 'freverse" maneuver as follows: with staging velocity> 500 ft/sec, 
reduce this velocity to zero and return to launch site. After flying downrange to 
. , , 
some point and approaching a flight path angle (y) of 90 degrees, reverse direc-
tion and head for launch -stte. Arrive over launch site at subsonic velocity and 
with zero propellants. 
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5.3.5.2 Loss of An Orbiter Engine. Following the failure of an orbiter engine during 
boost phase, the vehicle cluster can accelerate (T /W = 1.13) to some staging velocity 
and separate. The engine gimbal angle required to correct moment is < 5 deg. Booster 
propellants must be depleted equally before separation is attempted. This can be accom-
plished with the use of a crossfeed propellant system. With booster propellant depleted 
at staging, the boosters can return to the launch site. Orbiter now has sufficient AV 
to go once around the Earth. 
The probability of occurrence of failure for this case is estimated to be 2.5/1000 flights, 
which would result in loss of all crews and vehicles for the baseline configurations. 
Recommended corrective action is: provide propellant crossfeed to enable depletion of 
booster tanks equally. With this recommendation incorporated: 
a. The' 2. 5 fatality failures become aborts (no fatalities). 
b. Booster will burn off propellant equally, separate, and return to the launch site. 
c. Orbiter will separate at some velocity, go once around, and land at the launch site. 
d. All crews and vehicles are recovered. 
An alternate solution was investigated, but is not recommended: 
a. For boosters (same as above recommendation). 
b. ]Ior orbiter, execute "reverse" maneuver as described previously. 
5.3.5.3 Loss of Propellant Feed. The loss of propellant feed from one booster during 
liftoff-to-staging results in the loss of three engines. The result of this failure is cata-
strophic and is time critical as shown because T /VV is reduced to O. 66 and the gimbal 
angle required to correct the offset moment is 14 deg. Further, propellant is trapped 
in the failed booster. The probability of occurrence of this mode of failure is estimated 
to be 4.5/1000 flights. Recommended corrective action is: provide a backup system 
which will activate within one second to provide propellant feed toa11 three engines. 
With this recommendation incorporated, the 4.5 fatal failures become 4.4. aborts with 
approxima.tely 0.1/1000 flight fatalities remaining. 
Because of the critical nature of this failure and the uncertairi{.;r of the practicality of a 
backup system, alternate approaches were investigated. Th6g' are not recommended, 
however. 
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Case I. Failure occurs just off pad and before maximum aq. 
Recovery procedure: 
a. Switch to orbiter propellant feed in 1 second and throttle all engines. 
b. Dump failed booster propellant at + "g". 
c. Burn and dump good booster propellants. 
d. Burn and dump orbiter propellants. 
e. Separate. 
f. Boosters flyback to launch site. 
g. Orbiter flyback to launch site (must add turbojet + flyback fuel). 
Vehicle modifications required: 
a. 
b. 
Provide crossfeed from orbiter to left or right-hand cluster of three enigines. 
Provide propellant dump provisions for boosters and orbiter. 
c. Provide flyback turbojet + approximately 250 n. mi. flyback fuel for orbiter. 
With these procedures and modifications, 4.5 fatalities per 1000 flights are reduced to 
about 0.1 per 1000 flights and the remaining 4.4 become aborts with all crews and ve-
hicles recovered by landing at the launch site. 
Case II. Failures occurring in the maximum aq area. 
Recovery procedure: Same as above, except orbiter now has sufficient llV in remaining 
propellant to land downrange. 
Vehicle modification required: Same as Case I except turbojet and fuel not required. 
Case III. Failures occurring after maximum aq. 
Recovery procedure: Same as Case II. 
Vehicle modification required: Same as Case II. 
Case IV. Failures occurring near normal staging velocity • 
Recovery procedure: Same as Case I. 
Vehicle modification required: Same as Case II. 
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5. 3. 5.4 Loss of Engine Gimballing. Loss of engine gimballing is time critical and 
failures are catastrophic. Estimated probability of occurrence is 2. 7/1000 flights. 
Recommended corrective action is: 
a. Provide backup systems in guidance, hydraulics, and electrical power and distri-
bu tion with one second reaction time. 
b. Provide onboard checkout system to detect that failure has occurred. 
c. Continue flight through staging with boosters returning to the launch site and orbiter 
going once around and landing at launch site. 
With these recommendations incorporated: 
a. The 2.7 catastrophic failures become mission aborts and the probability of a cata-
strophic failure occurring is approximately 0.01/1000. 
b. Crews and vehicles return to launch site with orbiter going once around the Earth. 
5.3.5.5 Loss of Environmental Control. The approach here is that of airplane design 
philosophy. Backup systems are used to provide saf~ return in the event of failure of 
the primary system. The probability of occurrence of environmental control system 
failures is estimated to be about 4.0/1000 flights. 
Recommended corrective action is: 
a. For booster, provide 100% backup system. 
b. For orbiter, provide backup for a once around flight and land at the launch site. 
c. Provide onboard checkout and failure detection system allow detection of failure. 
With these recommendations incorporated: 
a. Boosters will complete boost phase and fatalities are reduced to approximately 
0.01/1000 flights. Boosters will land at launch site. 
b. Orbiter will conlplete boost phase, continue once around, and land at the launch site. 
5.3.5.6 Separation. The situation and the effect resulting from failure to separate is 
catastrophic. The failure rate is estimated at 1. 5/1000 flights, a significant number. 
Reconlmended corrective action is: provide independent J?ackup separation modes for 
mechanical, electrical, and pyrotechnic systems. 
With this recommendation incorporated the mission may be completed and catastrophies 
are eliminated. 
5-20 
) f ......... 1. 1 
~: , 
__ --,: --",",",",",_~niPlIJr$7"'-
p" ¥ ~. " 
Volume VIIT 
5.3.5.7 ~oss of an Orbiter Engine. Loss of one orbiter engine in the staging-to-orbit 
boost phase results in loss of roll control, reduced thrust, and a gimbal angle of 5 deg 
being required to maintain the thrust vector through the vehicle c.g. Frequency of 
failures is estimated to be 3.2/1000 flights. These are classed as fatalities when no 
landing site is available. 
Recommended abort procedure is: 
a. Use remaining propellant to go once around and land at the launch site. 
b. Provide dump capability - dump unused propellants. 
c. Use ACS for roll control. 
5.3.5.8 Loss of Propellant Feed. The loss of propellant feed in the orbiter during 
the staging-to-orbit boost phase results in loss of thrust from both engines. The 
effect of loss of propellant feed is tQtalloss of thrust. The problem is the propellant 
remaining that must be dumped before landing. Propellant dumping is not possible 
under the resulting zero-g condition. Frequency of failure is estimated at 1.4/1000 
flights, and failures are classed as catastrophic (loss of crew and vehicle). 
Recommended corrective action is to provide a backup feed system. (Again, no single 
failure should result in loss of propellant flow to both engines.) Provide onboard check-
out to detect failure and permit maintenance action before next flight (airplane design 
and operation philosophy). 
With recommended corrective action the 1. 4 catastrophic failures become aborts and 
the vehicle can return to the launch site by going once around the Earth. 
5.3.5.9 Loss of Gimbal. Estimated probability of occurrence of failure is 1. 0/1000 
flights and it is catastrophic. The failure is time critical. 
Recommended corrective action is: 
a. Provide a backup capability in hydraulics, guidance, and electrical power and 
distribution capable of sensing and activating in 5 seconds. 
b. Provide means of dumping orbit maneuver propellants. 
c. Provide onboard checkout and sensing system to detect failure. 
With these recommendations incorporated: 
a. The 1. 0/1000 catastrophies become aborts. 
b. Mission is aborted and a once-around the Earth maneuver is executed with orbiter 
returning to launch site. 
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5.3.5.10 Loss of an Orbiter Engine. Thrust is reduced to 1/2. However, the remain-
ing engine can develop the required impulse for orbital maneuvers to enable return from 
orbit. Probability of occurrence of failure is 0.5/1000 flights and the failures are clas-
sed as aborts. 
No corrective action is required. If failure occurs before docking, wait in orbit for 
suitable entry window and land at launch site. If failure occurs after docking, continue 
entry. 
5.3.5.11 Loss of Attitude Control. The vehicle cannot be properly oriented resulting 
in a catastrophic condition. Failure rate is estimated at 18.1/1000 flights, and they 
are classed as fatal failures. 
Recommended corrective action for this failure is to provide standby systems that are 
capable of orienting the vehicle (at reduced pitch, yaw, and roll rates) to allow retro-
firing. 
With the recommendations incorporated catastrophic failures are reduced to less than 
0.1/1000 flights. Procedure following failure is: 
a. Abort mission if failure occurs before docking. Wait in orbit and land at launch 
site. 
b. Continue entry if failure occurs after docking. 
5.3.5.12 Loss of Thermal Protection System. The effect is loss of structure, which 
is fatal. Failure rate is estimated at 0.5/1000 flights for the boosters and 1. 5/1000 
flights for the orbiters. 
Recommended corrective action: 
a. Design fail-safe attachment or under-layer of ablation. 
b. Provide means of detecting deficiency before next flight. 
5.3.5.13 Loss of Aerodynamic Control. Loss of aerodynamic control during entry is 
catastrophic for all phases of flight. The greatest number of failures (estimated at 
2.9/1000) will occur during entry. 
Recommended corrective action is: provide backup systems for hydraulics, guidance, 
and electrical power and distribution. Provisions to detect failure are required so that 
maintenance action can be taken before the next flight. Automatic switching to standby 
mode is required because of the time critical nature of this failure. The 2. 9 fatal 
failures are then eliminated. 
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Volume VIII 
5.3.5.14 Subsonic Wings Fail to Deploy. The effect of this failure is catastrophic. 
Failure rate is estimated at 0.5/1000 flights for each vehicle, making a total of 1. 5/ 
1000 flights for the boosters and one orbiter. 
Recommended corrective action is to provide fail-safe backup modes in the electro/ 
mechanical/hydraulic system. 
5.3.5.15 Loss of Turbojet Thrust. The effect of loss of 50% of turbojet thrust in the 
baseline vehicle results in thrust < drag which means range is severely reduced. Such 
failures are catastrophic for booster for launch azimuths> 15 deg. Failures are sum-
marized below and consider deployment and loss of thrust during engine operation. 
Vehicle Failure / 
1000 Flight 
Boosters (2) 
Orbiter (1) 
Failure to 
Deploy 
1. 00 
0.05 
Failure During 
Operation 
0.70 
0.05 
Total 
1.70 Fatal 
0.10 Fatal 
These are all classed as fatal failures. The value of 0.05 deploy failures for the 
orbiter is based on an estimated go-around requirement of once in 10 landings. 
Recommended corrective design action: 
a. Provide redundant electro-mechanical, s tructu raJ , pivot, and starting systems. 
b. Provide flyback capability with one engine malfunctioned. 
5.3.5.16 Landing Gear. The expected failures of the landing gear deployment func-
tion-are calculated to be 1. 5/1000 flights for the three vehicles (2 boosters and 1 orbiter) 
returning. One approach to correction is to provide a backup energy source in which 
case failure probability is reduced to a negligible number. An alternate approach is to 
provide a keel structure capable of providing for a successful belly landing. In this 
case, purging of propellant tanks is required. 
5.3.6 DESIGN IMPROVEMENTS. Figure 5-14 shows the effect of incorporation of . 
recommended operational and design improvements discussed previously. Incorpora-
tion of improvements results in catastrophic failures becoming aborts or a significant 
reduction in total number of catastrophies. 
For example, the fourth item listed is propellant feed. Total failures which are cata-
strophic are shown equal to 5.9. With the recommended backup system incorporated, 
the 5. 9 catastrophies become 5.8 aborts and 0.1 catastrophies. 
As a seo.pnd example, aero surface controls, the seventh item listed, with improve-
ments has a probability of occurrence of failure which is negligible. 
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5.3.7 FINAL DATA (MECHANICAL FAILURES). Figure 5-15 shows total failures 
occurring in each mission phase aild is interpreted as follows: 
a. Total failures of the baseline design include white, shaded, and black bars. The 
total = 84.9/1000 flights. 
b. Incorporation of recommended improvements and minor failure eliminates white 
bars and failures become 35.6 aborts (shaded) and 0.6 catastrophies (black bars). 
The effect of incorporation of the recommended improvements is: 
a. Catastrophic failures are reduced to 0.6. 
b. Abort failures (mission abort) become 35.6 giving a mission reliability of > 0.96 . 
Mission Phase 
Liftoff to Staging 
Staging to Orbit 
Orbit. 
Entry 
Flyback 
Approach and Landing 
Total 
Failures 
Abort 
Fatalities 
LIFTOFF 
TO STAGING 
STAGING 
TO ORBIT 
ORBIT 
~I 
Total Failures 
23.-3 
8.5 
34.5 
12.7 
4.3 
1.6 
84.9 
FAILURES 
Aborts 
10.4 
6.8 
18.4 
0 
0 
0 
35.6 
ENTRY I ~__________________ ~ 
FLYBACKI ... ___ ~ 
APPROACH &0 
LANDING 
o t 
GOAL 
10 20 
FAILURES/IOOO' FLIGHTS 
Figure 5-15. Summary of Mechanical Failures 
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Emphasis in design improvements should be placed on providing backup systems in 
several areas. Achievement of these design changes coupled with recommended abort 
p!'ocedures discussed earlier will result in vehicles with crew safety, intact abort, 
and mission success values of: 
Crew safety: 
Intact abort: 
Mission success: 
0.994 
0.994 
0.964 
5. 3.8 LOSSES DUE TO FIRE AND EXPLOSION. An estimate of losses due to fire 
and explosion calculated by applying a weighting factor of 30 to historical data to ac-
count for the increased hazard of a H2/02 propellant compared with JP-/J: fuel will 
yield 0.15 10sses/1000 flights as follows: 
Convair report, GDC-64-273, Investigation and Study of Fire and Explosion Hazards 
for F-105 airplanes, shows F-106 losses due to fire and explosion to be 0.005/1000 
flights. This reports points out deficiencies in the design approach used in the F-105 
and shows how good design can reduce losses. This approach has been demonstrated 
in the F-106, where losses are reduced by an order of magnitude by good design 
practices. 
'With this rational applied, losses due to fire and explosion can be held to 0.15/1000 
flights. This value is excessive and points up the need to design for safety (along 
the lines of the F-106 design approach used in the above mentioned report) to reduce 
this hazard so that losses of this kind are held to essentially zero. If the problem is 
recognized soon enough in the design stage these losses can be eliminated. The term 
0.15/1000 is used in the analysis for comparison purposes. Adding mechanical 
failures (0.61) gives catastrophic losses equal to 0.8/1000 flights. 
5. 3.9 TIME CRITICAL FAILURES. In addition to the mechanical failures discussed 
above, other failures of a tinle critical nature will occur at relatively low frequency 
where it will be necessary to separate prior to staging. These are cases where it is 
desirable to limit the kinetic energy buildup of the system because of structural or 
thermal protection system failure or where immediate separation and abort is required 
due to fire. Following separation, a throttle/burn/dump/reverse flight operation can 
be used. This abort procedure is described in detail in Section 5.4. 
5.3.10 TIME CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR PROPELLANT FEED. Loss of the primary 
propellant feed system is time critical. An analysis was made to determine the maxi-
mum time allowable for thrust interruption to prevent the trim angle from exceeding 
the selected limit value. 
The FR-1 boost configuration was exam.ined at max aq and near staging q to dete:r-
mine the effects of propellant feed failure in one booster resulting in loss of thrust to 
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two engines in that booster and one engine of the orbiter. High gimbal rates delay 
angle of attack buildup as shown in Figure 5-16. Although the vehicle is aerodynamic-
ally stable, the moment (92 X 106 ft-lb) due to thrust failure cannot be counteracted by 
a reasonable angle of attack. 
Gimballing the three firing engines reduces the moment by 43 X 106 ft-Ib. Crossfeed 
in the orbiter that would permit bringing the second orbiter engine back to full thrust 
would relieve 24 X 106 ft-lb leaving an imbalance of 25 X 106 It-lb. However, th,l3 
design objective is to provide restored thrust for all three engines so that the mission 
continues. Figure 5-16 shows that for max Or!q a reaction time of 1 sec is available 
for restoration of full thrust by the propellant feed system with an angle of attack of 
5 deg. 
5.3.11 CONCLUSIONS. 
a. In event of abort, provide backup and complete the boost phase. The boosters fly 
back to launch site and the orbiter stage goes once around the Earth and lands at 
the launch site. 
b. Time critical failures (structural failure or fire) r6quire provisions for immediate 
separation and abort. i" 
c. Predicted intact abort success (safety): 
Predicted mission success probability: 
0.9992 (0.8 10sses/1000 flights) 
0.96 (35 aborts/1000 flights) 
These values compare favorably with established g'oals of 0.999 (1/1000) and 
0.97 (30/1000), respectively. 
5.4 ABORT PROCEDURES 
It is necessary to develop operating procedures to employ when a failure occurs at 
the fail-safe level. The basic procedure for such abort situations is that the orbiter 
continue on to orbit and go once around the Earth and perform a glide return to the 
launch site. A schematic of this maneuver is shown in Figure 5-17. For the baseline 
55-degree orbit the crossrange required after entry to return to ETR is about 800 n. mi. 
5.4.1 ABORT DURING LIFTOFF TO STAGING. The booster and orbiter elements 
will complete the boost phase reaching a staging point with booster propellants deplet-
ed and orbiter propellant tanks full. The vehicles separate and the booster returns to 
the launch site in a normal manner while the orbiter continues once around the Earth 
and returns to the launch site. The once-around abort procedure reflects a high 
probability of successful intact abortt:,rom all failures of a mechanical nature such as 
engine failure or gimballing. 
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In addition, there are rare failure situations which require immediate abort. Some 
typical types are structural failure, thel'mr-.l protection system failure, time critical 
failures, hardover gimbal, and catastrophic situations such as a fire which may re-
quire early separation. On the pad, or just off the pad, the vehicles separate, climb 
to some suitable altitude, say 30, 000 ft, and throttle back engines to burn off 
propellant while limiting altitude and velocity. When empty, each vehicle used an 
equilibrium glide path intercept to land at the launch site. 
Above 30, 000 ft altitude (approximately Mach 1. 0) the procedure is similar in that the 
booster and orbiter separate and deplete their propellants through the rocket engine. 
However, the vehicles are downrange and have high velocity. If the vehicles continue 
thrusting, both booster and orbiter are liable to be too far downrange to be able to 
return to the launch site. This is particularly critical for the orbiter because it has 
very little subsonic flyback range. Rocket propellants and rocket thrust are there-
fore used to return the vehicles to the vicinity of the launch site. 
This reverse maneuver was investigated to establish that the orbiter was in fact cap-
able of returning directly to the launch site. Figure 5-18 presents a typical trajectory 
in terms of altitude and outgoing or return velocity. The critical case in terms of 
performance occurs at staging. From a nominal staging velocity of about 8000 feet 
per second at a 10. 9-degree flight path angle, the orbiter is assumed to apply its main 
propulsion in a retro rocket fashion at some positive attitude (0 to 10 deg) to nullify 
forward velocity and develop sufficient velocity towards the launch site to be able to 
continue on an equilibrium glide trajectory back to the launch site. An upward direc-
tion of thrust is required in order to have this maneuver intercept an equilibrium glide 
trajectory. For a glide at maximum LID, the point indicated in Figure 5-18 repre-
sents the case when the orbiter range out during boost and retro to zero velocity is 
equal to the range back during acceleration to and gliding on an equilibrium path. 
Total velocity increments on the order of 14, 000 to 15, 000 feet per second are required 
for this maneuver, well within the 6V capability of the orbiter at staging. 
5.4.2 ABORT AFTER STAGING. For a critical failure occurring in the orbiter, 
after staging and prior to injection, the abort procedure is to switch to a backup mode, 
continue once around the Earth, and return to the launch site. During orbit or entry 
the procedure is to switch to a backup mode and return to the launch site. 
5.4. 3 PROPELLANT DUMPING. A gross analysis of the requir61nent for propellant 
dumping has established that the need for dumping is limited to special cases of low 
frequency of occurrence. In event of a structural or thermal protection system failure 
it is desirable to limit energy buildup (velocity) and in event of a time critical failure 
(fire) it is desirable to terminate boost (abort). 
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Problems associated with accomplishing actual dumping involve (1) high dump rates due 
to short time of onset of excessive load factor and heating, (2) adverse gravity axis 
(zero g and aerodynamic drag); and (3) reduced reliability of propellant feed system 
due to complexity of providing propellant dumping. 
Investigation of the abort situation following dumping reveals that for most launch azi-
muths landing sites are not available for the orbiter due to lack of flyback capability. 
Ditching is not considered a satisfactory solution because of cost, even if the orbiter 
vehicle incorporated the penalties required for a safe water landing. Vehicle losses 
must be held to < 1/1000 to make the reusable concept feasible. 
5. 5 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
Vehicle and vehicle system design requirements which will enable accomplishment of 
the abort procedures specified in Section 5.4 are: 
Following failure of: 
a. Any rocket engine: 
1. Des ign to keep going. 
2. Design liftoff thrust/weight ~ 1.16 
3. Design orbiter to fly once around the Earth and land at launch site. 
b. Propellant feed: 
1. Provide backup in 1 second (propellant feed tank pressurization). 
2. Design propellant feed backup for full thrust capability. 
3. Design to deplete boosters equally before staging (for FR-4 by throttling 
opposite booster engines). 
4. Design for once-around mission: 
a) Use main propellants. 
b) Use or dump orbit maneuvering propellant. 
c. Thermostructure 
1. Design for any engine out in any part of the trajectory . 
. 
2. Design for any turbojet out. during flyback. 
3. Design for failure transients. 
4. Provide redundant attachments, etc. 
5. Provide multi-load path design. 
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d. Subsystem. Design for fail operational/fail safe operation. Design provisions such 
that after failure of: 
Guidance 
Power 
Hydraulics 
Electrical 
ECS 
ACS 
Avionics 
Gimbal 
Aero Control Surfaces 
Wing Deploy 
Turbojet Deploy 
Landing Gear Deploy 
Inerting Sys terns 
Switch to backup. 
Complete mission. 
After second failure, return to launch site. 
Perform function, may be at reduced rate. 
Com.plete mission. 
After second failure, return to launch site. 
5.6 DESIGN FOR SAFETY (FIRE AND EXPLOSION HAZARD) 
5.6.1 INTRODUCTION. The hazard of fire and explosion on the FR-l, FR-3, and 
FR-4 vehicles is potentially greater than on a conventional JP fueled aircraft because 
of the large quantity of H2, which has a very broad flammability range and a low igni-
tion energy. There is always the possibility that a leak somewhe.re in the LH2 system 
will generate gaseous hydrogen. For the ascent phase of flight and during entry, 
ambient air containing oxygen can enter the interstitial space where GH2 could form. 
Since the concentration of GH2 required to form a combustible mixture has a broad 
range (4% to 75% by volume), it must be assumed that a small cryogenic leak of LH2 
could subsequently vaporize and form a mixture whose concentration is within the 
flammable range. The gaseous mixture is not hypergolic. However, because of the 
low ignition energy required (0.019 millijoules, 1/10 that for JP fail and air) .it must 
be assumed that an ignition source in the form of electrical spark (chaffed Wires/or 
static discharge) is always present. Since sources of ignition in accidents reported 
(except Apollo) have not been identified conclusively, no potential source can be dis-
regarded. Duringent;ry, stratified layers of hot air above the spontaneous ignition 
temperature could enter the interstitial space and ignite any combustible mixture that 
may be present. 
Table 5-3 shows a. comparison of the relative hazard of a reusable launch vehicle and 
an airplane. It shows that hazard is greater for the reusable vehicle because of the 
type of propellant~ the amount of propellant, and the vehicle size compared with an 
F-106 airplane. Figure 5-19 shows schematically the hazard potential (sources of 
fire and explosion) in the vehicle for an early FR-l design. The vehicle carries 
quantities of L02, JP-4, and LH2' the major source of fire and explosion hazard. 
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Volume VIII 
Table 5-3. Hazards Comparison - Reusable Launch Vehicles/Airplanes 
I .Propellant al~1 Fuel Characteristics (1 Atmos.) 
Flammability Range 
(% by Volume) 
Ignition Energy Required 
(Millijoules) 
.Vehicle Characteristics 
Propellant/Fuel 
Weight at T.O. 
p (Density) 
Volume 
*Early FR-1 vehicle. 
0.003 
!!2/Air 
4-75 (520GB) 
0.019 
Reusable Launch Vehicle* 
(H2/02 Propellant) 
~ 2 1/2 Million lb 
At mixture ratio 7:1 
average density = 24 Ib/ft3 
~100, 000 ft3 
JP-4/Air 
0.7-4.8 (520° R) 
0.2 
Aircraft (F-106) 
(JP-4 Fuel) 
9,0181b 
48.5 Ib/ft3 
Figure 5-20 shows schematically the design safety requirements. These design pro-
visi.ons are necessary in order to demonstrate that the vehicle will be operationally 
safe, and to ensure that failures due to fire and explosion do not occur. 
In summary, the vehicle design requires the following in order to eliminate occurrence 
of fire and explosion: 
a. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
e. 
Provide sealed, gas tight bulkheads to separate compartments containing fuels 
and/ or oxidizers. 
Provide diaphragms to seal off hot air and isolate hot surface ignition sources. 
Provide purg~ng with an inert gas during ascent and descent to an 02 concentration 
< 2% by volume for LH2 tank surrounds, the rocket bay, and the payload bay. 
Provide 02/N2 crew and passenger compartment atmosphere. 
Apply design practices to eliminate leakage potential and isolate electrical ignition 
sources. 
5.6.2 PURGE AND POSITIVE PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM 
5.6.2.1 Purge of Interstitial Space. This initial assessment indicates that a solu-
tion to the fire and explosire hazard is to provide an inert gas to suppress any potential 
fire or explosion with a purge and positive pressure control system. 
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Figure 5-20. Design for Safety 
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Volume VIII 
The basic premise for the design evolves from consideration of several probabilities. 
The probability of occurrence of a small cryogenic leak of LH2 or L02 is equal. The 
probability that both of these will occur at the same time is remote. The probability 
of a line breakage resulting in a large flow of either LH2 or L02 is remote. The 
probability of ambient air being present in the interstitial space is a certainty unless 
a positive pressure is ID.aintained in the space so that ambient air containing 02 cannot 
enter. If the pressurizing gas in inert and if the 02 concentration < 2% by volume, 
combustion is not possible even with a large concentration of H2• The potential of fire 
or explosion from this cause is thus removed. The system consists of: 
a. Provisions for introducing an inert gas (N2) into the rocket engine bay, the area 
surrounding the LH2 tank, and the area surrounding the payload bay on the ground. 
b. Pressure regulator and vent valves, one of which is shown schematically in Figure 
5-21, located in these same spaces to control interstitial space pressure to a posi-
tive value above ambient and within structural limits during ascent. The valves are 
open in orbit and close during entry and descent. 
c. Stored inert gas which is used to repressurize the interstitial space during entry 
and descent. 
AMl3IEN'l' AIH 
INSULATION 
I 
UPPEH IlEAT S1IlELD 
CIlECK 
/VALVE 
t 
The LH2 tank surrounds, the rocket engine, 
and the payload bay are purged and pressure-
controlled. The L02 tank surrounds and 
turbojet bay are not because these contain 
no H2 • These bays are pressurized with 
ambient air and are provided with a lower 
pressure barrier on the cold side of the 
lower heat shield which prevents hot air I'HESSUHE~ 
SENSING LINE I o from entering the compartments. The 
I 
I 
I 
I 
IN'l'EHSTITIAL SPACE 
~ PHESSUHE HEGULATOH 
Figure 5-21. Pressure Regulator 
Vent and Check 
Valve Schematic 
(PRV) 
small amount of heat transfer from air 
from the upper heat shield area used to 
repressurize these compartments on entry 
is negligible. 
The LH2 tanks themselves cannot be purged 
during ascent, when the probability of fail-
ure which might lead to fire or explosion is 
greatest. For the orbiter, residual gaseous 
hydrogen and gaseous oxygen is used for the 
A CS and APU operations. Time does not 
permit purging of LH2 and GH2 from the 
main tanks for booster or for the orbiter 
under an abort condition. 
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Volume VIn 
5.6.2.2 Purge and Pressure Control. The basic pressure control schedule is shown 
in Table 5-4. 
5.6.2.3 Source of Repressurizing Inert Gas (He). Gaseous He is stored in a con-
tainer inside the long term LH2 tanks at 30 o R. A system conSisting of a gas gener-
ator and a heat exchanger is used to expand the gas for efficient volume utilization. 
Table 5-4. Purge and Pressure Control Schedule 
Trajectory Interstitial Space 
Phase (lIS) Pressure 
Function 
Performed 
System 
Operation 
--------------------------~------------------------+~~----------------------
Ground 
Ascent 
~P = +1 psig 
with GN2 
~P = +1 psig with 
GN2 . (GN2 is 
venting overboard) 
Compartment is purged 
to [02] <2% by volume. 
Positive pressure keeps 
ambient air out of lis. 
[02] <2%. Positive pres-
sure keeps ambient air 
out. 
Orbit liS vented to space This gets rid of fuel and 
- hard vacuum 
Pre-entry lis repressurized 
and Entry with inert ga.s 
(He) to ~P = 1 psig 
Descent, liS repressurized 
with inert gas (He) 
to ~P = 1 psig 
oxidizer gases, which if 
retained would represent 
a hazard. Provides safe 
condition for orbital stay. 
Positive pressure 
keeps ambient air out 
Positive pressure keeps 
ambient air out 
Pressure regulator Ivent 
valve (PRV) holds pres-
s ure to 1 ps ig nominal. 
PRY controls pressure 
to structural limit. 
PRY open to vacuum. 
PRV closed (electrically) 
pressure is controlled by 
inflow regulator in He 
supply system. 
PRY closed (electrically) 
A 10 min. pos t landing 
provision provides for 
time to connect ground 
cart. 
--------------------------~----------------------~~----------------------liS = Interstitial Space 
[ ] = Concentration 
5.6.2.4 Pressure Regulator Valve. During ground purge, the valve holds pressure 
to ~P = 1 psi. During ascent, purge gas is vented at a flow rate sufficient to hold 
pressure < 1 psi above ambient. In orbit, the valve is opened and all residual gases 
vent to vacuum. During entry the valve is closed, and compartment pressure is 
controlled by an inflow regulator which is part of the GHe supply system. Four 
18-in. diameter (flow area)pressure regulator valves accommodate the LH2 bay tank 
surrounds, providing redundancy. Any 1:\.170 valves can handle the vent flow required 
during ascent. Four are used for the payload bay, making a total of eight valves. 
5-38 
.. .... ~. 
" 
-p-, -----.""',,---------...,.,.-----------~-~-- -~ ~' 
I 
~. 
'.! 
tl 
ii 
1 j 
, ; , . 
1 ; 
. " 
Volume VIII 
5.6.3 ESTIMATED WEIGHT AND VOLUME. First order estimates of the weights of 
the elements that provide protection against fire and explosion are: 
a. GHe Orbiter Booster 
For entry (leakage + repressurization) 220 
For descent (leakage + repressurization) 700 700 
For 10 min. post landing (leakage) 225 
For flyback boosters (leakage + repressurization) 1300 
For 10 min. post landing boosters (leakage) 225 
Weight GHe Total 1145 .2225 
GHe Storag'e Container Weight = 1.7 X Tvvt GHe 1946 3782 
(usable gas + container) 
b. Gas Generator and Heat Exchanger 20 20 
c. 8 pressure regulator valves a.t 20 pounds each 160 160 
Total, lb 2126 3962 
The sensitivities of these weights are shown in Vol II Section 10. O. 
-
The volume of gaseous He required is 180 ft3 
5.6.4 LEAKAGE AREA. Leakage of purge gas interfaces with the pressure barriers 
and the heat shields. Vol. 5 Section 8 specifies leakage allowable limits for these areas. 
In calculating the total leakage areas for the LH2 tank bay, rocket engine bay, and pay-
load bay, the following value was used: 
CA = 0.04 ft2 
where 
C = discharge coefficient = 0.6 
A = geometric area 
5.7 ENGINE EFFECTS ON SAFETY AND MISSION SUCCESS 
5.7.1 INTRODUCTION. A study was conducted to determine the effect of rocket 
engines on safety and mi~sion success for the FR-3 31ld FR-4 vehicles. The objec-
tives were: 
a. Determine safety, reliability, and mission success of the vehicles for given 
engine arrangements. 
b. Determine the adva.ntages and penalties associated with the application of fail-
operational/fail-safe to boosters and orbiters. 
c. Make a recommendation for final vehicle configurations. 
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Mission success and safety are a function of engine reliability, number of engines, 
catastrophic failure rate of engines, vehicle design in terms of thrust to weight at 
liftoff and thrust to weight at staging to enable engine out operation, and reliability 
of other subsystems not associated with engines. 
In this study, subsystem failures not associated with engines are ignored and con-
sideration is given to' the engine portion of the propulsion system during the as~ent 
phase. Failure modes associated with engines are identified as follows: 
a. Catastrophic failures (engine catastrophic failures resulting in loss of adjacent 
engine and loss of vehicles). 
b. Loss of performance (thrust loss is non-catastrophic). 
A mission success goal of 0.97 (30 aborts/1000 flights) and a crew and passenger 
safety goal (intact abort) of 0.999 (1 10ss/1000 flights) were established for the study. 
These goals required that an assessment of the potential catastrophic engine failure be 
made particularly since use of the 400, OOO-ib engine requires more total engines than 
use of larger engines. The probability of catastrophic failure is directly proportional 
to the number of engines, while performance failure (loss of thrust which may negate 
abort capability) diminishes with increasing numbers of engines. 
Further, as the vehicle advances along the boost trajectory, fewer and fewer numbers 
of engines are required to accomplish a safe return. As less and less engines are 
required, the probability of vehicle losses due to engine performance failure approaches 
zero. 
Three engine reliabilities - 0.99, 0.997, and 0.999 .- were studied. These relia-
bilities apply to the total burn time of 0.155 hr. The liftoff to staging (boost 1) 
and staging to orbit (boost 2) times were taken as equal at 0.06 hr. Orbitalopera-
tions were not included in the trade study since the minimum number of orbiter en-
gines studied was three which provide fail operational/fail-safe operation for on-
orbit maneuvers. 
The fail-safe and fail-operational/fail-safe concepts were applied to boosters and 
orbiters to different degrees, and the penalties for achieving different reduced loss 
rates (missions and vehicles) were determined. 
Reliability considerations following one engine out, two out, and three out are: 
a. Can the mission be completed? 
b. Can a successful abort be accomplished? 
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In a given engine vehicle configuration, if the mission can be completed with an en-
gine out and a successful abort ~made with two engines out, this is equivalent to 
saying the vehicle system is capable of a fail-operational/fail-safe operation. If the 
mission cannot be completed with one engine out, but safe return is possible, the 
vehicle is capable of fail.-safe operation. The minimum mission is safe return of 
the vehicle with at least one engine out. Specific values of liftoff and staging thrust 
to weight ratio must be maintained to achieve successful fa.i.1-safe and fail-operational/ 
fail-safe. In addition, overthrust capability must be provided to allow fail-opera-
tional/fail-saie performance. 
5.7.2 PROBABILITY OF ENGINE CATASTROPHIC FAILURE. A quantitative 
assessment of the probability of engine catastrophic failure is not available, though 
Pratt and Whitney has estimated that 1% of all engine failures will be catastrophic 
resulting in loss of the vehicle. Vehicle losses must then include consideration for 
these catastrophic engine failures. The more engines there are, the higher the 
probability of vehicle loss due to catastrophic failure. The bell and aerospike 
engines were investigated to determine the characteristics of catastrophic failure 
modes. 
Mission reliability is greatly improved when the fail-operational/fail-safe concept is 
used instead of fail-safe, but vehicle losses remain essentially unchanged because 
of the catastrophic ratio. The major factor in engine design is the reduction of the 
catastrophic failure ratio. 
The bell engine has a set of turbine-driven propellant pumps, a pre-burner chamber 
and a thrust chamber and nozzle for each engine element. 
5.7.2.1 Design Features Involving Catastrophic Failure Considerations. The basic 
cycle of the bell high pressure rocket engine has the following design features: 
a,. 
b. 
c. 
d. 
Mixture ratio control (first level sensor). 
Closed loop turbine cycle. 
Preburner temperature sensor (second level sensor). 
Transpiration wafer pressure sensor (second level sensor). 
e. Ten hour life and reuse requirement. 
Features a, b, c, and d tend to turn down thrust if variation of propellant flow 
occurs for any reason. The probability of cracks occurring in heat exchangers and 
transpirtation wafe~, is reduced beca\:~se of the requirement for reuse which calls for 
greater design margins (reduced stresses and over cooling). 
Temperature and pressure sensors will act as second level monitoring sources to 
shut down thrust as required to prevent catastrophic failure which may damage ad-
jacent engines or the spacecraft. 5-41 
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5.7 .2.2 Failure Modes 
a. Turbine Bearing Freeze. The engine controls mixture ratio so that reduced 
fuel or oxidizer flow will turn down thrust. Reduced fuel flow will increase 
the mixture ratio but before the preburner temperature reaches stoichiometric 
values, the preburn temperature sensor will shut down the engine. 
Turbine Overspeed. The closed loop turbine cycle tends to prevent turbines 
from overspeeding because of choked flow at the nozzle throat. As propellant 
flow (gas) is increased, the turbines are back pressured and will slow down or 
reach a limit speed because of reduced pressure ratio. This would not be the 
case if a separate gas generator is used such as in the Atlas engine. The 
turbines handle large mass flows (large turbines) and operate at low pressure 
ratio. Overspeed of turbine can occur with a sudden reduction in source flow of 
fuel or oxidizer because energy is momentarily stored in the pre burner case, 
which has a relatively large volume. 
c. Propellant Flow Interruption (Gradual) 
For oxidizer: assuming reduced flow upstream of inducers, if NPSH is lost or 
the closed pre valve , if used, fails the mixture ratio control will turn down 
thrust. 
For fuel: with the same assumptions as above, the mixture ratio control (first 
level sensor) will turn down thrust, and the preburner temperature sensor 
(second level sensor) will shut down the engine. 
d. A crack in the heat exchanger (bell nozzle) will dump fuel tending to increase 
the pre burner mixture ratio. As the stoichiometric temperature is approached 
the preburner temperature sensor will shut down the engine before the pre-
burner case fails. 
e. A crack in the transpiration wafer will tend to increase flow in the area of the 
crack which will reduce H2 flow to the preburner 8 The preburner tempera.ture 
sensor will turn down the thrust as the temperature reaches a set limit. Wafer 
pressure will also act to shut down the engine. 
It is recommended that further work be done by this engine manufacturer on a failure 
analysis. The basic objective in the failure analysis should be to make compromises 
in favor of a fail-safe design (1. e., an engine which does not fail catastrophically in 
a way which may damage adjacent engine or the spacecraft). During the test program, 
temperature and pressure spikes which could cause failure should be carefully 
mon.itored. 
5.7 • 2.3 Aerospike Engine. The basic engine consists of a set of turbine-driven 
propellant pumps, a pre burner chamber and a nozzle for each set of 400,000 Ib 
elements. 
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Design Features Involving Catastrophic Failure Considerations. The basic cycle of 
~-
the aerospike rocket engine has the following features: 
a. Mixture ratio control (first level sensor). 
b. Open loop turbine cycle. 
c. Preburner temperature sensor (second level sensor). 
d. Ten-hr life and reuse requirement. 
Features a and c tend to turn down thrust if variation of propellant flow occurs for any 
reason. As in the bell engine, the probability of cracks occurring in the heat exchang-
ers is reduced because of the requirement for reuse, which calls for greater design 
margins (reduced stresses and over cooling). 
Temperature and pressure sensors will act as second level monitoring sources to shut 
down thrust as required to prevent catastrophic failure which may damage adjacent 
engines or the spacecraft. 
Failure Modes 
a. Turbine Bearing Freeze. The engine controls the mixture ratio so that reduced 
fuel or oxidizer flow will turn down thrust. Reduced fuel flow will increase the 
mixture ratio but before the preburner temperature reaches stoichiometric 
values, the pre burn temperature sensor will shut down the engine. 
b. Turbine Overspeed. The open loop turbine cycle is in effect a gas generator with 
turbine discharge pressure essentially ambient. The turbines handle a relatively 
slnall mass flow (smaller turbines) and operate at high pressure ratio. Although 
overspeed of turbines can occur with a sudded reduction in source flow of fuel 
or oxidizer, it is not likely to because of the reduced turbine size and less stored 
energy in the smaller pre burner • 
c. Propellant Flow Interruption (Gradual) 
For oxidizer: assuming reduced flow up$tream of inducers, if NPSH is lost or 
the failed closed prevalve, if used, fails, the mixture ratio control will turn 
down thrust. 
For fuel: with the same assumptions as above the mixture ratio control (first 
level sensor) will turn down thrust, and the preburner temperature sensor (second 
level sensor) will shut down the engine. 
d. A crack in the heat exchanger win ,dump fuel tending to increase the pre burner 
mixture ratio. As the stoichiometric ~mperature is approached the preburner 
temperature sensor will shut down the engine before the pre burner case fails. 
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It is recommended that further work be done by this manufacturer on a failure analysis. 
The basic objective in the failure analysiS is the same as for the bell engine: to make 
compromises in favor of a fail safe design (i. e., an engine which does not fail cata-
strophically in a way which may damage adjacent engine or the spacecraft). During 
the test program, temperature and pressure spikes which could cause failure should 
be carefully monitored. 
5.7.3 MINIMUM NUMBER OF ENGINES REQUIR~!? FOR SAFETY 
5. 7 • 3.1 Fail Safe Approach. For some portion of the boost 1 phase, only one engine 
failure can be tolerated for the "once around" abort to be still accornplished. But for 
the remainder of the boost 1 phase, two, three, and even more engine failures can be 
tolerated and the abort can be accomplished. In other words engines may fail as the 
vehicle advances along the trajectory and a safe return still can be made. 
If this fact is taken into account, vehicle loss calculations will show significantly 
reduced values because the ti.me required for n-1, n-2, and n-3, etc., engines opera-
ting is drastically reduced. Vehicle 10s8es beyond n-3 engines are negligible. 
One approach to assessment of the quantitative effect of this is to assume that the 
time required for n-1, n-2, n-3, etc., engines operating is a function of n (number of 
engines) . 
If time required for n-1, n-2, etc., engines operating is some function of total tra-
jectory (boost 1 phase) time divided by number of engines, then: 
t 
t = traj phase total time 
req'dforn-1, n-2, etc., engines operating n (1) 
Equation 1 was modified in the interest of conservatisnl by the application of a factor 
of 2, giving the expression used to calculate losses: 
(2) t 
traj phase 
treqid for n-1, n-2, etc., engines operating =- n (2) 
5.7 • 3.2 Fail-Operational/Fail-Safe Approach. A similar situation is applicable 
to the fail-operational/fail-safe approach, but here vehi.cle safety is further enhanced 
because the added engines reduce the probability of having less than the number of 
engines required for a "once around" abort. 
The effect of providing fail-operational/fail-safe to improv,e mission reliability then 
also improves vehicle safety by the application of Equation 1 if the engine catastroph-
ic failure ratio is «1%. 
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5.7.4 IMPLICATIONS OF UPRATED THRUST RATING 
5. 7 . 4. 1 Overthrus t (Overs peed) of Engines. The propellant utilization (PU) sys tern 
significantly reduces residual propellants which improve vehicle performance. This 
system monitors tanked mixture ratio and regu.lates engine mixture ratio to give full 
utilization of available propellant (simultaneous depletion of fuel and oxidizer). The 
rocket engine :is designed to provide a range of mixture ratios for this purpose. The 
engine so designed will actually have an increased thrust capability at some fixed mix-
ture ratio. This is because of the pump and thermal limits required in the engine 
design. This situation is shown in Figure 5-22. For the 400, OOO-ib engine currently 
defined by Pratt and Whitney, this capability is 108 percent of nominal. 
PUMP LIMIT Some overthrust capability is then inher-
ent in the engine design. However, this 
inherent overthrust capability cannot 
i--'0~t~AL be used for fail-operational purposes 115----1.----___ --~--_... without significant performance penalty E-l -- ---........ since no PU control is possible. To ~o 110080 __ E __' I ""'-........ provide PU control capability at thrusts ~_ _ - - ~- - _ J above nominal, the engine must be de-
........ _ signed to operate beyond the nominal 
5.5 6.0 6 5 d d 
• spee an temperature limits. Over-
ENGINE MIXTURE RATIO 
Figure 5-22. Engine Thrust vs. 
Mixture Ratio 
thrust to 115 percent of nominal as de-
fined in Figure 5-22 is thought to be 
feasible for a single flight by Pratt and 
Whitney. This capability would allow 
control of engine mixture ratio over the full design range at thrust up to approximately 
7 percent. If engines are operated in this mode, some refurbishment is required after 
use. The cost of this refurbishment requires further investigation to determine if the 
use of overthrust is cost effective in terms of reduced mission aborts. 
The application of this, overthrust to a 15 engined booster (FR-3) can be advantageous 
from a mission abort standpoint. For an engine MTBF (mean time between failures) = 
15 (Reng = 0.99) mission aborts during liftoff to staging caused by engines alone can 
be reduced from 60/1000 flights to approximately 2, if provision is tnade to reach 
staging with one engine out (fail-operational for booster engines). This is a significant 
gain since it can be accomplished with presently conceived engines. The amount of 
overthrust required is given by 1/n-1 = 1/15-1 = 7.2% which is approximately within 
the range of m.ixture ratios required for operation of the PU system. The FR-3 incor-
porates this fail-operational provision for booster engines. The application of fail-
operational/fail safe to engines in the 9-3-9 engine configuration FR-4 vehicle is ad-
vantageous from a mission loss standpoint. Losses can be reduced from 78 to 2, but 
an overthrust = 1/9-1 = 1/8 = 13% is required because without propellant crossfeed, 
the booster element with the failed engine must produce the required performance 
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thrust-to-weight ratio so that it uses up all of its propellant. Under the constraint of a 
fixed engine module thrust engine (400,000 Ib) it would be necessary to add two engines 
and create a 10-3-10 engine configuration with a gross liftoff weight increase of approxi-
mately 125, 000 lb. 
With the application of propellant crossfeed to the FR-4 9-3-9 configuration, the amount 
of overthrust for booster elements would be = 1/n-1 = 1/18-1 ~ 6%. This would allow 
PU control in the present engines and a saving of the c::!125, OOO-pound gross liftoff weight. 
5. 7.4.2 Alternate Approach (Throttlin[).. An alternate approach to operation of engines 
in an overthrust mode is to provide an extra engine and operate booster engines throttled. 
The fail-operational/fail-safe concept applied to the FR-3 15-3 engine arrangement can 
be accomplished by providing 16 rather than 15 booster engines and operating the 16 
normally throttled to 93%. If one engine fails, the remaining 15 good engines are op-
erated at 100% to maintain performance T /W. The throttling approach (added engine 
in booster) will increase gross liftoff weight by ~ 54, 000 lb. 
5.7= 5 FR-3 CONFIGURATION 
5.7.5.1 Analysis. Table 5-5 presents information obtained from the study. Data were 
generated from Figures 5-23 and 5-24 for a 15-3 engine configuration. The 15-3 con-
figuration was selected for the case where fail-safe is applied to both booster and orbiter. 
The same configuration was considered where fail-operational/fail-safe was applied to 
the booster and fail-safe to the orbiter. TW0 approaches to providing fail operational/ 
fail safe in the booster are shown (with overthrust and with throttling). The throttling 
approach requires an added booster engine. 
Figure 5-23 is a plot of engine reliability versus losses for the 15-3 FR-3 installation 
for the liftoff to staging (boost 1) phase. Five curves are shown. The probability 
of one and two engines being out are shown as solid lines. Catastrophic failure prob-
ability for assumed catastrophiC failures of 1% and 0.1% of the basic non-catastrophic 
engine failures, and probability of not having the minimum number of engines re-
quired for safe return (at left) are presented. Figure 5-24 is a similar plot for the 
staging to orbit phase (boost 2). 
Table 5-5 presents data in terms of the degree of application of fail-safe and fail-
operational/fail-safe and in terms of engine reliability. Mission losses are reduced 
from 72 to 13.5, as fail-operational/fail-safe is applied, for Reng = 0.99 and from 
21.5 to 3.7 for Reng = 0.997. Vehicle losses are not Significantly changed. Vehicle 
losses are reduced by an order of magnitude for all cases of fail-safe and fail-
operational/fail-safe as the catastrophic ratio decreases from 1% to 0.1%. 
A discussion of Table 5-5 in terms of engine reliability (read across) follows. Looking 
at the F /S case, as engine reliability is improved from 0.99 to 0.997, mission losses 
reduce from 72 to 21.5 and vehicle losses reduce from 0 0 70 to 0 0 23 for a catastrophic 
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Table 5-5. Losses/lOOO Flights for 15-3 Engine Configuration 
01 
I 
~ 
c:o 
Booster Engines 
Overthrust Throttle 
F /S(B&O) 0% 0% 
F/O-F/S(B) 7%* 93%** 
F /S(O) 
* 15-3 Engine Configuration 
** 16-3 Engine Configuration 
GLOW 
(M lb) 
4.32 
4.32*/ 
~4.38** 
F /O-F /S = Fail-Operational/Fail-Safe 
GLOW = Gross Liftoff Weight 
F /S = Fail Safe 
As-
surned 
Catas. 
Ratio 
0.01 
0.001 
, 
0.01 
0.001 
C = Loss due to Engine Catastrophic Failure 
B 
o 
T 
" 
= Booster 
= Orbiter 
= Total 
,,~~ 
Missions (Abort) 
Reng = 0.99 0.997 0.99 
B 0 T B 0 T B 0 
60 12 72 18 3.5 21. 5 0.6 0.1 -C C 
60 12 72 18 3.5 21.5 0.06 0.01 C C 
1.5 12 13.5 0.20 3.5 3.70 0.6 0.1 -C C C 
1.5 12 13.5 0.20 3.5 3.50 0.06 0.01 - --C C C 
- ~ .. ~'! .... 
,.:; 
Vehicles 
T B 
0.7 0.2 
- -C C 
0.07 0.02 
-C C 
0.7 0.2 
- -C C 
0.07 0.02 
- -C C 
0.997 
0 
0.08 
-C 
0.003 
C 
0.03 
-C 
0.003 
C 
T 
0.23 
-C 
0.023 
C 
0.23 
-C 
0.023 
C 
~ 
..-
a 
CD 
~ 
...... 
...... 
# 
·1 
. j 
d 
p 4 -. 
I 
p 
Volume VIII 
ratio of 1%, and from 0.070 to 0.023 for a catastrophic ratio of 0.1%. Looking at the 
F/o-F/s for booster, Fls for orbiter case, the mission improve from 13.5 to 3.7 and 
vehicle losses reduce from O. 70 to 0.23. This occurs because of constraints imposed 
by the catastrophic ratios. 
5.7 0 5.2 :evaluation of Results. Figure 5-25 is a graphic representation of Table 
5-5. This figure shows a significant improvement in mission reliability with in-
creasing application of fail-operational/fail-safe and improved engine reliability. 
Vehicle safety is improved with improved engine reliability but not with application 
of the fail-operational/fail-safe because of the constraints of the catastrophic ratio. 
5. '7. 6 FR-4 CONFIGURATION 
5.7.6.1 Analysis. Data shown in Table 5-6 were generated from Figures 5-26 and 
5-27 for a 9-3-9 engine configuration. 
The 9-3-9 configuration was selected for the case where fail-safe is applied to both 
booster and orbiter with zero over thrust. The same configuration was considered 
where fail-operational/fail-safe was applied to bOvsters with 13% overthrust and fail 
safe for the orbiter. 
Figure 5-26 is a graph depicting engine reliability versus losses for the 9-3-9 FR-4 
installation for the liftoff to staging (boost 1) phase. Five curves are shown: the 
probability of one and two engines out are shown as solid lines. Catastrophic prob-
ability for assumed catastrophic failures of 1% and 0.1% of the basic non-catastrophic 
engine failures, and probability of not having the minimum number of engines required 
for safe return are presented as dotted lines. Figure 5-27 is a similar graph for the 
staging to orbit phase (boost 2). Table 5-6 presents data in terms of the degree of 
application of fail-safe and fail-operational/fail-safe and in terms of engine reliability. 
In Table 5-6 mission losses are reduced from 90 to 14.2 as F/o-F/s is applied. 
For Reng = 0.99 and from 24. 5 to 3. 7 for Reng = O. 99 7 GLOW increases from 4.92 
to 5.04 million pounds. Vehicle losses are not significantly changed. Vehicle 
losses are reduced by an order of magnitude for all cases of F Is and F 10-F Is as 
the catastrophic ratio decreases from 1% to 0.1%. 
A discussion of Table 5-6 in terms of engine reliability (read across) follows 0 For. 
the F Is case, as engine reliability is improved from 0.99 to 0.997, mission losses 
reduce from 90 to 24.5 and vehicle losses reduce from 0.9 to 0.23 for a catastroph-
ic ratio of 1% and from 0.09 to 0.023 for a catastrophic ratio of 0.1%. For the 
F I 0-F Is for booster F /8 for orbiter case, mission losses decrease from 14.2 to 
3.72 and vehicle losses reduce from 0.9 to 0.23. Again this is because of the con-
sh"aints imposed by the catastrophic ratios. 
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Figure 5-25. FR-3 Mission Aborts and Vehicle Losses for 
Different Engine Arrangements 
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Table 5-6. Losses/1000 Flights for 9-3-9 Engine Configuration 
'I,? 
I'm. 
19' jui 
01 
I 
,c, III 01 
I.\:) 
Overthrust 
F /S (B&O) 0 
F/O-F/S 13% 
(B) 
F /S (0) 
As-
sUlned 
GLOW Catas. 
(M lb) Ratio 
4.92 0.01 
0.001 
5.04* 0.01 
0.001 
Mission 
Reng = 0.99 0.997 
B 0 T B 0 
78 12 90 21 3.5 
78 12 I 90 21 3.5 
2.2 12 14.2 0.22 3.5 --C 
2.2 12 14.2 0.22 3.5 C 
Vehicles 
0.99 
T B 0 T B 
24.5 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 - - -C C C C 
24.5 0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 - - - -C C C C 
3.7 0.8 0.1 0.9 0.2 - -C C C ", oJ 
0.08 0.01 0.09 0.02 3.7 - -- --C C C C 
------- - --- - ------
0.997 
0 T 
0.03 0.23 
-- --C C 
0.003 0.023 
C C 
0.03 0.23 : 
- --C C I 
1 
0.003 0.0231 
C C 
* The 13% overthrust is beyond the presently designed engine limit for PU control needed for the fail-operational mode, 
and the constraint of using a 400, OOO-Ib thrust engine module requires that 2 engines be added (1 for each booster) 
It I 
i' 
!i 
11 
to obtain a 13% overthrust capability. A 10-3-10 configuration is required. 
F /O-F /S = Fail-Operational/Fail-Safe 
F /S = Fail Safe 
GLOW = Gross Liftoff Weight 
C = Loss Due to Engine Catastrophic Failure 
B 
o 
T 
= Booster 
= Orbiter 
= Total 
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Figure 5-26. Engine Reliability Versus Losses/Aborts for 9-3-9 Engine Configuration 
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5.7.6.2 Evaluation of Results. Figure 5-28 is a graphic representation of Table 5-6. 
This figure shows a significant improvement in mission reliability with increasing 
application of F 10-F /S and improved engine reliability. Vehicle safety is not im-
proved with increasing application of the F/o-F/S". 
5.7.7 IMPLICATIONS OF PROPELLANT CROSSFEED FOR THREE-ELEMENT 
CONFIGURATIONS. The safety and operational implications of providing crossfeed 
to a three-element configuration appear in two areas. 
a. Equalized Depletion for Boosters. Crossfeed enables booster propellants to be 
depleted equally so that dynamics at separation are symmetrical and a normal 
staging sequence can be executed following subsystem failure or engine faiiure 
during liftoff to staging. 
b. Fail-OperationaI/Fail-Safe Application. For a multi-engine vehicle (say 9-3-9) 
with fail-operational/fail-safe provisi;ns for booster engines, significant weight 
and cost savings can be made because the engine overthrust requirement is 6% 
rather than 13%. If provisions are made to achieve operational staging with a 
booster engine out fail-operational then: 
1. 
2. 
With crossfeed, the amount of overthrust :a 1 1 = 2:. = 0.06 = 6% 
nbtot- 17 
where 
nb
tot 
= total number of booster engines 
Minimum performance thrust to weight ratio is maintained and boosters 
reach staging with propellants equally depleted. 
Withoutcrossfeed, the amount of overthrust required = -2-1 =.!. = o. 13 = 13% 
nb - 8 
in order to achieve operational staging. 
where 
nb == number of booster engines per element. 
e 
e 
5. 7.8 SUMMARY AND R~COMMENDATIONS 
5.7.8.1 FR-3 Configuration. Table 5-1 summarizes the FR-3 rocket engine study. 
Mission Losses. In order to approach a mission goal of 30 failures per 1000 flights, 
the 15-3 configuration with F /0-F /S for the boosters and F /S for the orbiter, with an 
engine reliability of 0.99, is required. Engine overthrust reqUired is 7%. 
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Table 5-7. Summary of FR-3 Rocket Engine Study 
Losses/lOOO Flights All Causes 
Engine Mission Vehicle (Safety) 
Engine Vehicle Overthrust Calculated With Assumed'-
Engine Reliability GLOW Capability Engine Catas. Ratio 
Configuration Required (M lb) (%) Calculated Allowable 1% 0.1% Allowable 
15-3 0.99 4.32 0 92 30 1.33 0.70 1 
F/S in (B &0) 0.997 4.32 0 41 30 0.8() 0.65 1 
15-3 0.99* 4.32 7** 33 30 1.33 0.70 1 
F/O-F/S in 0.997 4.32 7 24 30 0.86 0.65 1 B; F/S in 0 
* Recommended configuration (froIn the standpoint of safety, low mission losses, and attainable engine reliability 
of 0.99) 
** The presently conceived rocket engine provides for up to a 7% overthrust with full PU control. Some refurbishment 
of the engine is required after use at the 107% thrust level. 
Note: A value of 20 mission losses/1000 flights for causes other than engines is added to losses caused by engine 
failures to reflect total mission losses from all causes. A value of 0.63 vehicle losses/1000 flights for causes 
other than engine catastrophic failures is added to reflect total vehicle losses from all causes. The rationale 
for these values is based on the gross failure and mission termination analysis presented in Section 5.3. 
F /O-F /S = Fail Operational-Fail Safe 
F/S = Fail Safe 
GWW = Gros s Liftoff Weight 
B = Booster 
0 = Orbiter 
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Volume VIII 
Vehicle Losses. Vehicle losses are not significantly affected for any of the configura-
tions shown. Reduction of the engine catastrophic ratio to less than 1% is required to 
meet the overall safety requirement. 
Recommendations. The recommended configuration is the 15-3 with F /O-F /S in the 
booster and F /S in the orbiter,. This configuration provides a significant decrease in 
mission losses approaching the allowable limit and achieves the safety criteria of 1/ 
1000 losses. 
An engine reliability of 0.99 (with a MTBF of 15 hours) with a 7% overthrust capa-
bility is recommended. With this provision the vehicle system can achieve staging 
with one engine out and is capable of safe return with two out. The orbiter is capable 
of safe return with one engine out after staging. On-orbit mission operations can 
be accomplished with one engine out and safe return to earth with two out. 
Vehicle losses can be held within requirements with a catastrophic ratio ~ 0.1% in 
a 15-3 arrang'ement and engine MTBF = 15 hours. 
An engine reliability of 0.99 is a reasonable performance goal for engine develop-
ment. Emphasis in the engine development program'should be in reducing engine 
catastrophic failures to not over 0.1% of total engine failures. 
5.7.8.2 FR-4 Configuration. Table 5-8 summarizes the FR-4 rocket engine study. 
Mission Losses. In order to approach a mission goal of 30 failures per 1000 flights, 
the 9-3-9 configuration with F/o-F/S and 13% overthrust for the boosters and FIS 
for the orbiter, with the c.:tendant engine reliability of O. 99, is required. Actually, 
in order to achieve a booster engine out fail-operational condition with 400,000 lb 
engine modules, a 10-3-10 configuration is needed with a gross liftoff weight in-
crease of~120,0100 pounds. Presently designed engine PU control capability cannot 
accommodate a 13% overthrust. 
Vehicle Losses. Vehicle losses are not significantly affected for any of the configura-
tions shown. Reduction of the engine catastrophic ratio to less than 1% is required 
to meet the overall safety requirement. 
Recommendation. The· recommended configuration is the 9-3-9 (actually 10-3-10) 
with F/O-F/S in the booster and F/s in the orbiter. This configuration provides a 
Significant decrease in nlission losses with a reasonable penalty. An engine relia-
bilityof 0.99 (with a MTBF of 15 hours) with a 13% overthrust capability is recom-
mended. With this provision the vehicle system can achieve staging with one engine 
out and be capable of safe return with two out. The orbiter is capable of safe return 
with one engine out after staging. On-orbit mission operations can be accomplished 
with one engine out, and safe return to Earth with two out. 
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Table 5-8. Summary of FR-4 Ro?ket Engine Study 
Losses/1000 Flights All Causes 
Engine Mission Vehicle (Safety) 
Engine Vehicle Overthrust Calculated With Assumed 
Engine Reliability GLOW Capability Engine Catas. Ratio 
Configuration Required (M Ib) (%) Calculated Allowable 1% 0.1% Allowable I 
9-3-9 0.99 4.92 0 110 30 1.53 0.72 1 
F/S in (B &0) 0.997 4.92 0 45 30 0.86 0.65 1 
9-3-9** 0.99* 5.04 13 34 30 1. 53 0.72 1 
F/O-F/S in 0.997 5.04 13 24 30 0.86 0.65 1 B; F/S in 0 I 
* Recommended configuration (from the standpoint of safety, low mission losses, and attainable engine reliability 
of 0.99) 
** The 13% overthrust is beyond the engine design limit .for PU control needed for fail operational mode and the 
constraint of using a 400, OOO-Ib thrust engine model requires that two engines be added {one for each booster) 
to obtain a 13% overthr:ust capability (a 10-3-10 configuration). 
Note: A value of 20 mission losses/1000 flights for causes other than engines is added to losses caused by engine 
failures to express total mission losses from all causes. A value of 0.63 vehicle losses/1000 flights for : 
causes other than engines is added to losses caused by engine catastrophic failure to reflect vehicle losses 
from all causes. The rationale for these values is based on the gross failure and mission termination 
analysis presented in Section 5.3. 
F /O-F /S = Fail Operational-Fail Safe 
F /S = Fail Safe 
GLOW = Gross Liftoff Weight 
B = Booster 
o = Orbiter 
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vehicle losses can be held within requirements with catastrophic ratio ~ 0.1 % in a 
9-3-9 (10-3-10) arrangement and engine IVITBF = 15 hours. 
5.7.8.3 Comparison of Fail Safe and Fail-Operational/Fail-Safe Applied to Rocket 
Engines. Figure 5-29 describes the fail-safe and fail-operational/fail-safe concepts. 
Table 5-9 shows aborted missions, and costs when fail-safe only is applied to the 
booster and the orbiter. The number of engines required, T /W, and prnbability of 
loss of engines are also shown. Table 5-10 shows the application of fail-operational/ 
fail-safe to the booster engines. Two approaches to providing performance T /W are 
shown: overthrust and throttling. 
Table 5-11 shows weight and cost penalties for fail-operational/fail-safe for the over-
thrust and throttling approaches. 
The engine refurbishment cost estimates shown are tentative. It is conceivable that 
the application of 7% overthrust could be accomplished with essentially no refurbish-
ment. This is being determined by the engine manufacturer. 
Table 5-12 shows a comparison of overthrust with the throttling approach and fail-
safe versus fail-operational/fail-safe applied to the FR-3. If refurbishment costs 
can indeed be brought to zero then fail-operational/fail-safe will reduce cost of aborted 
mission $33,000,000 with 14 mission aborts. This compares with a cost of. 
$166,000,000 and 72 mission aborts using the fail-safe concept. Both approaches 
(i. e. , overthrust and throttling) results in reduced mission aborts and reduced cost 
when compared with utilizing the fail-safe concept. 
Adding an engine to the orbiter to obtain fail-operational/fail-safe during staging to 
orbit is not cost effective for either overthrusting or throttling (data not shown on table). 
The weight penalty for adding an engine to the orbiter is on the order of 1/4 million 
pounds. 
5.8 FINAL VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS RELATIVE TO SAFETY, ABORT, AND 
MISSION SUCCESS 
5.8.1 FR-3 VEHICLE CHARACTERISTICS. The safety and reliability characteristics 
of the FR-3 are summarized in Table 5-13. Significant points are: 
a. The vehicle demonstrates a predicted high safety (intact abort success) of 0.999 
(110ss/1000 flights) if engine catastrophic failures are ~ O. 1%. 
b. The mission reliability goal for the FR-3 is 0.970 (30 aborts/1000 flights). The 
predicted mission success using an engine reliability of 0.99 is ~O. 970 and using 
an engine reliability of 0.997, a 0.976 mission success probability is achieved. 
c. All mechanical/electrical subsystems provide F /O-F /S capability. 
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FAIL OPERATIONAL-FAIL SAFE 
(F 10)- (F /S) 
--------------------------------.-----~----------------------------CONCEPT #1 
(F/S) 
CONCEPT #2 
CRITICAL 
COMPONENT 
F AlLURE OF FIRST 
CRITICAL 
COMPONENT 
ABORT AND FLY 
HOME SAFE 
CONTINUE MISSION 
(F /O)-(F/S) 1-------------------------
FAILURE OF SECOND 
CRITICAL 
COMPONENT 
o 
ABORT AND FLY 
HOME SAFE 
Figure 5-29. Fail Safe and Fail Operational-Fail Safe Concepts 
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Table 5-9. Main Propulsion - F-S Versus F-O/F-S With F-S 
Only Applied to Booster and Orbiter 
Booster Orbiter 
Number of Rocket Engines 15 3 
Performance T /W 1. 386 1. 527 
Number of Engines Required for T /W 15 3 
Probability of Not Having Required 60/1000 flights 12/1000 flights 
Engines (i. e., one engine out) 
Aborted Missions/1000 Flights 60 12 
,. 
D.$ Aborted Missions $138M $28M 
$166 M Total 
Table 5-10. Main Propulsion - F-S Versus F-O/F-S With 
F-O/F-S Applied to Booster Only 
Booster* Orbiter Booster** 
Number of Rocket Engines 15 3 16 
Perlormance T /W 1.386 1.527 1. 386 
(with 14) (with 3) (with 15) 
Probability of One Engine Out 60 12 ~60 
Probability of Not Having Required Engines 2 12 2 
(i. e., two out on booster, lout on 
orbiter) 
Aborted Missions/1000 Flights 2 12 2 
~$ Aborted Missions $5M $28M $5M 
Overthrust (Overspeed) Required 7% - -
Throttling Required 
- - 0.93 
*With Overthrust (Overspeed); ** Throttled (Add One Engine) 
Orbiter 
3 
1.527 
(with 3) 
12 
12 
12 
$28M 
-
-
Table 5-11. Cost and Weight of Overthrust and Throttling for Fail-Operational/ 
Fail-Safe for Booster (M~in Propulsion) 
Booster* Orbiter Booster** Orbiter 
Engine Refurbishment Cost After Use in 
7% Overthrust (overspeed) 
@ 25% of Initial Cost $810M - - -
@ 5% $162M 
- - -
Weight Ado.ed to Engine, Thrust, Struc- - - 54K 
ture, etc. (GLOW), lb 
$ Added Weight 
- - $32M -
Added Engine 
- - 66M 
Thrust Structu.re, Propellant Feed, etc., 
- - 12M 
---110M 
.-
* With Overthrust; **With Throttling 
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Table 5-12. Overthrust/Throttling Cost Comparison 
$ 33M 33M 
~$ With Overthrust 
Ab9rted Missions 
Engine Refurbishment @25 810M @5%62M 
33M 
0% 0 
~$ With Throttling (Added Engine) 
Aborted Missions 
Added Weight + One 'Engine, etc. 
Fail/Safe, Booster 
and Orbiter 
~$ $166M 
Aborted Missions 72 
843M 
33M 
110M 
143 M 
195M 33M 
Fail-Operational/Fail-Safe, 
Booster & Fail Safe Orbiter 
With With 
Overthrust Throttling 
33M or 843M 143M 
14 14 
d. Once-around abort capability is achieved with up to three engines out during 
boost 1. The same capability is achieved with up to two engines out during 
boost 2. 
5.8.2 FR-3 VEHICLE OPERATIONS AND ABORT 
Operations (Mission Completion). The vehicle cluster will reach staging with one 
booster engine out. The minimum performance thrust-to-weight ratio is maintained 
by providing a 15-3 engine arrangement with engine overthrust capability ~7% or added 
booster engine in a 16-3 arrangement. In the 15-3 arrangement, when a booster en-
gine fails the remainllng 14 engines are stepped up 7% to give same initial total thrust. 
Some refurbishment of engines is required after this operation. For the 16-3 arrange-
ment, the 16 engines a.re normally throttled to 93%. Upon loss of an engine, the re-
maining 15 are advanced to 100%. 
On-orbit operational maneuvers for the three-engine orbiter are accomplished with 
one or even two engines out. The probability of loss of three engines in the orbiter 
is a negligible number; however, if this should happen, it is possible to de-orbit 
using the attitude control system. In summary then, the orbiter has F/o-F/s 
capability for the on-orbit maneuver. 
FR-3 Abort. Abort procedures for the FR-3 are essentially the same as for the 
FR-l vehicle. The number of mission aborts required is low because of the F I O-
F Is provision in the recommended vehicle which makes possible a 0.97 mission 
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Table 5-13. FR-3 Basic Vehicle Characteristics Relative to 
Safety, Abort, and Mission Success 
Payload 
Mission Time 
GLOW (gross liftoff weight) 
Rocket Engine Configuration 
T /W L. O. (one rocket engine out) 
T /W L. O. (two rocket engines out) 
T /WStaging (one rocket engine out) 
F /O-F /S Capability for rocket engines 
F /O-F /S Capability for subsystems 
"Once Around" Abort Capability With 
1 Rocket engine out (boost 1)* 
2 Rocket engines out (boost 1) 
3 Rocket engines out (boost 1) 
1 Rocket engine out (boost 2) 
2 Rocket engines out (boost 2) 
Intact Abort Capability 
Propellant Crossfeed 
Propellant Dump Provision 
50,0001b 
7 days 
* 4.32 x 106 1b 
** 15-3 (3 orbiter engines) 
1. 38 (with F /O-F /S - 7% overthrust) 
1. 2 (T /WL.O. required for 0/ A < 1. 2) 
1. 0 (T /Wstaging required for O/A <1. 0) 
Yes (for booster) No (orbiter) 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes at t~ 20 sec 
Yes 
Yes at t ~ 100 sec into boost 2 
Yes 
No 
No 
-
Initial Reliability Achieved Reliability Goals 
Goals (Predicted) 
For Reng = 0.99 For Reng = 0.997 
Safety (Intact 0.999 0.999 (1 108s/1000 flights) 0.999 (1 10s8/1000 flights) 
Abort Success) (1 loss/ >0.999 «110ss/1000 . >0. 999 «1 10ss/1000 
1000 flights) flights) flights) 
-
Mission 0.970 .. ~O. 97 (33 aborts/1000 >0.976 (24 aborts/1000 
Success (30 aborts/ flights) flights) 
1000 flights) 
....... ae 
;, i * 7% overthrust for rocket engines. 
** Alternate engine provision-GIJOW (4.38 X r06 1b - with engines thrnttled in booster 
- added engines in a 16-3 engine arrangement) 
. 
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reliability resulting in 33 mission aborts/1000 :flights, approximately 4/year based 
on 1000 flights/10 years. 
During liftoff to staging, loss of two engines will be cause for abort. The abort op-
tions for the FR-3 are also applicable to FR-1 (i.e., "once around" and intact abort). 
After staging, the orbiter will achieve a once-around the Earth abort maneuver 
and land at the launch site if an engine fails during staging to orbit. 
5.8.3 FR-·4 VEHICLE CHARACTERIS'rrCS. The safety and reliability characteris-
tics of the FR-4 are summarized in Table 5-14. Significant points are: 
a. Predicted mission relia.bility using an engine reliability of 0.99 is ~ 0.89. 
Using an engine reliability of 0.997, mission success is im:-roved to 0.95. 
b. Safety (intact abort success) goal is achieved with either engine reli.ability 
(0.99 or 0.997) if engine catastrophic failures are :;;0.1%. 
c. All mechanical/electrical subsystems have the fail-operational/fail-safe 
capability. 
d. "Once around" abort capability is achieved with up to three rocket engines out 
during boost 1. The same capability is achieved with up to two rocket engines 
out during boost 2. 
F /O-F /S for FR-4 boosters can be provided with a 10-3-10 arrangement as shown in 
Table 5-14 with weight penalty as shown. 
5.8.4 FR-4 OPERATIONS AND ABORT 
Operations (Mission Completion). The vehicle cluster with the 9-3-9 engine arrange-
ment cannot reach staging with one booster engine out. Loss of a booster engine will 
be cause to abort the mission. For the alternate engine arrangement (10-3-10) engines 
are normally throttled to ~ 91 %. In event of failure of an engine (in one booster) re-
maining 9 are advanced to 100% and the normal staging point is achieved. 
On-orbit operational man.euvers for the three-engine orbiter are the same as for the 
FR-3. 
FR-4 Abort. Abort procedures for the FR-4 are essentially the same as for the FR-1 
vehicle. The number of aborts is high because tn~re is no fail-operational/fail-safe 
provision. The abort options for the FR-1 are also applicable to the FR.-4 (i. e. , 
"once around" and intact abort). 
After staging, the orbiter will achieve a once-around the Earth abort maneuver and 
land at the launch site if an engine fails during staging to orbit. 
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Table 5-14. FR-4 Basic Vehicle Characteristics Relative to 
Safety, Abort, and Mission Success 
Payload 
Mission Time 
G LOW (gross liftoff weight) 
Rocket Engine Configuration 
T /W L. O. (one rocket engine out) 
T /W L. O. (two rocket engines out) 
T /WStaging (one rocket engine out) 
F /O-F /S Capability for rocket engine 
F /O-F /S Capability for subsystems 
"Once Around" Abort Capability With 
1 Rocket engine out (boost 1) 
2 Rocket engines out (boost 1) 
3 Rocket engines out (boost 1) 
1 Rocket engine out (boost 2) 
2 Rocket engines out (boost 2) 
Intact Abort Capability 
Propellant Crossfeed 
Propellant Dump Provision 
Initial 
Reliability 
Goals 
50,0001b 
7 days 
* 4. 92 X 106 lb 
**9-3-9 (3 orbiter engines) 
1.38 (T /WL. O~ 1.47 is required to 
reach staging) 
L 30 (T /W L. O. required for "once 
around" < 1. 3 ) 
O. 81 (T /W staging required for "once 
around" < 0.8) 
No (except for alternate)** 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes, at t :::::: 20 sec 
Yes 
Yes, at t :::::: 100 sec into boost 2 
Yes 
No 
No 
Achieved Reliability Goals 
(Predicted) 
--------"''''.~----t__-----------------------
Safety (Intact 
Abort Success) 
Mission 
Success 
0.999 
(1 loss/ 
1000 flights) 
0.970 
(30 aborts/ 
1000 flights) 
For Reng = 0.99 
*>0.999 «1 10ss/1000 
flights) 
*0.89 (110 aborts/1000 
flights) 
For Reng = O. 977 
*>0.999 «1 10ss/1000 
. flights) 
*0.95 (45 aborts/1000 
flights) 
** Alternate engine provision - GLOW 5.04 X 106 with F /O-F /S for boosters in a 
10-3-10 engine arrangement gives: safew (intact abort success) = 0.999 (110ss/ 
1000 flights), mission success = 0.97 (34 aborts/1000 flights). 
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